

A DISSERTATION
ON
JOHN NORRIS
OF BEMERTON,

SUBMITTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FACULTY OF
ROSTOCK FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph.D.

BY
FRED. J. POWICKE,
HATHERLOW, NR. STOCKPORT, ENGLAND.

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GEORGE PHILIP & SON, 32, FLEET STREET, LONDON.
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LIVERPOOL.



REFERENT:—PROFESSOR DR. VON STEIN.

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COMPRISING

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TO THE
REV. D. W. SIMON, Ph.D., D.D.,
PRINCIPAL OF YORKSHIRE COLLEGE, BRADFORD,
—ONE OF THE MOST INSPIRING OF TEACHERS—
THIS ESSAY,
LARGELY DUE TO HIS ADVICE AND ENCOURAGEMENT,
IS DEDICATED,
WITH SINCERE GRATITUDE AND RESPECT,
BY ONE OF HIS OLD SPRING HILL STUDENTS.



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SOME ACCOUNT OF JOHN NORRIS.

Outwardly, nothing could be simpler or tamer than Norris's life. Born in a Wiltshire village (1657); educated for five years at Winchester School (1671-6); for the next thirteen years (1676-89) resident in Oxford; then for two years Rector of Newton-St-Loe; and lastly Rector of Bemerton from 1691 till his death in 1711. That is all. Of course, it is possible to fill in the outline to some extent, but the additional facts are neither numerous nor striking. His was emphatically "a quiet life," rich and intense within, but self-secluded from active movement in the world, and from all the common paths of pleasure and ambition.

Collingbourne Kingston, near Marlborough, was the place of his birth, and its date was *2nd January 1657. Here, for some years his father—also named John—was Minister. (The title Minister should be noted. According to Walker, he took the place of an ejected Vicar, and was himself ejected at the Restoration. The man whose place he usurped was Leonard Alexander, and the man who succeeded Norris was Henry Bradshaw †. Probably, therefore, Norris was one approved by Cromwell's Friars (1653-4), and so to all appearances was a Puritan‡. After his removal from

* "1656-7. John ye sonne of Mr. John Norris, Minister. was born ye 2nd of January, baptised ye 12th of January." Extract from Register of Collingbourne Kingston. (Furnished me by the present Vicar).

† Jno. Norris Senr. "never was Vicar here; I believe he was not instituted—only a usurper. Leonard Alexander was Vicar till ejected, and was alive at the Restoration, but did not claim his living. (cp. Walker. Sufferings of the Clergy). Henry Bradshaw was instituted in 1661, on the resignation of Alexander." From letter of present Vicar.

‡ But see "List" of Norris's books for some further particulars of the father.

office, he still lived on at Collingbourne—not one or two years, but many; for his son John entered Winchester School in 1671, and the School Register shews that his home at the time was still Collingbourne. But the long years of suspension would seem to have brought the father to another mind, as regards nonconformity. This is suggested by the fact that he died * Rector (or Vicar) of Aldbourne, in the same county of Wilts, and is made as good as certain by the fact that he wrote “a Discourse† concerning a pretended Religious Assembling in Private Conventicles,” wherein “the unlawfulness and unreasonableness of it “is fully evidenced by several arguments.”

Of the boy's early days no trace remains except a fact which may be taken as further witness that the atmosphere of his home was Puritan, even strictly so. One of his first writings was a “Tractate”‡ against the “Decretum Absolutum,” and in the preface we find him saying that “ab ineunte “ætate et quasi cum materno lacti Præ-destinariæ “Doctrinæ Principia incantus hauseram.” He goes on to say that the doctrine thus instilled he did not question till he met a certain “vir pereruditus qui contrariæ sententiæ nomen dederat.” He then remained long in doubt, but at last grew impatient of his doubt, and applied himself zealously to an examination of the question, meditating day and night. Finally, he came to plant his feet firmly on the opinion he now holds.

One would like to know exactly the age when he went through this mental struggle. He must, however, have been quite young; for he was only twenty-five at the time of publishing the “Tract” which tells of it.

* 16th March, 1681.

† Published by Jno. Norris, Junr., in 1685. See Wood's *Athenæ Oxonienses*. (Wood mentions a monument to Norris Senr. at Albourne, but the present Vicar says there is none now, and no trace of Norris).

‡ 1682.

As already said, he entered Winchester School in 1671.* Here he spent five years, the ordinary term. "He was a Commoner at the beginning, and then got a Scholarship on the nomination of the Bishop of Winchester, Visitor of the College, who, by courtesy but not by law, used from time to time to recommend boys for Scholarships."

We get a glimpse into the round of his life when we are told that "before the year 1707 the scholars used to sleep in truckle beds; that at 5 a.m. the Prefect of the chamber gave the order to rise; that then the boys repeated some Latin Psalms before dressing, combed their hair and made their beds (till 1540 they had only bundles of straw), said private prayers, and then went to study or class."†

The course of study in Norris's day is not easy to determine precisely; but it was, in the main, classical. And that Norris took to the classics kindly is made evident by his own testimony: for in after years he wrote, "I myself had my education in a very eminent School, that of Winchester, where I made no small proficiency in Classick Learning, as 'tis call'd; and I have since plied it very hard and run through all the criticisms of it." He lets us know, at the same time, that one of the books given him to study was "*Ovid de Arte Amandi*," and quotes the fact as putting a point to his complaint that this sort of learning is vain—or worse; nay, he does not "understand upon what principle, either of prudence or piety, such books as these should be read by *any*, but especially by boys; nor why such pains should be taken and so much diligence used to make them understand 'em."‡ Winchester was designed by its

* "John Norris appears as 13th of a roll of 14 in the year 1671. Norris John (13) Collingbourne, Wilts. A Commoner. Nominated by Bishop Morley. S."—From Letter, to me, of Rev. H. J. Hardy, Winchester College.

† Adams' *Life of Wykeham*, p. 83.

‡ *Reflections on Conduct of Human Life*. iii, § 43, p. 254.

founder as a preparatory school for New College, * Oxford. Year by year, therefore, a public examination takes place, when the vacant Scholarships at New College are filled by the Warden from among the most promising boys. The entry relating to Norris in the School Register, has at the end the letter S. This means "that he was *superannuated* in the ordinary course of things, and did not succeed in getting a New College Scholarship." † He was, then, not ranked among the few boys held to be deserving of the first place. Neither was Bishop Ken, who, just twenty years before, failed in the same way ; but, like Ken, he may have been—indeed was—a good scholar.

He lost no time between closing his school, and commencing his university, life. In Michaelmas term, ‡ 1676, he became sojourner of Exeter College. Oxford was not what it had been in the Commonwealth period, and Exeter College shared in the decline. Under Cromwell, John Conant was its rector, and he made the College famous for learning and discipline. § The Restoration put an end to both alike, and brought in a reign of "drinking and duncery." Even Anthony Wood, strong Royalist as he was, deploras the fact that the aim of the students generally "is not to live as students ought to do, viz :—temperate, abstemious, and plain and grave in their apparel ; but to live like gentry, to keep dogs and horses, to turn their studies into places to keep bottles, to swagger in gay apparel and long periwigs." When Norris came to Oxford, indeed, Exeter had a decent Rector. But it could still be said, some years later, that "Exeter is totally spoiled." Norris, of course, was one of the few who settled down to steady work.

* William of Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester, founded St. Mary's College, Winchester, (1382-93), and also "St. Mary Winton College," Oxon, afterwards called 'New.'

† Letter of Mr. Hardy.

‡ Wood's *Athenæ Oxonienses*.

§ See Clarke's "Oxford Colleges," (p. 82).

In his day, the curriculum meant (1) a two years' course of college and public lectures on Logic, Classics, Rhetoric, Moral Philosophy, Mathematics, Theology (as far as a general knowledge of dogmas of the Church and of the New Testament), Exercises under the Dean of the College, Disputes as Respondent and Opponent. (2) Then followed an Examination in College and presentation for B.A. Then an University Examination. Then the Degree Ceremony.* Norris received his degree on June 15, 1680†.

The same year sees him made a Fellow of All Souls' College, where he presently went on to M.A., his "declamation" for it in the Schools having as its theme "a commending of the Roman Senate for their banishing all mathematicians out of their dominions."‡

How came he to get an All Souls' Fellowship? In answering this question, the date is important. For more than a hundred years an evil practice called "corrupt resignations" had prevailed in the College. "A member of the College, when about to vacate his fellowship, not unfrequently had some friend or relation whom he wished to succeed him. This candidate he naturally pushed and supported at the annual election on All Souls' Day. It came to be the tacit custom of the College to elect candidates so supported; for each Fellow, when voting for an outgoing Colleague's nominee, remembered that he himself would some day wish to recommend a protégé for election in a similar manner. The right of nomination, being once grown customary, soon grew into a monstrous abuse, for unscrupulous Fellows, when about to vacate their places, began to hawk their nominations about Oxford, etc."§ Such was the practice of corrupt resignations. Various

* See Huber's *English Universities*, Vol. ii. (translated by F. W. Newman.)

† Anthony Wood's 'Fasti Oxonienses.'

‡ So Wood—who says the "Declamation" was printed with Norris' "Tractatus ad Decretum Absolutum," after the 3rd Chapter, but it is not in the "Bodleian" copy of the Tractatus, the only one I am acquainted with.

§ Clark's "Colleges of Oxford" (1891), p. 217.

unsuccessful attempts had been made to stop it. At length it was put down by Warden Jeames.

"The fight came to a head in 1680-1, when Jeames, for two years running, used his veto to prevent the election of all candidates nominated by resigners."* It is certain, then, that Norris did not owe his Fellowship to nomination by a resigner. Either he was elected by the Visitor,† who, in the case of vacancies occasioned by the exercise of the veto, had power to fill them up, or he was elected in the regular way by the existing Fellows. In either case, the election was a tribute to his academical merit.‡

His next step was to take 'holy orders,' and then it becomes natural to see him occupying from time to time an Oxford Pulpit, that of All Souls, *e.g.*, or of St. Peter's Church § in the East. How he impressed people as a Preacher I find nothing to shew, but they cannot have helped feeling that, at any rate, he was practical. Thus, on one occasion, he is standing before the members of his own College in the College Chapel, and is speaking to them on the reasons "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary" which men have for praising God. Yours, he says, are "extraordinary." For you are here set amid circumstances which "invite you to," and "further you in," the richest kind of life. "Here your thoughts are your own, and so is your *time*, too, wherein to employ them." "Here you have solitude, Retirement and Leisure, and so may serve God without distraction and without disturbance." Here, "in short, your very profession is to be Religious; you live in a place where the order of the morning and evening sacrifice is duly observed, where you have stated hours of Prayer and Thanksgiving to serve God in

* Clark's "Colleges of Oxford" (1891), p. 226.

† At this time, Archbishop Sancroft.

‡ An All Souls' Fellowship is still a 'blue ribbon' in the University.

§ At St. Peter's he preached "before the University," the Sermon dedicated to Henry More, 29th March, 1685. There is a Sermon preached at All Souls' in the "second volume of the Discourses"—no date; but before 1690, and so most likely during residence there.

publick, and all the rest of your time is one continued opportunity of serving Him in private."
 "And as you here enjoy all the advantages of serving God in the way of a contemplative life, so you have here, also, all the advantages of fitting yourselves to serve both Him and the publick in an active life whenever you shall be called to it. For besides that, what makes you good and religious here, serves to make you useful and serviceable hereafter—a Pious and well principled education being the best preparative for a life of Publick action and employment; besides this, you have all the advantages of learning that *Books* and conversation, and leisure to use them well, can possibly afford: so that there is no Employment or Profession, either in Church or State, either Spiritual or Secular, but you have the best helps . . . to fit yourselves for."* Evidently the preacher knew how to speak straight home to his hearers. His words, too, are interesting, as letting us see his own way of taking life at Oxford, and his appreciation of its advantages.

He continued at All Souls' for nine years, and gradually grew to be known inside and outside the University as a writer on various subjects. First, he translated Robert Waryng's "*Effigies amoris*," and published his rendering of it under the title of "*A Picture of Love unveiled*." Love is here used in a Platonic sense, and is treated of in a sort of Rhapsody—a fact which may account for Norris's interest in it. His Platonic tastes likewise led him—in the same year, 1682—to make a Latin translation of "*Hierocles upon the Golden verses of the Pythagoreans*." A year later, in what he called a "*Murnival of knaves*," he had a fling at the Whigs†—declaring, however, in

* See Sermon in Vol. II. of Discourses.

† The nickname had but lately come into vogue, and, having been first "fastened on the Presbyterian zealots of Scotland," would in England instinctively suggest "Dissent." See Macaulay, Vol. I., cap. ii.

the Dedication, that he is aiming "only against the Dissenters." The lines

"Have you not heard a squeaking ape
Tire the Gods with shrill-mouthed gape," etc.,

are sufficient to reveal its calibre. Norris was not naturally coarse, but the violence of party spirit in those days, especially when 'Religion' was concerned, could sometimes make him so.

In the same year appeared the Tractate already referred to. "Upon the first coming out of this book, the author (a conceited youngster) was looked upon as over pert, bold, and pragmatically daring to engage in so profound a controversy by publishing his little and raw judgment concerning the said decree." * Anthony Wood does not say how many there were who so "looked upon" him. But one can well believe that his tone, always—when he felt sure of his ground—distinct and inclining to the dogmatic, might repel not a few who may have agreed with him that the "*Decretum absolutum*" was nothing less than "*Religionis omnis internecivum venenum*," † In 1684 he opened and carried on a correspondence with Henry More, whose printed writings he had studied himself, and induced the authorities of All Souls' to place in the College Library. Boundless is the admiration he feels for the Cambridge Mystic, and the old man replies with all the gracious humility and sweetness which won him so much love. About this time, also, letters began to pass between him and Damaris Cudworth‡—not yet, it would seem, Lady Masham of Oates, but living with her learned father at Cambridge. A sentence in the letter dedicating to her his essay on the "Theory and Regulation of Love," gives the impression that the first

Wood wrote thus, but the words were suppressed by Bishop Tanner (the antiquary).—See Bliss's "*Athenæ*," Vol. IV. 585.

+ The correspondence is at the end of the essay on the "Theory and Regulation of Love."

‡ Born 18th January, 1659; became second wife of Sir Francis Masham in 1685 (Fox Bourne's "*Life of Locke*," Vol. II., p. 210.

advance, as in the nature of the case was likely, came from her—this namely; “For I was hence led to conclude that if anything of mine could afford you pleasure and entertainment when you had no other interest in it than in the Common Light of the Sun, much more would it be acceptable if made yours by some peculiar Right and Property;” which seems to mean that she had read with pleasure what writings of his had come in her way, and had written to tell him so. *Letters then went and came on points, no doubt, of moral or philosophic interest, until, in 1688, he dedicated to her the book just named. As we learn from† her own book on a similar Theme, Norris’s did not altogether please her. One who reads the book will hardly wonder at this. He will be disposed to think, too, that she cannot quite have relished the palpable flattery of the dedication, wherein her Ladyship is told that she is a person “whom Nature” and her “own curiosity have conspired to accomplish beyond what the present can parallel, or” (unless she will be pleased to publish a book) “the future will ever believe.” Nay, he will even think that she may have asked herself whether certain words toward the end of the book did not mask a ‘broad hint’ unworthy of the writer. The words are these:—“Thus, had I the disposal of an Ecclesiastical Benefice, which is a thing in which the good of the publick is highly concerned—I ought certainly to bestow it on him who I thought would do most good in it, though at the same time I had never so many friends and relations that wanted it.” Norris may have written this in all simplicity; but coming from man just then in want of a Benefice, to a woman who may have had it within her power to give, or get one for, him—it is difficult to imagine her

* The evidence for this is indirect, but seems conclusive. Chalmers in his *Biographical Dictionary*, gives the date, 1684 for the beginning of the correspondence.

† Discourse concerning the Love of God. 1696.

reading it without something of a shock. In a few years, the friendship—if it ever deserved the name—had ceased. The * next book to which he put her name pleased her less than the first, owing chiefly to the way he dilated on some complaint of the eyes that endangered her sight. He tried to make amends by cancelling all reference to her eyes in a later edition. But the mischief was done. Besides, the devotion she grew to feel toward Locke † was not at all compatible with continued admiration for the ‘English Malebranche.’

Turning back to his Oxford life, we get a little more light upon him in connection with the ‘Miscellanies’ which came out, enlarged, in 1687.

The high-handed dealings of James the Second with some of the Oxford Colleges, are matters of general history—particularly his action at University College, at Christ Church, and at Magdalen. All Souls came off easily, but not unscathed. “Warden Jeames died in 1686‡ and every one expected and dreaded an attempt to force a Papist Head on the College. What happened was almost as bad. There was in the foundation a very Junior Fellow—only elected in 1682—named Leopold Finch, son of the Earl of Winchelsea, whose riotous outbreaks§ and habitual fits of inebriety had done much to embitter Jeames’ last years of rule. Finch was a hot Tory, and when, on the outbreak of Monmouth’s rebellion, the University proposed to raise

* “Conduct of Human Life,” 1689-90.

† See Letter of Locke to her brother—Thomas Cudworth—April 27th, 1688, as showing how early the acquaintance of Locke with the family began. Locke, writing to Limboreu (13th March, 1690-1), says—“From reading, to which she once devoted herself with much assiduity, she is now to a great extent debarred by the weakness of her eyes, but this defect is abundantly supplied by the keenness of her intellect, etc.” *Life* by Fox Bourne, Vol. II., p. 213.

‡ Clark’s Oxford. p. 226-7.

§ Cp. Anthony Wood’s “Diary” under date June 6th, 1681—“Mr. Leopold Finch, etc., had been drinking at the Crown Tavern, and on their way home plucked old Lady Lovelace out of her coach, and called her old protesting bitch, and broke windows that night, and did many misde-meauours.”

a regiment of trained bands for the King, was one of the leaders in the movement. He enlisted a company of Musketeers from members of All Souls' and Merton, and this company was the only part of the University battalion that actually took the field. It's not very glorious record of service consisted in occupying Islip for ten days, to secure the London Road, and stop all transit of suspicious persons. When the news of Sedgemoor came, Lord Abingdon bade the company dine with him at Rycot, and they came home "well fuzzed with his ale," insomuch that their very drum was stove in, and remains to this day, stored, with one of the muskets borne by the volunteers, in All Souls' Bursary. Finch, then, had nothing to recommend him save this military exploit—which attested his Toryism—"his good birth, and his notorious looseness of life and conscience." But the King nominated him as Warden. The Fellows, though refusing to elect Finch in due form, let him take possession, and Warden he contrived to remain till he died in 1702—with the bailiffs in his house.

The bearing of this on Norris becomes apparent, when we find that Finch was the man to whom he chose to dedicate his 'Miscellanies.' He once wrote "that the supreme Magistrate is not subject to the sanction of the law" *; and, how reverence for the kingly office could blind him to the personal character of the King, we see by his † "Pastoral Ode on the Death of His Sacred Majesty King Charles II.," where, in the affected style then common, he compares that virtuous Monarch to "Pan," whose "gentle Hand secured the World from Harm, and for whose loss all Nature mourned." But, for his own part, he has 'Discharged his Care' in reflecting that

"the Royal Stock does yield.

Another Pan (*i.e.*, James II.) to patronise the Field."

* Letter on Schism, p. 308.

† In *Miscellanies*.

Such extravagance of loyalty will explain a good deal. It will explain, *e.g.*, how Norris could accept the nomination of Finch to the Wardenship without a word, because made by the King. But something more is needed to explain the deliberate selection of Finch for a Patron, and the sort of language he uses in addressing him :—

Sir,* The Greatness of your Quality and Personal Worth, consider'd with that Happy Relation which has further endeared you to us, gives you so Just a Title to these Performances, that I could not, without a heinous Alienation, devote them to any other patron ; and therefore, however my boldness may be tax'd for making you so disproportionable a Present, yet certainly I should have incurr'd more dishonour by with-holding a debt ; and Presumption is less crime than Injustice.

Sir, 'tis by your kind Patronage and Protection (next to the favourable influences of a good Prince) that our studies prosper, and our Laurels thrive and flourish, and that any of us are in a capacity to throw in the least symbol into the Muses Exchequer. To whom then should the Fruits of this Sacred ground be offer'd, but to that Sun by whose genial influences they grow and ripen ?

To you, therefore, I humbly present this Collection of Miscellanies, for the entertainment of your leisure hours, which were composed in some of mine. I shall not beg your Protection any farther than you shall find it worthy of it. I am only concern'd that you should hence conclude how well your (now more than over fortunate) Society stands affected towards you, particularly how much you are honour'd and esteemed by, Sir,

Your humble and most obedient Servant.

Evidently there was, at this time, something of the sycophant in Norris, with all his unworldliness. Indeed, he never ceased to manifest an undue deference to rank and authority. But it should be remembered, by way of excuse, that in his view rank and authority were Divine Facts, institutions ordained of God. This was the prevalent opinion among the Tories and High Churchmen to whom Norris be-

* In the "stereotyped" Edition of 1706, this dedication is omitted.

longed ; and it enables us to understand the ease with which they accommodated themselves to the changes—despotic or revolutionary—that went forward in Church and State, as well as the compliancy of their tone toward the powers that happened to *be*.

In 1689 he married* and resigned his Fellowship. In the same year he became Rector of Newton St. Loe, a “beautiful village” on the Avon, between Bath and Bristol (in Somersetshire). The presentation to the living was from Joseph Langton, Esq., Lord of the Manor, who seems always to have remained his very good friend. † The first fruits of this “country retirement” was the letter to Lady Masham, entitled “Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life.” It is mentioned here because it acquaints us, near the end, with an interesting reminiscence and resolution. ‡ “I have now spent,” he says, “thirteen years in the most celebrated University in the World, and, according to the ordinary Measures, perhaps not amiss, having accomplished myself in a competent degree, both with such learning as the Academical Standard requires, and with whatever else my own Private Genius inclined me to. But truly, I cannot say that I have ordered my Studies in that Theatre of Learning, so much to my own satisfaction as to my Reputation with others. To be free with you, I must declare, that when I reflect upon my past Intellectual Conduct, I am as little satisfied with it as I am with that of my morals ; and that I think I have nigh as much to answer for the Former, as I have for the Latter, being very conscious that the greatest part of it has been employ’d in Unconcerning Curiosities, such as derive no Moral Influence upon the Soul that contemplates them.

* His wife’s Christian name was Elizabeth, but I can find nothing about her family or family name.

† See Dedication to Discourses, Vol. I.

‡ In the “Conclusion,” p. 257.

"But I have now (if I sufficiently understand myself) a very different Taste and Apprehension of things, and intend to spend my uncertain remainder of Time in studying only such things as make for the Moral Improvement of my Mind, and the Regulation of my life, not being able to give an account upon any rational and consistent Principles why I should study anything else. More particularly, I think I shall chiefly apply myself to the Reading of such Books as are rather Persuasive than Instructive, such as are Sapid, Pathetick and Divinely-relishing; such as warm, kindle, and enlarge the interior, and awaken the Divine Sense of the Soul, as considering with myself that I have now, after so much Reading and Speculation, more need of Heat than of Light."

Her Ladyship will perhaps say he is "already countryfy'd" since leaving the University; and true it is that he has now "got into a little corner of the world where" he "must be more company to" himself "than he has been ever yet." But, however these new thoughts may have been occasioned, he is sure that they are "entertained upon the deepest and severest consideration." The influence which really did most to produce this change of mind is visible on almost every page—I mean, Malebranche, whose disregard for what he esteemed vain learning, and whose love of retirement, are well known.*

† In illustration, once for all, of his love for Malebranche, may be quoted here the words in which he commended him, a year or two later, to his children. After advising them to "imploy what vacant hours they have from things of higher importance," in the study of the Cartesean and the experimental Philosophy—especially the former—he goes on to say, "but if you would have a book that is alone a Library, and an ever-rising and flowing spring

* See cp. *De Inquirenda Veritate*. iv, 6, 7, 8.

† See "Spiritual Counsel to my children," 43.

of knowledge, that ought never to be out of your hands, but always to be read, studied, felt and fed upon till it be digested, made your own, and converted as it were into the very substance of your souls, let me recommend to you M. Malebranche "*de la Recherche de la Verite*," a Book (though for some considerable while extant) but little known, and whose worth is less understood ; which the falsely Learned hate, because they cannot endure its Light ; and yet of such excellent and universal use that 'tis great Pity any Study should be without it, or any Person ignorant of it that is capable of understanding it. For, indeed, to speak out what I think.....I take it to be one of the best Books that is in the World ; and that of all human composures, that does better serve the interests of Truth and of True Religion."

He lived at Newton till sometime in 1691—not very contentedly, it would seem : for in bringing out the first volume of his discourses, he says, *"*I am afraid (wherever the fault lies) that it will not be my happiness to be able to do that good where I am, which I might have done in some other station. Which makes me the more frequent in publick, that I may supply this defect by the service of my pen, having some reason to hope that my discourses will meet with better liking abroad than they usually do at home ; and that there are some in the world to whom I shall not be a Barbarian.*"

Did he then seem a Barbarian to his parishioners ? And does this mean that, when he preached, they found it hard to understand him ? If so, the fact was not so very surprising.† His sermons are indeed excellent, and would be clear enough to a cultivated hearer. But with their long words and sentences ;

*Preface to Reader.

† cp. "*The Sermons of Jeremy Taylor, with their splendid decorations of antique learning, excited not a livelier feeling of surprise in his rustic auditors in Wales than the cottagers of Bemerton must have experienced while listening to the harmonious eloquence of Norris.*" R. Willmott's *Pictures of Christian Life*, p. 158.

their strict logical arrangement; their learned references and quotations, they must often have been bewildering to the rustic mind. No doubt he tried to act upon the * wise advice which he gave to his brother clergy in the Abbey Church, at Bath, soon after settling in the neighbourhood. Perhaps, too, he thought the effort successful, and that the people of Newton must be unusually dull. But, in truth, his mental structure and habits set, and kept, him more or less aloof from the thoughts and ways of simple folk.

In 1691, we see him translated by favour of the Earl of Pembroke to Bemerton, near Salisbury (or Sarum), in his native county of Wiltshire. What "procured him" this 'Rector,' we are told, was his † Distinguished Merit: which was likely enough in the case of a patron so appreciative of learning and goodness as the Earl. "This living," we are told further, "came very seasonably to his growing family, its value being upwards of £200; and was the more acceptable for the easiness of the parochial duty, which gave him leisure to make an addition to his revenue by the fruits of his genius, the activity of which produced a large harvest that continued to increase till 1710." ‡ Norris's own account is different. In a letter to Dr. Charlett, § of Oxford, || he says, "I might be glad,

* July 30th, 1689. He advises them to preach (1) nothing but what is true, (2) useful truths, (3) plain truths, (4) in a plain and intelligible manner.

† Chalmer's Dictionary.

‡ See Biographia Britannica. According to Walker (in his *Sufferings of the Clergy*), the income in the interval between Herbert and Norris was £140. The net income now is about £400.

§ 1655-1722. He and Norris lived near each other in boyhood, for Charlett's father was rector of Collingbourne Ducis (Wilts). He was also at Oxford all through Norris's time, and died there, as Master of University College, in 1722. He was nicknamed "the Gazetteer, or Oxford Intelligencer," from his love of gossip. He delighted in correspondence. There are many references to him in Bliss's "*Reliquiæ Hearnianæ*." See, too, Wood's "*Athenæ*," Vol. III., 1161. He has been identified with the "Abraham Froth" of the "*Spectator*," No. 43.

|| This letter is dated April 9th, 1707. Dr. Charlett seems to have suggested that Norris should print 'another impression' of a 'little tract' of his, and to have asked his support for some scheme started by Bishop Sanderson. Norris replies that he is 'insufficient' for it, that his stock of health will not serve, that he has no leisure, that he doesn't quite agree with the scheme, and that he has other designs on hand.

perhaps, to be a little easier in the World, which, indeed, is but strait and hard with me, the clear Income of my parsonage not being much above three score and ten pounds, all things discharged." The last three words may explain the discrepancy. The nominal or gross income was £200, but "all things discharged," the net income was little more than £70. As to the additional income gained from the sale of his books, it can hardly have been very great; for not more than half-a-dozen of his works went beyond the first edition, and the later editions even of these were reached after his death. Here, in a scene as peaceful as heart could desire, he spent the remaining twenty years of his life. No doubt he occupied the Rectory House, built by George Herbert, on whose front the poet had caused to be inscribed the lines :—

If thou chance for to find
A new house to thy mind,
And built without thy cost,
Be good to the poor,
As God gives thee store,
And then my labour's not lost.

A pretty stream, tributary to the Avon, flows at the foot of the Rectory grounds. Opposite the House, on the other side of the road, stands the Church, one* of the smallest in England. The first entry in the Parish Register tells us that, "on March 31 (o.s.), 1632, Mr. George Herbert, Esq., Parson of Fugglestone and Bemerton, was buried on the North side of the Altar, but no monument,"

Under date 19 April, 1693, we read :—"Baptized Edward Norris, son of John Norris and his wife Elizabeth."

* It has 30 sittings, is 44 ft. 5 in. long, and 14 ft. wide. The Church is dedicated to St. Andrew, and has a low wooden turret. It was restored in 1866.

There is now a new Church as well, called the "Herbert Memoria Church."

The full name of the Rectory is Bemerton-cum-Fugglestone, Fugglestone being a small village three miles away.

The second entry about Norris, and the last, is "1711, 5th February, Mr. John Norris was buried."*

Herbert's ministry lasted two years, and Norris's ten times as long ; but their personal record in the Church Book is equally brief, while in the memory of men the record of Norris has faded altogether before that of Herbert. There is, perhaps, nothing unjust or surprising in this. For Herbert certainly had more personal charm than Norris ; and, besides, he spent himself entirely on behalf of his flock, moving among them day by day with the desire ever burning in his heart to realize his own lofty ideal of the "Parish Priest : " whereas Norris, however punctual and dutiful he might be in the doing of parochial work, was sure to feel far less at home in it than in his study—whither he would fly as often, and where he would stay as long, as possible. This is not mere conjecture or inference from his known disposition. Take, *e.g.*, the following curious passage in his preface to the second Vol. of the "Ideal World." He is regretting that he had not been able to keep at it so constantly, or get it done so soon, as he wished, and says, "it is those who enjoy abundance of leisure, and are retired from the noise of of the World, and have their Time at their own disposal, as Religious Persons, Fellows of Colleges and above all Private Countrymen," who can do "what they please" in the way of intellectual work. . . . "But we that want these advantages, who have parochial cures to depend upon, whose Hands are full, whose Engagements great, whose Interruptions many, who live in Noise and Hurry, much to others and little to ourselves, and whose Time is rendered yet more short for want of Health to employ it, we must do not as we would, but as we can." † One

* See Sir Richard Colt Hoare's History of Wiltshire (1825, June). Vol. I., p. 11.

† Bemerton's "noise and hurry" seemed a real grievance to him ; thus, in the letter to Dr. Charlett, he says—"of leisure I have very little, not only by reason of my parochial charge, but also because of the company

does not easily associate "noise and hurry" with Bemerton. But the coming and going of his neighbours, and the inevitable claims of parish work even in so small a place, might be apt to seem such to one who never felt less lonely than when alone.

Scarcely a single incident of the sort that gives vivid colour to a life has been handed down concerning Norris; probably there was none to hand down. Days, weeks, months, years, were linked each to each—so one imagines—by the same recurrent round of outward commonplace. * "Bene latuit" are among the words on his tombstone. They tell how his life appeared to those—whether friends in the village or distant admirers—who joined to do him honour. And they tell the exact truth.

He did, however, come into touch now and then with the world. For instance, his Bishop was Burnet,† and once, at least, we can picture the two face to face—when Norris preached a brave sermon‡ before him "in the Cathedral Church at Sarum"—"at his visitation held there September 2nd, 1692." His subject was "that the Law was not made void through Faith;" and the good Bishop must surely have listened with keen sympathy while the Preacher indignantly brushed aside the "empty notional way of preaching up the Doctrine of Faith in Christ," and

I am exposed to, and the multitude of visits wherewith I am continually interrupted and engaged." And again, in the same letter, "what is £70 in a dear country and so public a place, being so near a great town and a great road, where I am exposed to so much company from all parts." Here it appears that the company were a drain on his income. Seven years earlier (June 6, 1700) he had written to Corinna (Lady Wharton) in the same strain—"You cannot imagine what a hurry my life is, and what little command I have of my Time, which, instead of being free and entire for my own use and the service of my friends, is lost and dispensed among a company of strangers, to whose visits I am continually exposed, an unhappiness which I can more easily lament than remedy, but which my friends I hope will forgive."

* *Johannes Norris Parochiæ hujus Rector ubi annos 20 bene latuit curæ Pastoralis et Literis vacans, Quo in recessu bene posuit. Late Jam per orbem sparsa Ingenii parvis ac Pictatis monumenta. Obiit anno* (Dm. 1711, ætatis 54).

† (1643-1715). Bishop from 1689.

‡ Vol. III. of Discourses,

laid it down that "*he* preaches Christ best that insists most upon the necessity of obedience to his commands ; and *he* makes the best Christians that makes the best men ; and then is the Gospel most truly represented when it is so set forth as to be an establishment of the Law." But, however friendly Burnet may have been to Norris on this occasion, and for a time, he was not so always—as Norris himself says "somewhat plaintively" in the letter to Dr. Charlett already quoted.* On this point it has been said—"more light is needed." If the demand is for light on the particular causes and circumstances of the unfriendliness, none such seems to be forth-coming. But is any "needed" beyond the fact that the two were of incompatible temper and principles? Burnet, *e.g.*, "was tolerant both to Non-Jurors and to Presbyterians to a degree which roused the anger of all extreme men." He could say of himself, "I was moved never to be silent when Toleration should be brought into debate, for I have long looked on liberty of conscience as one of the rights of human nature, antecedent to Society, which no man could give up, because it was not in his power."† Imagine him, then, reading such words as these ; and finding them, with many more to the like effect, sustained on grounds abstract and scholastic:—"I believe there ought to be no such thing as a Toleration, and that 'tis more than either the Church or the State can rightfully grant. For, not to insist upon that Trust which seems to be reposed in them, to defend and support Unity of Faith and

* "The Bishop of Salisbury I find, and am also well informed from those who well know his mind in that matter, is absolutely resolved I shall never have anything here."

† He permitted him to starve within sound of his Cathedral bells"—Hugh James Rose (one of the Leaders of the Oxford movement): quoted by Wilmott, who says Rose was a zealous admirer of Norris. Nichols, in his *Literary Anecdotes*, Vol. I, p. 639, says the following was told by Rev. Thos. Colborne. "You are happy, Sir, in this delightful prospect," said Mr. Colborne as he and Mr. Norris looked towards Salisbury from Bemerton. "Yes" said Mr. Norris, "it is all the prospect I have with respect to that Cathedral."

‡ Burnet's speech, 1703, in opposing the Bill against "occasional Non-conformity."

Unity of Worship ; if there ought to be a Toleration, then there ought to be no Establishment (for to what purpose is an Establishment whose order must never be executed ?)" In fine, "Absolute and Universal Liberty of conscience is a downright contradictory, inconsistent supposition ; which one Consideration, by the way, is sufficient to overthrow all that a late author* has pleaded in its behalf."† Other things as well may have tended to cause estrangement on the Bishop's part, but in default of these there seems to be enough in the single fact here made clear—remembering its intensely practical bearing at the time—to account for it.

For the rest, Norris's relation to the 'World' is revealed to us only by the successive appearance of his books, with the correspondence and controversies they called forth. His controversies were numerous. He wrote against the Quakers, against the Dissenters, against the impugnors of his teaching on "the Love of God," against Locke's "hypothesis," against the Deists and against Dodwell's doctrine of Immortality. A writer of such decided and sometimes of such singular opinions—so frankly, clearly, and confidently uttered—was sure to be assailed. But it is strange, at first sight, that a man so meek should strike again. The explanation, however, is easy. For one thing, he was not by any means naturally meek. He became meek, as the Apostle John did, under the influence of his Christian Faith. And it is probable that the process of conversion was a long and hard one. Then, too, he was a man whose thoughts were all convincingly clear to himself, and were on subjects which he took to be of the greatest practical moment. Accordingly, he felt deeply about them ; he could not help expressing them ; and—in meeting objections, or clearing away misapprehensions, or amending and

* *i.e.*, Locke, whose first letter on Toleration appeared in 1689, and was welcomed by Burnet.

† Charge of Schism continued, p. 296-7.

expanding the argument—he seemed to his own mind simply a witness for the truth, and in fact, there was little or nothing personal in his aims. He was not animated by spite, or vanity, or self-seeking. And hence his writings exhibit none, or scarcely any, of the fury and bitterness which so commonly disfigure the controversial works of the period. They are, on the contrary, vigorous without being vulgar, and perfectly candid without forgetting the Law of Charity. And so we can believe him sincere when he says he does not “love controversy”; and when he advises his children against it—for “’Tis a thing of great Labour and but little profit, there being not so much truth gain’d by it as will compensate for the loss of Charity. For that which the world is pleased to call controversy is generally little else than a Litigious wrangle, proceeding upon Darkness and Obscurity, fallacies and equivocations, double acceptation of words, and Confusion of Ideas; from Men’s mistaking and misstating the thing in Question, from misunderstanding of the Point, of themselves, and of one another. And while men do so, they may dispute for ever, without knowing when they agree, or when they differ. Leave, therefore, these wranglers to enjoy the Dust which they raise, and while they Dispute, do you learn to Live.”*

Much of his controversial writing took the form of letters to persons unknown; but all his correspondence was not controversial. He had admirers from the first, oftenest among the ladies, and when any of these wrote to him he was always ready to respond. Belonging to the Bemerton period are the † letters to and from Mistress Mary Astell. She was a devoted disciple, and he was a delighted teacher. Her enthusiastic acceptance of his views would be all the more grateful to him, because they were so generally despised; and his warm eulogies of herself and her

* A Father’s advice to his children. § 43.

† Letters on the Love of God, 1694: see abstract of these in ‘List of Books.’

writing would be very sweet to one whose "Serious Proposal to the Ladies" brought upon her so much unmerited blame and suspicion. Another correspondent was "Corinna"—a fanciful name assumed by Lady Wharton—an admirer who tries hard to understand his books, and is otherwise anxious to improve her mind. She, like Mary Astell, wrote the first letter, and sent him, at the same time, what he calls in his reply, "a very extraordinary and obliging present," (viz. : a copy of verses upon his own writings). He grants that she has "a pregnant genius for poetry"; yet he would advise her "to employ her great Force and Strength of Spirit in other company than that of the Muses, in more serious and useful studies." This leads her to ask his further "advice and instruction," which in his second letter he promises to give "when he knows better what her education has been hitherto," a promise kept in the third letter, when he sets her a course of reading which certainly agrees with his own resolution to read mainly for moral benefit; but is rather hard to reconcile with his complaint against those who do "nothing but read, read, as long as eyes and spectacles will hold—not regarding whether the head be clear, so that it be full." *

Corinna apparently had not seen her instructor face to face, for it is to her curiosity that we owe the single description of him ever, perhaps, written down; or at least, handed down. It is a letter † from Marissa—another veiled lady—to Corinna. "He is a little man of a pale complexion. but he has a great deal of sweetness and good humour in his face, attended with an Extraordinary modesty, and a more than common air of Humility. There seems to be a reservedness in his temper, but when you're acquainted with him you'll

* See "Conduct of Life," p. 96; and for particulars as to the Letters see "List of Writings."

† Dated, Ashton, Oct. 8, 1703. "Marissa" is (said to be) Lady Chudleigh.

find it only the result of thoughtfulness. In a word, he's a man whose conversation is very agreeable as well as Instructive ; and as I write to you, one who is very much your friend." *

A further clue to his outward appearance is at Oxford. In the Library of his College—All Souls—"over the gallery are various busts in bronze of the most eminent Fellows of the College, cast by Sir Henry Cheere, Knight, being taken from original paintings, sculptures, etc. Between each Bust is a Vase." So wrote Anthony Wood in his History of Oxford, † and he gives a list, which includes John Norris. "The bust is still in the Library. It is on the top of a high book-case, and is, therefore, not very visible. The hair hangs down the back in Cavalier fashion. The face is looking upwards, and shows a strong chin and clear cut profile. The eyes are deep and give an impression of sternness."

Sternness in repose, but readily expressive of sweetness and good humour ; this is just the sort of face which the reader of Norris would picture to himself.

Norris had three children, two sons and one daughter. His eldest son, Edward, became Rector of ‡ Little Langford, and then Vicar of the two Chilterns, in Wiltshire. His second son, Thomas, was also a Clergyman, and sometime Minister of Stroud, in Gloucestershire. The daughter married a Mr. Bowjer, Vicar of Martock, in Somersetshire, and the mother, after the father's death, lived with her. § Further trace of the family is wanting.

Norris was married in 1689. In 1694 his eldest child could not have been more than four years old. Yet in that year he wrote "Spiritual Counsel ; or, the Father's Advice to his Children." He published

* From "Phylades and Corinna," a Collection of Letters (in Bodleian). Vol. II., page 3.

† P. 285 (and note), edited by John Gutch, chaplain of All Souls'. 1786.

‡ Where Arthur Collier was Rector till 1732. The fact is interesting as a sign of friendship between the Colliers and Norrises.

§ See Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary.

it soon after, partly, he tells us, "because the contents of these papers (though directed to his own children) are of general concernment, and such as are calculated for People of all ages and conditions, and partly for the greater security of the copy, which, in a private Manuscript, would be in great danger of being lost; but, by being printed, would be better preserved for the use of those for whom it was first designed." The writing of such a piece while his children were "infants" is itself good proof that he was a "careful and affectionate father;" and the contents show how truly he could claim to be "touch'd with a most lively concern both for your present and future Welfare, but chiefly your Future, that of your precious and immortal souls, which must be either eternally happy or miserable in another World, according as you live and demean yourselves in this." In none of his writings does he let us see so distinctly what he meant by religion and the religious life, and how absorbed he was in living that life himself. For the things he writes are the "Results of my own Reason and Experience," and are such "Instances of Spiritual Counsel" as seem to him "Material and Fundamental." On this account a few of them are quoted. Their spirit, it will be seen, is Puritan; but in parts they could have been written only by a Churchman of the Laudian School. Thus, in regard to Reading, he will not say that Plays and Romances are absolutely unlawful, but "I would have you wholly decline the use of them," as serving to "defeat the Ends of your Retirement, by bringing the World into your Closet." Again, "He would allow conversation (in the old sense of intercourse) "with a few well-chosen Friends;" but considering "there is so much danger in common society," and considering "the malignity of popular Discourses and Examples"... "I would advise you to retire from the World as much as conveniently you can, and, declining all unnecessary Engagements and Alliances, to betake yourselves to the safe Harbour of

Solitude and Retreat, where you may breathe a purer air; live to God and yourselves; attend with less Distraction upon the grand concern; and, withal, Pray for those who are out abroad, and ‘passing the waves of this troublesome World.’” “Suppose,” therefore, “you were invited, or otherwise disposed to go, to a Ball or a Play; before you adventure to do so, I would advise you to pause awhile and consider whether you can possibly make any reference of such an action to the Glory of God; whether (in particular) you do verily think that it would consist with that Grave, Serious, and recollected Spirit, and that constant Air of Devotion and Religious Severity which appeared in Our Saviour’s ordinary life, and the general way of His conversation.” In short, all “considerations” touching this life must be governed by reference to the End and the Judgment to come. Accordingly, he advises them to “be much in the contemplation of the shortness of life, and of the day of God’s Grace,” and to “be as much, also, in the contemplation of the four last things—Heaven, Hell, Death and Judgment.” “Place yourselves frequently upon your Death-beds, in your coffins, and in your graves.” “Meditate much upon the Places and upon the Days of Darkness, and upon the Fewness of those that shall be saved; and be always with your Hour-glass in your hands, measuring out your little span, and comparing it with the endless Circle of Eternity.” Moreover, while not forgetting “that a just and upright conversation is the best way of Worship, and a holy and good life the best Prayer,” remember to practise habitual Prayer in the sense of “contemplating God in and through all His Creatures, that none of those objects which surround you may ever present themselves to your senses without awakening the Idea of God in your Minds, and admonishing you of that absolute and intire dependence you and all creatures have upon Him.” But this is not enough. There must be set times for Prayer. Besides “securing the two extremities of the Day,” morning and evening,

with Prayer, he advises them "to make Solemn Prayers to God in Private upon their knees, at least three times a day ; to set apart ' whole ' days—say the first or last Friday in every month"—"to be purely and entirely days of Religion, to be wholly spent in Reading, Prayer, and Divine Meditation." And to "compleat the Repentance and Humiliation," he would have them "make these days to be days of Fasting as well as of Prayer." To complete the case, they are "constantly to frequent the Publick Worship of God in all the parts of it, especially those two, much disregarded and neglected by some of late (which yet are the only parts that properly deserve the name of Worship), the Prayers of the Church and the Administration of the Holy Sacrament."

Here, we see a man whose every other interest is lost in what to him is the grand concern, whose religious views, notwithstanding the necessity he so often urges of putting Love for God in the first place, are largely grounded on Fear ; and who, however at times he might rise into mystic heights of feeling and contemplation, is yet severely practical in the use and prescription of means for "making our calling and Election sure." We see, at the same time, a father who could scarcely have been a 'sunny' influence in his home, but whose love brooded over sons and daughter with deep and prayerful tenderness, and must have pervaded the domestic circle with a nourishing warmth. Something of this brooding love appears in the following letter, written on a blank leaf in a copy of "Spiritual Counsel," belonging to the Rev. John Good, who married his granddaughter:—

To my dear Daughter Elizabeth.

My dear Child,

I give you this Book as my best legacy, and I entreat you to make such good use of it that it may prove so to you. I wrote it for your sake, and now commend it to your serious consideration, both for my sake and your

own, to observe and follow its wholesome directions, which I also beseech Almighty God to accompany to you with His grace and blessing, which shall ever be the prayer of

Your most affectionate Father,

JOHN NORRIS. *

George Herbert and John Norris were alike at least in two points; both were poets, and both loved music intensely. Herbert is said to have walked over to Salisbury Cathedral twice every week, that he might enjoy the ravishing strains of its "majestic organ, and magnificent choir." We are not told that Norris did the same; but it is certain that the little church and parsonage at Bemerton would not lack music in his day. For † "there are some things" he says "which I love with great passion . . . such as are conversation with select Friends, or men of Harmonical and Tunable Dispositions, reading of close and fine wrought discourses, solitary walks and gardens, the Magnificence of the Heavens, the Beauty of the Spring, and *above all* majestic and well-composed music,—which last, could I enjoy it in its highest Perfection, and without Interruption, would, I am apt to fancy, terminate my desires" . . . He expresses the same feeling in several of his poems. Thus, "the Retraction," in two verses, has for its first verse:—

"I've often charg'd all sublunary bliss
With vanity and emptiness:
Yon woods and streams have heard me oft complain
How all things, how even your delights, were vain.
Methought I could with one short simple view
Glance o'er all human Joys, and see them through;
But now, great Preacher, pardon me,
I cannot wholly to thy charge agree,
For Musick sure and Friendship have no vanity."

* Printed by Sir Richard Colt Hore in his *History of Wiltshire* (p. II. Vol. I.)

† *Miscellanies*. (p. 242, 3.)

And these are the first three verses of "A Wish"—

"Whatever Blessing you my Life deny,
Grant me, kind Heaven, this one thing when I dye;
I charge thee, guardian Spirit, hear,
And as thou lov'st me, further this my Prayer.
When I'm to leave this grosser sphere and try
Death, that amazing curiosity;
When just about to breathe my last,
Then, when no mortal Joy can strike my taste,
Let me soft melting strains of Music hear,
Whose Dying sounds may speak Death to my ear;
Gently the bands of life unty,
Till in sweet Raptures I dissolve and dye."*

There is no intention to deal here with Norris as Poet; but one or two words may be said.

(a).—Norris wrote nearly all his poems in early life. When he published his "Miscellanies," in 1687, he had already made up his mind to forsake the Muses†—whose society he had cultivated in his "blank hours" for years past. Remembering this, we shall not expect to find in his poetry anything like the same record of "internal struggles which form the staple of the poetry of Herbert."

(b).—He attempted too much. He was the victim of a theory. "Poetry," he says, "is of late mightily fall'n from the Beauty of its Idea, and from its ancient Majesty and Grandeur, as well as Credit and Reputation. . . . The Design, therefore, of the Present Undertaking is to restore the declining Genius of Poetry to its Primitive and genuine Greatness, to wind up the Strings of the Muses' Lyre, and to shew that sense and gracefulness are as consistent in these as in any other Compositions. I design here all the Masculine Sense and Argument of a Dissertation, with the advantage of Poetic

* See also the poems entitled "The Infirmary" p. 80, and "On a musician supposed to be mad with music."

† See Preface.

Fineness, Beauty and Spirit ; and accordingly I have made choice for the most part of Divine and Moral subjects ; and if I meddle with any other sort, I commonly turn the stream another way, as particularly in those Two Poems call'd 'Beauty' and 'Love,' which I have rescued from those sordid Abuses they have hitherto suffer'd."

This is one of several bits of evidence going to shew that the Modesty which distinguished Norris in later life was an acquired grace. He confesses that "'tis a difficult Province to make substantial massy sense yield to the softness of Poetry." He does not, however, appear to doubt his own success. Nor did the early admirer, who thought the "genius of Norris as a Poet not at all inferior to that of his contemporaries ; and that he displays specimens of genuine poetry, whose fire and sublimity are barely excelled by the 'Paradise Lost.'"* But, in fact, he fails most signally in just those pieces which to him and his admirers came nearest the Ideal. Effusions like that on the "Passion of our Blessed Saviour, Represented in a Pindarique Ode," or the "Pastoral on the Blessed Virgin, gone from Nazareth to visit Elizabeth, wherein the sadness of the Country Nazareth is described during the absence of the Virgin" (translated out of Rapin), or "Divine Hymn on the Creation," are intolerable.† But these do not do him justice. He is better in the "Elevation"—a poem aiming "to represent the gradual ascent of the Soul by Contemplation to the Supreme Good." He is never so happy, however, as when he stops trying to "teach the Age" or be sublime ; and lets the genuine lyrical impulse which often came to him have its way. The poem

* Quoted in Chalmer's Dictionary—but name of admirer not given.

† cp. Willmott,—"Cowley was a poet whom Norris loved . . . but he learned only the errors of his master. The gentle stream of his fancy, instead of flowing at its own will with the freedom of nature, is forced into artificial windings."—"Pictures of Christian Life." I may add that he nowhere mentions Cowley.

called "Superstition"—one of those occasioned by the death of his dear niece, M. C—— is worth all the strictly "didactic" poems put together. This is too long to quote, but the following will also serve to illustrate his simpler and purer strain :—

'Twas my beloved spake,
I know his charming voice, I heard him say
Rise up, my love, my fairest one, awake,
Awake, and come away.

The Winter all is past ;
The stormy Winds that with such rudeness blew ;
The Heavens are no longer overcast,
But try to look like you.

The Flowers their sweets display ;
The Bird in short praeludiums tune their throat ;
The Turtle in low murmurs does essay
Her melancholy Note.

The fruitful Vineyards make
An odorous smell, the Fig looks fresh and gay ;
Arise, my love, my fairest one, awake,
Awake, and come away.

There is no particular excellence here, and it is not claimed for him that he ever did, or could, rank with the excellent in poetry. At the same time, the neglect which has fallen upon him as Poet is no less undeserved than is the neglect he has suffered in general. The only Editor* of his Poems thinks he has "shown cause" to believe that some of his successors in the Poetic craft were not unwilling to borrow from him ; but it is a strange fact that, as even his name finds no place in any ordinary account of English writers, so no anthologist has deemed him worthy of mention in any collection of English poetry. †

* Dr. A. B. Grosart has "reprinted" them in Vol. III. of his "Miscellanies of the 'Fuller Worthies' Library." He suspects indebtedness here and there, on the part of Blair, Gray, and possibly even Wordsworth, Burns, Byron, Collins, Shelly and Poe. But the instances he cites are mostly very slight and unconvincing.

† This is now not quite true. Palgrave, in the last edition of "Sacred Songs and Lyrics," having given one of Norris's poems—"The Hymn to Darkness,"

(c).—On the whole, he kept to his purpose not again to write poems. So far as I know there are only two belonging to a later date than 1687. These are in the “Ideal System ;” and may be said to flash like two clear flames from the heat of enraptured feeling, as he pursues his argument. They are too long for quotation here, but they seem to me among his best, in point of genuine feeling and forceful expression.

To sum up.—In the main, Norris had his wish in life :—

* “Let me in some sweet shade serenely lye,
Happy in leisure and obscurity ;
Whilst others place their Joys
In popularity and noise,
Let my soft minutes glide obscurely on,
Like subterraneous streams, unheard, unknown.”

Moreover, if he really did not “care,” after death, “to be awhile the talk and boast of men,”† this wish, too, was realized. He never was, or became, the “talk or boast of men” in general. He had some few ardent disciples. For a time his sermons and moral treatises seem to have been pretty widely read. In 1747, Richardson,‡ the novelist, could still speak of “the famous Mr. Norris of Bemerton.” Six years before, John Wesley condensed—for the edification of his young society—the “Conduct of Human Life” into a tract,§ which ran through several editions. As late as 1800 parts of his “Reason and Faith” were published in a collection of tracts entitled “The Scholar armed against the Errors of the Time.”||

But here all visible trace of him comes to an end. Readers he has continued to have, no doubt, and even

* Miscellanies. “The Choice.”

† An Ode to Henry More.

‡ In letter to Mrs. Carter. Dec. 18, 1747, quoted by Willmott.

§ Printed by R. Hawes, and sold at the Rev. Mr. Wesley's preaching houses in town and country. 1st Edition, 1741. Fourth, 1776.

|| Issued by the Society for the Reformation of Principles. 2 Vols.

passionate admirers. Perhaps he will have the same in the future. Judging from the past, however, we can scarcely expect him "to *live* among the writers who have embellished the severities of argument with the charms of fancy, and strew'd with flowers the thorny paths of truth." * All we can say is that he deserves so to live; and that, if abundance of sober thought often richly expressed and suited to the practical needs of all time, constitute a claim to live, his influence will yet be revived. For, in a more limited sense, it is true of his, as of Plato's writings, that "they abound in beauties which will not fade with the speculations with which they are intermingled, and may be appreciated by persons who care nothing for the philosophy of the Author, or, indeed, very little for any other philosophy." †

* Willmott.

† "Literary Genius of Plato" by Henry Rogers.—"Essays from Edinburgh Review," Vol. I.

THE IDEAL SYSTEM.

The work in which Norris expounds his Philosophy most fully is in two parts (and volumes)—the first designed to establish its Theory; the second to show the relation of that Theory to the Human mind.

Turning to the first part, we may linger a moment or two on the preface. This tells us how, and why, the Work has been done.

(1.) "Some years ago," he says, "when I had the honour to be one of the Fellows of All Souls' College, in Oxford (which God for ever bless and prosper), I began a Treatise * on this subject in Latin, whereof I there finish'd two chapters, with a good part of a third."

(2.) For one reason or another, *e.g.*, "the difficulty of the undertaking and other avocations," he laid it aside; and on later taking it up again he found neither the matter nor the form of it to his mind, and so the present "Edifice" has been built "from the very ground," except for "here and there a stroke of the old materials."

(3.) So much by way of apology to those who have been wondering why he did not sooner fulfil an old promise, and who may think the "piece" now produced unworthy of so long a preparation.

(4.) But what has directly moved him "to set out his notion more in the Light, and to digest his

* He mentions this in "Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life," i. § 29, speaking of the treatise "now under my hands, to be called 'Theoria Mundi Idealis sive Metaphysica Platonica'" (pub. 1690).

thoughts upon it into a just and regular system," is the fact that "several passages disseminated up and down (his earlier writings) that glance at the notion" have not done him justice. They have led some to call it "visionary and fantastick," and even, in the case of a "certain person," * *Platonic Gibberish*.

(5.) Respect for his reputation, however, might not have made him write had he not felt that his "farther silence would have been a prejudice to an important and concerning Truth."

(6.) But the subject is difficult; treating of it has been like "making his way" "through wild and untrodden coasts;" and this, he hopes, will procure him "the favourable censure" of "candid and equitable readers."

(7.) At the same time, he has "proceeded with the greater confidence because, to more than ordinary thought" he has joined the "great help of imploring the Divine aid and assistance." He has sometimes thought, therefore, that he might see things in a "better light" than other men," "though not with better eyes." "For which reason, though I would not have anything implicitly taken upon the authority of my judgment, yet neither would I have my reader so hasty and impatient a critick as to censure without consideration, what has been written with so much."

(8.) To be fairly judged, the Theory needs to be displayed on its practical side, and this he will do if "health serve," and the "kindness of the World encourage" him to proceed.

(9.) The task, as already said, was completed three years later, (1704). † In excuse for the delay he mentions his want of health, and again lays stress on the difficulties of his theme. Never had writer, he says, more right to urge that plea. "For sure never was there any subject of a more abstract nature, nor

* Locke. This scornful epithet had evidently stung him. He refers to again in his "remarks on Locke's Essay," p. 27.

† Preface to Vol. II.

many of a larger compass. For the abstractness of it—had I the metaphysics of men and angels I could here employ and bury it all; and for the compass of it—could I live till the Revolution of Plato's year, I could never hope to wade through it."

(10.) He has, then, felt "oppress'd and overlaid with abundance of matter"—he has hardly been able "to see the wood for the trees"—and so, to "set everything in its due and proper place," "according to the natural dependencies of one thing upon another," and always to express himself clearly or even intelligibly, has been a work of more trouble than men of mere *Bookish Learning* can well be aware of, or than will easily be imagined even by the thoughtful without some trial and experience. But "*Perito Judice nihil æquius.*"

We will now try if we can follow him through the wood which he found so dense. He is certainly, on the whole, a clear writer;* and as a rule, his own words will best express his meaning. But, with all his efforts, he has not succeeded in setting forth the argument concisely and systematically; and so, here, not a little re-arrangement and many omissions are called for. †

I. There is ^{an} He affirms the existence of two worlds: Ideal World. the one natural, the other ideal. The former consists of "things in rerum naturâ" "created in time out of nothing by the free and arbitrary will of their Almighty Cause." To describe the latter, he piles epithet on epithet, which may be said better to relieve his feelings than to "clear" his thought. Thus

* "Norris well copied, though he did not equal the clearness and choice of expression of his Master," Sir John Macintosh. (*Sketch of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 59). This judgment may perhaps justly apply to the two vols. now under notice; but his writings generally are models of lucid English, often rising for page after page into a stately eloquence worthy of Hooker.

† All the headings, divisions and sub-divisions have been added by me for the sake of clearness. I have generally retained Norris' spelling, and the references are his, except those marked P.

it is "this state of things which is necessary, permanent and immutable, not only antecedent and pre-existent to this, but also exemplary and representative of it,"—"really simple and one, but yet virtually and eminently multiform and various; and by its multiform variety, having in it the reasons, essences and specific natures of all things; i.e., such degrees of Being and Perfection as answer to them, and are intelligibly expressive of them, and whereof all things in the natural world are but as the prints and impressions—I might say the shadows" "it is the *κόσμος νοητός*" . . . the great Type and mould of external nature, and the measure of the things that are "

Which
is
‘Intelligible’

This Ideal world is also fitly called
Intelligible,* for several reasons :—

(1) Because it “is the sole and immediate
object of our intellectual views.” (2) Because, as
opposed to sensible, it is “purely spiritual and intellec-
tual.” (3) Because it is a world “such as we cannot
but conceive to be ;” in other words, which the under-
standing sees intuitively. But, (4) chiefly because,
according to the description just quoted, “it is the idea
of this sensible world.” (c.p. St. Austin, *Contra*
Academ. Lib. 3 cap. 17. Plotinus, *Ennead 4. Lib. 9.*
cap. 7, Philo, Cosmopoea.)

p. 12

p. 13

II. Proof of this. The next step is to prove what is thus affirmed. To this end he lays down two arguments. (a) He supposes himself "set in the world at a mature age," "with a competency of natural reason and understanding." He looks round him, and one of his first thoughts will be "concerning . . . the *existence* of this great visible system," "whether it was always in being." The answer would certainly be in the negative.

* "By intelligible world is meant not the same as intellectual, for the latter signifies the world of Spirits, the former the world of ideas." See Vol II. p. 253 note.

Reason would say, further, that its being must have been received "from some other Being;" that this Being must be Almighty: for one capable of turning
 p. 19 not-being into being, "can do anything or everything;"
 p. 20 that He had need of Infinite *wisdom* "to make *such* a
 p. 23 world:" for "this world is a considerate system, a very
 thoughtful composure." Its Maker, therefore, must
 have thought it before He made it. But thinking is
 a seeing of the mind. How, or where, then, did God
 p. 25 see the world before it was made? Not in its "natural"
 or sensible "state," for in that state it is supposed to
 be absolutely non-existent, and what is *not* cannot be
 an object of the Understanding. Where, then? *In*
 or *out* of Himself? That requires further consideration;
 but certainly somewhere. Consequently, there must
 needs be an Ideal or intelligible world, "in which
 things had a real existence according to their essential
 reasons and natures, before they had any in this."*
 Species in (b) Again, "the certain, precise, de-
 nature terminate limitation, such as belongs to
 imply a creatures of the same order and species"
 pattern or (p. 38), implies an "ideal" volition.
 Idea
 behind.

"Why is not the body of *one* man as big as the globe
 of the sun, while that of another is too small to be
 seen without a microscope?" (p. 39). Because "'tis
 not according to the Idea of that creature that he
 should be either so big or so little." (p. 39) Thus,
 "God worked not alone by will and power, but by
 "Certain ideal models or standards, according to which
 things were all formed in number, weight and
 measure," (p. 40).†

III. But But where are these Eternal Essences,
 where are or Ideas of things? *In* God or *out* of
 these
 Ideas? Him? (a) Now, truth can only exist when

* Moses, I. Genesis. cp. Philo; Cosmo: ἡ ἀρχήνυπος σφραγίς, &c.

† As a third argument he urges the immutable nature of geometric figures. (p. 51ff.) As a fourth argument he dwells on the admission even of scepticism, that there is such a thing as objective truth, (p. 62ff.) And a fifth he "derives from" the nature of science. (p. 127ff.)

and where there are ideas. But truth is everywhere,* p. 135
 "As the ideas are co-eternal with Truth, so likewise
 are they compresential; and since the presence of the
 latter is not limited or confined to any place, neither
 is that of the former."† And "since there is no such p. 136
 way of existence (*i.e.* omnipresent and
 eternal) possible out of God, I think I need
 not scruple to conclude that our Intelligible World,
 or world of ideas, is in God." "Nor do I doubt," he p. 138
 Plato says says, "but that I have herein concurring
 the same. with me the general suffrage of the Platonic
 School, not excepting the Head Master of it. There
 is, I know, a certain traditional presumption . . . handed
 down among some learned men from one to another, I
 know not well how or why, as if Plato should place
 his ideas out of God, representing them as so many
 abstract and universal Forms or Essences, separately
 existing from the Divine nature, which must be very
 gross Philosophy, if really Plato's; but I think . . . that
 it is indeed none of his, and whoever can but keep
 himself awake while he but reads over his 'Timaeus'
 will, I believe, find reason to think so too; viz. that by
 his ideas he meant . . . only the 'exemplaria rerum in
 mente Divina'—the original forms, or patterns, of
 things in the Divine understanding (the very same
 we are now contending for), and accordingly that he
 placed his ideas nowhere else but in God" (p. 138-9)‡

And the
 same may be
 inferred
 from the
 nature of
 God.
 He goes on to confirm his view by con-
 siderations drawn from the nature of
 God. Here his argument becomes per-
 plexingly scholastic. He might, indeed,
 "plant his margent thick with authorities"—ancient
 and modern—in support of the statement he advances,

* Veritas nec quadra est, nec rotunda, nec longa: ubique Praesens est, si cordis oculus ad eam pateat. St. Austin Enarr. in Psalm 30, etc. (cp. Plotinus on Ideas, Ennead, 5, 9. (P)).

† cp. Marsilius Ficinus upon Plotinus Ennead. 6 Lib. 4. "Mundus intelligibilis quum dicitur ubique esse, est ipsum quod appellatur ubique."

‡ cp. Norris's earlier Letter on Plato's ideas in the "Miscellanies." (P)

“that God must have in Himself the ideas of all things” (p. 141). When, *e.g.*, the Schoolmen say “that things are contained in God *per modum eminentiæ*,” this simply means, “if reduced to plainer sense,” that though the very essences of things, as they are in *rerum natura*, are not contained in God, yet there are in Him such degrees of Being and Perfection as are equivalent to them, and representative of them, and so virtually the same with them” (p. 141). But there is no need of authorities. “The proposition is capable of the strictest Demonstration” (p. 142). For (a)* God, as Infinite Being, is infinite *in* Being, is infinitely removed from *not* being (or nothing), is *all* being . . . p. 144 “so that there is no degree of being in the creatures nor any so much as absolutely possible, which does not, some way or other, pre-exist in God, at least as to the intelligible order and kind of it” (p. 143). (b) Moreover, consider his attribute “Wisdom.” God knows all things that are possible—“but everything p. 148ff that is known, so far as it is known, must be a real being;”† therefore God’s knowing of all possible things implies their existence, as to idea or essence, in His own mind. Accordingly, “God, by understanding Himself, knows all possible creatures.” We may have to put up with “*cognitio vespertina*”‡ (p. 162)—a mere “eventide” knowledge, such as is gained by considering creatures after they are made. But God possesses full and complete “*cognitio matutina*”—morning knowledge—such as springs from seeing creatures in His own essence, before they are created—nay, whether created or not § (p. 162). He sees them “as in a looking glass, in which he that looks does, indeed, immediately behold the species in the glass; but also, at the same time, actually beholds Peter or

* cp. Descartes’ argument from *Idea* of God to His Being.

† cp. *Nemo enim falsa novit nisi falsa esse novit. Verum est enim quod illa falsa sint.* From St. Austin ‘*De Trinit.*’ Lib. 15, c. 10.

‡ St. Austin. *De Civ. Dei.*, Lib. II., cap. 7.

§ He refers to the Schoolmen, especially Aquinas.

Matter. Paul, whose image it is" (p. 166). Even matter itself "so far as it has a being, retains some similitude of the Divine Being.* It is, indeed, the remotest and faintest imitation of Him, His shadow, rather one of His most projected rays ; and yet, forasmuch as it is a metaphysical unit at least, and has some degree of reality in it, we must allow it to have its ideal counterpart in the Divine mind (that which Malebranche calls Intelligible Extension), and conse-

quently to be eminently and intelligibly contained in it, as well as other things" †
 IV. But God did not make Ideas, (p. 251). But, though ideas have their seat and sphere and spring in the Divine mind, God is not, strictly speaking, the author of them. The same terms hold for them as for God, viz., "immutable," "eternal," "increate," "self-consistent." "They are wholly independent upon the creature ; and in some measure even upon the Creator Himself" (p. 234). In regard to things, they co-exist with them as their essence ; but, "as they existed before them, so, supposing their annihilation, they would as certainly exist after them ; and, in the meantime, are utterly unconcerned in, and unaffected with, any of their generations or corruptions, changes or revolutions" (p. 234). "In regard to the mind of God, as it is eternally pregnant with them, so it eternally knows and contemplates them, but it does not make them" (p. 235). "His Ideas are as much pre-supposed to all the acts of His will, as their *measure* ; as to all the acts of His understanding, as their *object*" (p. 235). "So that, though the Divine ideas have an Emanative result—as I may call it—from the essence of God, yet they are not the creatures of His understanding or of His will which, by the way, may intimate to us what near relation they stand in to Him of whom we are taught

* Aquinas.

† cp. St. Austin De Trin. Lib. IV., cap. 1, and Dr. More :—"God may be said even to *contain* all things in Himself, from the basis to the very cusps of the mystical cone."

to say in our more solemn creed—"not made nor created, but begotten'" (p. 236).

V. They are
His Eternal
Word—be-
gotten, not
made.

These last words indicate where, in this high region, the Christian theologian comes upon the scene. For "Ideas, as being in God, are God"* (p. 239). But the λόγος is also God.

"He is the Brightness of His glory, and the express image of His person" . . . whose great characteristic in the School account is "procedere in Divinis secundum emanationem Intellectûs." "He is indeed the great Idea and Exemplar of the whole creation, and the true intelligible world† . . . and, as the Divine Ideas themselves give us a fair designation of His person, so their necessary emanation from the all-perfect and all-being nature of God, do as well express His eternal, but ineffable generation." "For *that*, indeed (I mean the immense richness and fulness of the Godhead, that which the Platonists may be presumed to have signified by their τὸ ἀγαθόν and which, accordingly, they put before ὁ νοῦς), is the great spring and fountain, or, if you will, parent of the Divine Ideality, as *this* is its fair offspring" . . . "which well adumbrates the filiation of the second hypostasis, whom the Platonists called the νοῦς and whom the Platonizing apostle calls λόγος, and who may very rationally be said to be the Word and Wisdom of God, because—as being the intelligible, or Ideal world—He represents to Him, as an omniform mirror, both Himself and His whole creation—nay, all that is possible, all that is intelligible" ‡ (p. 241, § 1, cap. V., cp. § 3 passim).

* "Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde Idæa in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia," Aquinas, Sum. Theo. Part 1. Quest. 15. Art. 1.

† cp. Plotinus Ennead, 3, lib. 2. Num. 1.

‡ cp. Dr. More, in his Philosophic Poems. p. 3.

VI.
The function
of the
"Word" in
creation, not
to make, but
to model.

But the question arises, how are the Divine Ideas related to the "formation of the natural or sensible world?" (1.) "Efficiency," says our author, is confined to "the will of God: there being no will or power included in Ideality as such, and, consequently, no activity." (cap. V. §3 p. 256). Ideas, therefore, have no creative force: they did not cause things from not being to be (*that is the proper work of will*), but only "served to qualify, or specify, their being." There is in everything the "esse simpliciter" and the "tale esse," *i.e.*, simple being, and quality of being; or its being "thus" or "thus." Ideas have to do with the "tale esse." They are "patterns," the "plastick principles," the "substantial forms," that directed and conducted the energies of the Divine Will.

(2.) But if so, this will explain the sense in which the Eternal Word, or λόγος, is called the Creator. Quoting John I, 3. he argues (repeatedly and at great length) that "by Him" describes rather an "exemplary" than an "efficient" cause, *i.e.*, through Him, not *as instrument*, but *as archetype*. The argument amounts to this:—(a) "All ideas are 'in the Word'—yea, the Word is the Ideas; (b) things are made according to the Ideas: therefore, (c) things were made according to the Word." Taken 'essentialiter' indeed, the Eternal Word was the efficient cause in the strictest sense. But considered *Personally* (*i.e.*, quâ λόγος) He was not; He merely furnished the patterns for creation. So St. Austin, so the 'Doctor of the Schools,' so Plotinus, so Marcilius Ficinus, so Philo, "who in his 'Cosmopaea,' calls the Divine λόγος by these emphatic titles * ἀρχέτυπος, σφαγίς, ἀρχέτυπον, παζάδειγμα, and says 'that, if we will speak out plainly, the intelligible world must be said to be no other than the Word of God' (p. 288).

* Ipse enim vita est quae ita in illo est, ut ipse sit. St. Austin.

VII. Through the "Word," or "Ideas," the world is sustained as well as made (3) Moreover, as Ideas are "Exemplars, or patterns, in creation, or *first* production of things," so they are, "also, of all successive generations of them." "What is necessary in the work of generation by way of proper *efficiency*," is supplied by the establishment of "certain laws of motion, which are the same with what we call the *course* of Nature, and are, indeed, no other than the fixed and general will of its Author" (p. 289). But these motions always work in full view of those "ideal measures," and "tis by *their* direction that *these* are so determinate and uniform in their ordinary productions, bringing forth all things in the vegetable as well as the animal world according to their respective kinds" (p. 289). "God, guiding His temporary fiat by His eternal ideas, was so well pleased with the works which He had made, that he liked to have more of them, and so established the order of generation." Although, then, "the work of the *Creation* be long since concluded in a Sabbath of rest, yet the ideas must not be laid aside . . ." (p. 290).

VIII. How about mon- (4) But, how comes it that perfect ideas
sters, &c.? are so often represented by imperfect images? He is not afraid to face this problem, or to propose a solution. Imperfections, he says, come under two heads; * (*a*) *Natural and regular*; (*b*) *privative*.† The former proceed from a defective "imitation of the Divine essence at large," and are what *must* be, since God has but one "perfect image of Himself, even His natural picture, His co-eternal and consubstantial Son." The latter—*e.g.*, monsters—proceed from a defective imitation of the "proper species." There is "nothing ugly as to *species*." But the realization of the species in

* (Cap. V., § 2, p. 247-8.)

† Cp. At the "first production of things," the divine originals were copied with exactness—God acting by particular wills; now, acting by few and simple general laws, he lets Nature give us a jog sometimes by stepping out of the track—hence what we call "erratas" (p. 291, § 3, cap. 5). Cp. Malebranche *Traite de Morale*, I, 20-23. (P).

individuals depends on general laws of motion, which cannot be trusted to act with absolute precision. Hence occasional failures now and then. "God will have a perfect effect to follow, as far as it shall be *able* to follow, according to the order of natural causes, with which no necessary concurrence on His part shall be wanting" (p. 293).

IX. The
world of
sense is less
real than the
Ideal.

If, now, at this point, we compare the two "worlds," it may be shown that "the existence of the intelligible world is more certain than that of the Sensible." "More certain" (cap. IV., 186, ff), for reasons (a) greater in number, and (b) better in themselves.

(1) Greater in number. For you cannot say that the sensible world was bound to be; you cannot prove it "*a priori*;" it was not a "necessary emanation" from its cause; and, therefore, "the only argument producible for its existence must be from the effect, namely, from those impressions which are made upon our senses in our conversing with bodies" (p. 189). "But now, as to the intelligible world, the existence of *that* is demonstrable by a great variety of arguments. Both the nature of God, and the works of God, prove it; all the Arts and Sciences proceed upon it; every Eternal Truth supposes it; and there is no talking intelligibly, nor so much as thinking, without it" (p. 190).

(2) "But the quality of Reasons is more considerable than their number."

(a) "The intelligible world as necessary result of "the Divine perfections," as "necessary emanations" "from the Nature of God, is demonstrable *a priori*, and in a causal way of deduction . . . which, with the masters of reason, is accounted the most direct and perfect way of demonstration" (p. 191.)

(b) "The abstracter objects are the most knowable (as being the more universal, and more necessary), and the abstracter reasonings are the most certain,

evident and conclusive." Hence, those "sciences have the greatest reputation for certainty which are most abstract, as Metaphysics, and Geometry" . . . in fact, "all our knowledge, that strictly deserves the name, proceeds by way of abstraction, both as to its principles" * (p. 192), which are *intuitive*, and "as to its conclusions," which are clearly *demonstrative*; but there is nothing of a more abstract nature than the intelligible world.

(c) The issue lies "between sensible and rational evidence; and the question is, which of these is the best ground of certainty or criterion of truth" (p. 194).

Consider then—(1) That Reason does not always need the assistance of sense; (2) That "Sense ever wants the assistance, and sometimes the correction, of Reason."

"Concurrence of Reason" is needed to assure me even of "that great sensible object, the natural world," as a whole; and such assurance is given through the principle of contradiction. † In fact, "the evidence which we have of *both worlds* in strictness resolves into that which is rational" (p. 201, ff). What we have to determine is, where is the rational evidence strongest? "When, then, do I reason with most clearness or with most certainty. ‡—when I reason upon a sensation, or when I reason upon an abstract and intelligible principle or truth?" Surely the latter. Not that the principle itself is necessarily clearer than the sensation; "but there is a more close and evident connexion of the principle with the conclusion" (p. 203), with one exception; for, "I am in pain, therefore I am," is as good an argument as "I think, therefore I am" § (p. 204.)

* "Scientiam esse de universalibus. Intellectio fit per abstractionem." So—Scholastics.

† Impossible est idem simul esse et non esse,

‡ cp. Malebranche, "Traite de Moral," I.8 (P.)

§ Cogito ergo sum.

But do we not see bodies? : Yes, vision does "include an outward objective perception." "But what is the something" that is seen or perceived? "Not the very bodies that are without us; and that *because* they are without us, and sometimes far distant from us." * Hence we see them immediately, *i.e.*, we see "the representative species, or ideas of them" (p. 207). But these come from the bodies? That remains to be seen. On the whole, the existence of the ideal world is *certain*, and that of the natural world is merely put beyond "reasonable doubt."

X. The
Ideal World,
in relation to
Eternal
Truths. *cap.*
VI., p. 303ff.

"A farther view of the intelligible world" may be gained "in the doctrine of Eternal Truths." Truth is of the subject, or of the object. (a) Truth of the subject is either logical, consisting in correspondence between what we think and what is (p. 311); or moral, consisting in correspondence between thought and "words or any other significant action." (b) Truth of the object is either simple or complex. As simple, it refers to the 'ens,' the 'ding an sich,' the pure "Idea." As complex, it means "the mutual habitudes or relations" (p. 313), between "thing and thing," or, between "Idea and Idea." "When we speak of Eternal Truth as a distinct order of Truths (especially as they are considered in this Theory), we are *not* to be presumed to mean Truths of the subject, but of the object—those which the supreme intelligence contemplates, and which are the objects of his Eternal conceptions, and in conformity to which those conceptions are said to be true." As such, they result inevitably from the Divine Ideas. They are the "nexus rerum insolubiles et incommutabiles." They are necessary as God himself. "They are no creatures of our's, nor yet of God's neither. God is what he is, and they are what they are; they can neither *not* be

* He is very near Berkeley here. (P)

nor be otherwise ; but remain in their steady and immutable order and nature, 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, without variableness or shadow of turning'" (p. 314). Truth, indeed, *is* God. For since Truth is* "the Ideas in a certain order to one another," and since the Ideas are identical with the Divine essence ; therefore, "Eternal Truths must be resolved into the essence and substance of God" (p. 331). Norris tries to establish this statement in another way. Thus, "whatever is not the effect of God is God ; necessary truth is not the effect of God ; therefore, necessary truth is God" (p. 336, ff). For, if necessary truth be the effect of God, then (*a*) it must be a necessary effect ; and so God must be "a necessary agent even *ad extra*" ; (*b*) He would, also, be "an unintelligent Agent" ; and would (*c*) produce something "Perfective," both of "His own understanding"—who yet is presumed to be all wise, and of his own beatitude—who yet is presumed to be infinitely happy. (*d*) It would follow, too, that "God has constituted an order of Realities which He has no power nor dominion over" (p. 338). Accordingly, Truth and God are one and the same. "It is not really distinguished from Him, but co-essential and con-substantial with Him, and so, in consulting Truth, He consults His own essence, even the Divine λόγος." (p. 336).

XI.
Descartes,
however,
denies that
truth is
absolute or
necessarily
Eternal.

But what of Descartes?—"who will have all truth to be positively ordained and established by God so that, according to him, two and two might not have been four, or the three angles of a triangle might not have been equal to two right ones." He is a "great man," but his doctrine is "most monstrous," "and I think by far the most absurd in the notion of it, and the most

* cp. Malebranche *De Inquirenda Veritate*. III, ii, 1. Illust : ad ii. Sup. Nat. idearum. (P.)

dangerous and pernicious in the consequence of it, of any that can be pickt out of the whole body of Cartesianism" (p. 340).

For (1) Truth is a Perfection of the Divine Understanding; and so God, it appears, has "created" something which is Perfective of Himself and His own happiness (p. 341).

(2) Truth is the *measure* of the Divine Will—how, then, can it be an *effect*? (p. 342),

(3) Before God created Truth there was none; and, therefore, no knowledge—even in Himself—*i.e.*, He was, as a Being and as an Agent, unintelligent. So far Norris repeats what he has said already; but further,

(4) If Truth was the outcome of the Divine Will, God might have chosen whether He would make any such thing, *i.e.*, whether there should be any Truth or no. "'Tis a most wonderful thing to me that he (Descartes), that makes Existence essential to God, upon the consideration of His infinite Perfection (p. 343), . . . should yet so far forget himself, . . . as to lay down a Principle which makes it possible for him to have been *without* one of the greatest perfections in the World"

(5.) Truth, as dependent on God's free decree, is necessarily contingent; may, therefore, be truth only for a time; may, "like almanacks, be outdated" (p. 344).

(6) "How do I know whether God has, *de facto* . . . constituted any truths or no?" (p. 345). "'Tis certain that God may—absolutely speaking—change them if he pleases, as depending entirely upon His Will; and how do I know that he has not already done it, or that he will not hereafter do it? Unless you will suppose that he has obliged himself to the contrary. But, then, this being matter of pure will and pleasure too, how shall I know that?" (p. 346).

(7) The worst consequences, however, are those which flow to Morality and Religion. "Where," *e.g.*, is the "intrinsic beauty of virtue;" where the "intrinsic Deformity" of Vice? and then, what excellency, or advantage, has the Moral beyond that of the Ritual, or Ceremonial, or any other positive law of G. d" (p. 347). There would, indeed, be no such thing as a moral (intrinsically valid) law "which immediately runs us into the dregs of libertinism, and is a very far step towards Atheism itself."

(8) Nay: one is made uncertain "whether there be anything so much as *positively* good or evil, or what it is" (p. 348). We know it from Scripture? Yes: "but if all truth be positive, how shall I know, or how shall I prove, the Scripture to be of Divine authority; nay, how shall I be assured that there is any such thing as Scripture in the world? For in order to do this, I must reason upon certain principles; and if these very principles are no other than positive truths, how shall I know that *they* are put?"

(9) But, grant the "position" (*i.e.*, the positing) of certain truths, yet if there "be no *moral* good or evil," there seems to be no room for any positive. "For if every positive law *obliges* in the force of a moral one;" and, "if nothing be antecedently evil in itself, how anything should be made so 'tis not very easy to be conceived" (p. 349).

(10) Again, and what is enough "almost to turn the course of a man's blood as it circulates in his veins"—"ethics itself might have been transposed, so that the very *reverse* of it might have been true, and that even the love of God might have been a vice, etc." (p. 349).

(11) But, after all, let it be recollected "that we have proved the necessary and immutable nature of truth in a more direct way of reasoning than by arguing from the bad consequences of the contrary

supposition. For we have shown that eternal truths do necessarily result from the divine ideas, as also that they are in all reality the same with those ideas, and consequently they must be as necessary, as immutable, and as independent" p. (356).

(12) Bearing in mind the Platonic distinction between *νοῦς νοητός* (mind exhibitivè), and *νοῦς νοηρός* or *νοητικός* (mind conceptive, *i.e.*, pure act of intelligence), it may, no doubt, be said that *in the former sense* Eternal truths do depend upon the mind of God, "because we conceive them as necessarily resulting from the Divine Ideality" (p. 357); but not upon the mind of God *as conceptive*: "for that does not *make* the object, but supposes it; nor are things true because God conceives them so, but, on the contrary, He conceives them so because they are antecedently so in their own nature."

These are the outlines of an argument pursued by our author at great length, and sustained by copious quotations from St. Austin and the Schools: a proof that he considered the issue—as, indeed, it was and is—one of vital importance.

In connection with the same subject, he goes on

(1) To re-assert that, "by the same principles as we have proved the *general* Divinity of truth," we are to conclude that Truth is the distinctive and characteristic property of "the second person of the blessed Trinity" (p. 372), who is "the Way that makes us good, the Truth that makes us wise, and the Life that makes us happy" (p. 373).

(2) Next he proceeds to state two other favourite inferences, *viz* :—that these "necessary and eternal truths are the true and proper objects of all our contemplation and science;" and that, as being "most perfective of our understandings," they ought to engage our best attention. For "what are language, histories,

or any other matters of fact, to (*i.e.*, compared to) closeness of thought, exactness of judgment, and a distinct and enlarged view of those standing and settled relations, dependencies and coherencies, which things eternally and immutably have with one another in the vast and immense system of the intelligible world. These are the truths which God Himself eternally contemplates, and for the contemplation of which our reasons and understandings were given us"... (p 376).

(3) He then turns aside to encounter "Monsieur Regis, 1612-1707—(p 379 ff.) a very eminent Cartesian," who modifies the "Master's" notion of truth to the effect that eternal truths "consist in the substances which God has created, so far as the soul considers them after a certain manner, and compares them according to the different relations which they have one with another" (p 382)—which, in plain language, seems to mean that "substances"—here used in the sense of everything real—hold towards one another certain relations, and that the clear apprehending of these relations brings truth to the mind. But thus, truth is not eternal either as to the matter or the form: not as to the matter—because "*that* lies in substances which God has *produced*;" not as to the form—because *that* "is nothing else but the action whereby the soul considers substances after a certain manner" (p. 383). Truth, in short—so M. Regis would say—is better described as immutable than as eternal. Norris declines to admit the distinction, and says it drives the author of it into a "maze of intanglements and absurdity" (p. 387).

Here the argument designed to set up the "theory of the Ideal world 'absolutely,'" comes to an end, although in one or two closing chapters the writer reverts to points already discussed—as to the "place and region of truth," the notion and distinction of essence and existence. These, however, since they add nothing fresh except in the way of illustration and eloquently pious reflection, may be passed over.

1704. II.
 "I did not presently set about this (after publishing the first part), but spent some time in taking a view of my great and formidable subject, before I advanced to lay a close siege to it as the Roman General did before the walls of Jerusalem.... I went on with it as with church work—little by little."

(The Preface).

foundations, we can give an account of the true manner of human understanding, or, at least, erect an intelligible system of it," this is the task assayed. †

I.
 The understanding has a blind side.

And first, he appears to admit what on Locke's lips, he had questioned ‡ 15 years before, viz:—"that the understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself." § For, he says, "though the understanding seems to promise a Discovery of itself by its own light, yet it has a dark side to us-ward, and that which perceives all other things cannot so easily perceive itself" . . . that which "searches all things, and finds some, is blindest at home and knows least of herself or her own functions." || But he really means, what Locke also meant, that the mind cannot know its own essence. For he agrees with St. Austin that whereas "the eye of the flesh sees other things but not itself, the understanding sees other things and itself too" (p. 3) in this sense, that it is able "not only to act, but to reflect on its actions, and so to make itself its own object."

* Vol. I., pp. 452. Vol. II., pp. 574. Octavo.

† Vol. II., p. 2.

‡ In his "Remarks on Locke's Essay."

§ Human Understanding. Cap. I. § 1.

|| Cap. I. pp. 2, 3.

II. Before discussing *how* we think, he is
 Of what is thinking a function? drawn to a "preliminary consideration" (p. 4) as to "the Principle of Thought."

(a) "Thinking is generally presumed to be a property belonging to the Soul" "But perhaps (I speak as a philosopher) I *have* no soul, so far as that signifies a principle, or substance, distinct from matter Perhaps the soul is not really distinct from what we call the body, or is only a body of finer mould and contexture than the other." No observation, drawn from the appearance of life and death, can resolve the doubt—"since all these may be mechanically accountable." No, the only way into light is "by our thinking." "But even 'thought' would not demonstrate an immaterial principle if matter itself could think (p. 7).

III. (b) Can, then, matter think? For if it
 Can matter think? can, with the Immateriality goes also the immortality of the Soul (p. 8). No doubt matter, as well as spirit, is immortal in the sense of imperishable (*i.e.*, not to be annihilated); but, in the sense of indissoluble (as opposed to corruptible), spirit alone is so. Unless, therefore, thinking is distinctive of Spirit, man may not be a spirit; and, as finer matter, the soul may dissolve with the body. (c) The enquiry, then, is pressing,—“Can matter think?” Norris stretches the answer to this enquiry through many paragraphs; but he does little more than ring the changes on the Cartesian principle that matter precludes thought by *its very idea*. For the essential idea of matter is ‘Extension,’ and “Extension and Thought are two distinct Ideas—distinct in their whole kind, as distinct as a circle, or a triangle, or as any two things can possibly be” (p. 15). “*Omne id quod potest cogitare est mens, sed cum mens et corpus realiter distinguntur, nullum corpus est mens, ergo nullum Corpus potest cogitare.*” *

* Descartes Resp: ad Object, p. 69.

Thought, in fact, cannot be ascribed to matter on any ground of reason. And "so much is granted by the author* of the letter to the Bishop of Worcester; but he is pleased to betake himself to the Omnipotence of God" (p. 47). "To assign," however, "the power of God instead of a natural reason, or to fly to the power of God against clear reason, appears to me equally unphilosophical." There are impossibilities, and this is one. For, "although God, who comprehends all mechanism in its utmost extent, and wants no power to reduce His theory to practice, can, to be sure," evolve "all that the power of matter can possibly rise to," yet "to go beyond that, or to give matter a power, or a perfection, that is in no way contained in its idea, or intelligible essence"—this would be "to alter the species, and instead of making matter to do this or that, to make something else to do it, which is not matter—concerning which there is no dispute" (p. 51).

IV. Can (3) At this point, he cannot resist a Brutes feel? "digression concerning the souls of brutes—whether they have any thought, or sensation, in them or no" (cap. 2, p. 58). His answer might be anticipated. It is the same as that of Descartes and Malebranche; and is given on much the same grounds. It is really implied in the Cartesian definition of thought.

Thought is the property of spirit; Sensation is a form of thought; therefore, unless you are prepared to grant that animals have spirits—and so are immortal—they cannot think; and if they cannot think, then neither can they feel. This seems fairly to summarize all that Norris has to say on the subject, and, as it is a digression, we may pass on. †

* Locke to Stillingfleet. 2nd letter (P).

† Norris, like Malebranche, did not always hold the insensibility of animals, *e.g.*, cp. Discourses, Vol. II., p. 101—"Brute and irrational creatures . . . suffer pain for awhile, then resign up their breath," &c. Also Discourses, Vol. III., 160—"Beasts feel only the weight of present evil, and of this only pain," &c.

V. What is
Thought?
i.e., as to the
way it acts,
and as to
object.

But not even yet is the way quite clear for the main point—"How we think." He feels it necessary to engage the reader's attention on a long discourse concerning thought itself. If, indeed, he were asked to say what thought is 'per se' (cap. 3, p. 101), he would not pretend to explain—not because, as happens in some cases, he cannot explain it so well as he can conceive it, but because he does not in the least really know. If, however, the question be about the *act* of thinking, and about its object, he can say some things which "may be neither unworthy consideration, nor beside the limits of our present design" (p. 102).

Formal
and
objective
thought.

What follows betrays the Scholastic method at every turn: First (1) he distinguishes between "formal thought," "or the very act of thinking," and "objective thought," or, as he understands it, "the Immediate and Intrinsic term of that act" (p. 105)—"what a *School* Philosopher" would call, *not* the "objectum quod," but the "objectum quo"—the Idea.*

Thought,
reflex
and
direct.

(2) Next, he distinguishes between Direct and Reflex thought—"figurative terms" which, strictly speaking, are incongruous as applied to thought, because belonging to motion—a mode of matter. (a) "I conceive that *then* thought is said to be direct, when the act of thought terminates upon its *ideal object*; and then (b) reflex, when the same act of thought terminates upon itself, or is its own object: as when a man thinks that he thinks" (p. 120. cap iii. § 2).

Thought
of
perception
and
volition.

(3) He dwells on Thought of Perception—in which the understanding is concerned; and thought of volition—in which the Will is concerned. As to the former,

* The 'schools'—he says—and likewise Descartes in his 3rd Meditation, call that formal thought which is properly objective, and that objective which is properly the thing thought upon (p. 106 and pp. 114, 115).

"Perception is either in the way of Idea, or in the way of sentiment. For even our very feeling is a sort of perception, and is usually so called" (§3, p.124). He would name the one "Intellectual, or ideal, perception; and the other sensible perception, or, in one word, sensation." The function of the understanding is to perceive; and as such, it does nothing else (p. 127, ff); the function of the Will is to judge and decide.* "All reasoning is Judgment, though all Judgment be not reasoning; and all judgment, and reasoning properly so called, belong the Will" (p.131). Hence the proper defect of the understanding is ignorance, or mere non-perception, as that of the will is error, or wrong assent. Error is always blameworthy—"it being always in our power to avoid it by not judging" (p. 127), if we do not perceive; or, "by not judging any further than we perceive." Ignorance, on the contrary, is "sometimes excusable."†

(4) He distinguishes thought, again, into active and passive—declaring thought of volition to be purely active; sensible perception, or sensation, to be purely passive; Intellectual perception to be partly active and partly passive. This does not answer to the 'Agent' and 'Patient' understanding of the Schools—in whose language the 'understanding Patient' "is that, and that only," which does the thinking; whilst the "understanding Agent" finds its work in "forming intelligible species" for the contemplation of the other (cap. 3, § 4, p. 132, ff).

(5) He adds, further, that thought is either 'simple or complex,' not as regards the act of thinking—which both in thought of volition and thought of perception is always simple—but as regards the object. In this respect, thought of

* Cp. De Inquirenda Veritate I., 1. (P.)

† cp. Malebranche, Traite de Morale, VI., 12, (P).

volition is invariably complex : "because it compounds, or puts together, something else" (§ 5, p 139). Thus, that "act which we call judgment," . . . whether it be "immediate or mediate," whether it proceed "by way of proposition, or by way of conclusion" ; whether it be "ennunciative or illative," is "a complex thought as uniting and compounding one thing with another." Thought of perception, on the other hand, is both simple and complex—the one, "when it has for object single and solitary ideas" ; the other, "when it considers the truths (relations or habitudes) which result from those ideas" (p. 140). Our knowledge, too, shows a 'like difference'—being sometimes direct, or an intuitive apprehension of "Principles" which shine by their own light ; and sometimes indirect or a demonstrative reaching of conclusions through a middle term, or illustration (p. 145 ff). "The name of Science" may be conceded to both, but should belong, by "way of eminence," to intuition alone.

Thought,
clear and
confused.

(6) Proceeding still with his consideration about thought, he enlarges on Thoughts, clear and confused—disputing the validity of the "difference which Descartes makes between 'distinct' and 'clear':" unless "clear relates to the object of my thought as it is in itself," and "distinct to the same object of thought as it differs from other things" (p. 156) ; and agreeing with him that the criterion of truth—in the sense of *Criterion secundum quod* (for the *per quod* is Reason) is just and "clear perception." "Whatever we clearly perceive we perceive it as it is: for otherwise we do not clearly perceive it" (p. 167.)

The use of
abstraction
in thinking.

(7) He then devotes a section to the use of "Abstraction" in thinking—showing that, though occasioned by the Infirmary of our understanding (which is unable to comprehend all the intelligible nature of things in one view), "it is yet a great help to it in contemplation as serving to make

its view of things more clear and distinct * . . . and extensive."

Thought,
pure and
impure.

(8) He goes on to speak of "Pure and impure thought" (p. 176, 8), explaining the difference as follows: "All ideas are spiritual and immaterial, really and essentially" (p. 181), yet "they are not all so representatively"—for they do not all represent spirit, but "some of them extension or matter." "Now, when the idea that is the immediate object of my thought" is spiritual, in the sense of "representing a spiritual being to me, then my thought may be said to be pure" (p. 182). . . . "But, when the idea that is the object of my thought" is material, in the sense of "representing matter, or any material affection, to me, then my thought is said to be impure." The latter may also be described as Imagination, and the former as "Intellect, strictly and properly so called." For "I would assign this as the (p. 187) difference" between the two that "in imagination the immediate object of thought is an idea which is representatively material, and that in the intellect the immediate object of thought is representatively immaterial." There is another view of imagination—favoured by the new philosophy—which resolves "it into certain images or traces in the brain, imprinted on it, as is supposed, by the different motion and disposition of the animal spirits" (p. 184). The soul, applying itself to "those Prints or Images, is said to imagine, as, on the contrary, when she thinks, or perceives, without any such corporal Images, she is said to understand." But this notion—as making Images, instead of Ideas, an immediate object of thought—"is extremely gross and un-metaphysical." "And, therefore, I must own myself not a little surprised to find it so much favoured as it seems to be by M. Malebranche, as not seeing how it

* "As spectacles, though in him that uses them they argue weakness of sight, yet when used they very much aid the vision."

can consist with his Principles" (p. 186). The last words are quoted because they show that on some points—though very few, and these of minor importance—the disciple could, dissent from the master.

VI. Vision, (9). The next section treats of vision, material and formal. which, in the material sense, "signifies the passing or trajectory of the rays of light with all their refractions through the several coats and humours of the eye, and the impression which they make in the bottom of it upon the optick nerve." . . . In the formal sense, however, it "signifies that inward sense or perception which, according to the law of union established by the author of nature between soul and body, follows upon, and is occasioned by, that impression" (p. 190). This last is an act of the mind. The mind alone sees—or perceives the sensation produced by light, and, on occasion of it, an Idea is added "that is representatively material, or that represents extension with the several modes of it" (p. 195), answering to the outward object. There is thus in vision a twofold element—a perception of sensation, and an idea of the thing. Both are given to the mind, both are due to the direct action of God, and yet they are distinct from each other—"though M. Malebranche be the first Philosopher that I know of that ever formally made the distinction" (p. 207).

VII. The manner of our thinking. At last Norris feels himself free to enter upon "the explication of the manner of our Thinking." But (Chap. IV. 264 ff), he premises that by the manner of our thinking is meant (here) not "*how* we perform that intellectual operation which we call thought, but" . . . "what is it which by itself terminates our understanding, or is the immediate object of our thought." He is thus led to make a "general distribution of Intelligible objects into their several kinds"—going over, in so doing, not a little of the ground already traversed.

Objects of knowledge are absolute, or relative to us. (1) He enjoins us to "distinguish carefully between objects that are absolutely intelligible in themselves and such as are at present Intelligible by us, or which we perceive" (p. 267).

The Latter are in, or out of, the mind. (2) He divides the latter into those within the mind, and those without. (*a*) "Things *in* the mind are not our ideas but our thoughts (*i.e.* acts of thinking) of whatsoever kind they be—whether in the way of volition, or in the way of perception" (p. 269), and that either intellectual (*i.e.*, pure thought), or sensible (impure thought), and so on.

(*b*) "Things out of the mind" include ideas—both those perceived "in consequence of impression made upon certain parts of our bodies (whose organical structure is fitted for the reception of such impressions), and those which the mind perceives without having any such impressions made upon the body" (p. 271).

Thought—as mere act—needs no idea. (3) Our thoughts (*i.e.*, acts of thinking) are immediately perceived by themselves; because they are in the mind, and so more "intimate" than ideas can be. There is "no need here for Ideas" (p. 278).

God not seen by an idea but by a 'Real Presence.' (4) Objects external to the mind are mostly seen through ideas, but *some* by a "Real Presence." God, *e.g.*, is immediately intelligible; "not absolutely as to degree and extent of knowledge, but as to immediateness" (p. 283ff). For (*a*) no idea to represent God is needed—none being able to bring Him nearer to the soul than He is. (*b*) No idea could represent Him (p. 284). Descartes' argument, * (p. 292), has this fundamental fault, "that it all proceeds upon the false though common supposition, that we perceive

* "As to which I know not any just ground I had to say—as I do in my 'metaphysical essay'—that he was beholden for it to St. Austin and the Platonists."

God, as we do other things, by an idea that is really distinct from him ; and, indeed, that the idea of God is one of his effects." Amend the argument thus, and Descartes improved upon. "it is not, perhaps, so desperate." "We have a notion, or perception, of such a Being as we call God." Add to this—"what we have before shewn"—that we perceive Him immediately by Himself" (p. 295). . . . and it must "necessarily follow that He is, since otherwise he could not possibly be perceived by us."

Two things more—"because not really Ideas and Ideal but only formally distinct" from God Relations also self-revealing. —are also classed among self-revealing objects, viz.—Ideas and Eternal Truths (p. 296). "For Ideas, at least as to us, are simply 'Principia cognitionis,' by means of which other things are known." As to God, "they may be considered as 'Principia Operationis,' according to the distinction of Aquinas." But, if they, too, must be known by other things, *then* we have ideas of ideas "which will either lead us on in an infinite length, or about in an endless circle." On the contrary, "if other things are known by them, then they are supposed to be known by themselves." As to the self-revealing nature of Eternal Truths, "this is a necessary consequence of the other" (p. 297 f).

All material things seen through ideas. In regard to material objects—all these are seen by the mediation of Ideas : for (a), such objects are outside the mind, and so no union between them and the "perceptive power" is possible (cap. VI., p. 310 ff) ; (b) they are "utterly disproportionate" to it—thought and extension being "removed from each other by the whole diameter of Being"—and (c), moreover, "if material things" were immediately perceived by themselves, there would be no Physical Science ; for *they* "are contingent and in continual flux," whereas *it* is based on

the "fixed and permanent" * (p. 314 ff). Hence, "we think of corporeal things according to incorporeal reasons—as St. Austin expresses it," † In fine, God is the only "self-intelligible object"—all other things and Beings are known in their ideas, except ‡ our own soul, which is a matter of consciousness, but not of clear perception—its idea at present being hid from us.

VIII.
The origin of
Ideas.
Male-
branche's
Classifica-
tion.

The next thing we have to consider is whence and how men get their ideas. Here "M. Malebranche has laid out a very just and comprehensive division, where he says that it is absolutely necessary that the ideas we have of bodies, and of all other objects which we do not perceive by themselves, (1) should come from those very bodies or from those objects; (2) or that our Soul has a power of producing those ideas; (3) or that God has produced them with the soul when He created it; or (4) that He produces them whenever we think upon any object; (5) or that the soul has, in herself, all those perfections which we see in those bodies; or (6), in fine, that she be united with an all-perfect Being, and that includes in Himself—after an universal manner—all the perfections of created beings." § "This enumeration seems so true and adequate" that we cannot do better than "proceed upon the same heads," "intermixing with what this great man says" "some further reflections of our own as there shall be occasion" "And truly, considering what moderate assistance I have had hitherto in the prosecution of this Work from other men's thoughts, as writing upon a subject which few men have thought much about, I have the less reason to decline it now. And besides,

* De Trin; Lib. 12. c. 2.

† So Plato—According to Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol., Part I. Quæst. 84. Art. i.

‡ Cap. 3. § 9. cp. p. 252—also Malebranche, cap. 7. Bk. 3. pt. 2. Recherche de la Verite (P.)

§ Cap. VI. p. 327. cp. Malebranche Recherche de la Verite, III, ii. 1–5. (P.)

having travelled so much alone in the former stages, a little company now, towards the close of the journey, may be convenient; wherefore, having so good a companion, let us forthwith advance upon the foregoing heads, only taking liberty to word them a little otherwise than they are expressed here" . . . (p. 328). Accordingly, the rest of the work, up to the last chapter, is mainly an explanation and expansion of Malebranche's reasons for rejecting every means of accounting for our Ideas save the last.

IX. (1) He rejects the first "because material objects do not send forth from them any species resembling themselves;" and because, supposing they did, yet as material emanations they could not avail for perception.* It is, in fact, "as whimsical and phantastical an amusement as one can well meet with among all the Romantick Imaginations of the school of philosophy, and I cannot but wonder that so many learned men should so seriously and gravely take up, or rather sit down, with it"—and "among the rest my Lord Bacon," who supposes a kind of Eradiation of visible species from Bodies, and compares them to odours."† He adds that "some Philosophers" manage to attenuate 'the species' in their transit to the brain, and then, "by the help of 'Intellectus Agens' ('twas well I had not said Hocus Pocus), they come in with another sort of species formed out of these;" . . . and "these are the species which the mind has for its proper object" (p. 348). The 'Intellectus Agens' is thus that side of the Intellectual Faculty which 'expresses' out of the material supply (*ie.*, a sort of "corporeal accidents" or 'Qualities'

Why the first five ways of accounting for them are rejected.

Intentional species, *i.e.*, as tending to the brain.

* Cap. VII., p. 230 ff. His points are:—1. Bodies impenetrable. 2. Effects of distance. 3. Perspective—*e.g.*, cube. 4. Things would lessen or waste in the process. *cp.* Malebranche. *Idem.*

† Opuscula Posthuma, page 136. "Videntur species Visibilium esse tanquam emissiones radiorum a corpore visibili instar fere odorum"—about the only explicit reference to Lord Bacon to be met with in Norris.

impressed on the senses), species for the 'Intellectus Patiens' to perceive. He takes note, also, of 'Mr. Locke's Principle,' and says, "if it means that sensible objects do send or convey ideas from themselves to our minds by the mediation of the senses," . . . then it is wrong "by the whole tenour of this discussion;" but if it means* "that sensible objects"—by their impressions on sense—serve to "excite ideas in our minds," there is nothing in it to call for alarm or much scruple (p. 378).

(2) He rejects the second because it implies a "power of strict and proper creation" (p. 378)—Ideas being true realities; and because the power, even if possessed, would be useless: "for even as a painter cannot represent an animal (p. 383) of which he had never any idea, so a man cannot form an idea of any object, if he does not know it before; that is to say, if he has not already an idea of it, which does not depend upon his will."* Men fancy they have the power owing to the "ordinary conjunction of our ideas with our wills." As soon as men have "a mind to think" of this thing or that, the corresponding idea is also presented (p. 378)—"whence they are ready to conclude that the idea is the effect of their will: an error due simply to ignorance of the true cause. But to claim for our will a power to create ideas is "an arrogant conceit"—even God's will being unable to do so much.

(3) The third view is rejected because it means that God would need to store every mind with ideas infinitely numerous and various, as answering to an infinitely varied universe; and, also, to fit it with the capacity to select the right ideas for things on occasions infinitely multiplied (p. 386).

(4) The fourth, that ideas may be created in us 'pro re nata,' is put aside, partly, as bound up with

* "As perhaps it may."

† cp. Malebranche as before. (P).

the third; and, partly, on the ground of its being inconsistent with the fact that the "ideas of all things are, at all times," really present to our minds—at least "confusely," and must be so (p. 390); for "we can at all times will to think of all things," and to think of any object even "confusely," so long as it is utterly unknown to us—*i.e.*, so long as we have no idea of it—is impossible.

(5) But, perhaps, according to the fifth view, the "intellectual light" we are seeking "abroad," is all the time in ourselves; "like the man who, with a great deal of care and diligent circumspection, looks about after the candle, which he has, all the while, upon his own head." As regards sensation, there is no doubt of this; for we place its facts outside us while they are merely 'states' of our own Being (cap. x., p. 394). But to claim the same for Ideas is a "Luciferian ambition," which aims to share a privilege of the Divine mind (p. 369)—that of holding in itself an "Intelligible World." We should, however, "look upon this way of understanding as sacred," and should think the "hypothesis" which bestows it on man to be "sacreligious as well as proud" (p. 398). Besides, "since the mind of man is finite," and yet "can know all Beings, even infinite beings"—though not so as to 'comprehend' them—it follows that "it does not contain them, or see their essence, in itself" (p. 399). Can we say, then, that ideas are "Modalities of the Soul"—in other words, that the Soul thinks, or represents things to herself, simply by modifying her own substance, "sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another?" (p. 399). But (1) this is to confound "sensation with ideas." Sensations, indeed, are modifications of the Soul. Ideas, on the contrary—the idea of extension, *e.g.*,—"are something distinct" from the mind, are something which it cannot 'modify' or conceive otherwise than as they are. (2) Further, "we have a clear intellectual view and

knowledge of our ideas" "But we have no such knowledge of our modifications." "As the Soul knows not its own Being, so neither does it know the modalities of it, but only feels them by a confuse sentiment and if it were so with our ideas, they would be equally dark and untelligible" (p. 402). Again (3), our ideas cannot possibly be "modalities of our souls, because we are temporary, contingent and mutable beings; whereas" Ideas "are necessary, eternal, and immutable" (p. 406),

In short, this hypothesis is like that "odd one of the ancients"—vouched for by "Aquinas"—which made the soul to contain and consist of "the principles of all material things," to the end, that the soul might become possessed of ideas "for the understanding of material objects;" the only difference being that the latter was more 'gross.' And hence we may see "with what sottish extravagances men will take up, rather than go out of themselves for the light of their minds, or acknowledge themselves beholden to any other ideas, than what the perfections of their own nature can furnish them with" (p. 411).

X. And why the last is accepted,	The result so far amounting only to this:—'Scio me hactenus nihil scire'—we have now "one field more to beat" (p. 412). We have to consider that "'tis possible the ideas whereby we understand are the Divine ideas, and consequently that there is no necessity for having
It is at least possible that we see by the Divine Ideas.	recourse to any other" (cap xi., p. 413). The possibility of this is based on three considerations: (a) "that these (Divine) ideas are in themselves most intelligible, and so fit to be the immediate objects of thought" (p. 415); (b) "that they may well be intelligible to us," inasmuch as they are "intimately present with us, and have an immediate union with our minds" (p. 416); (c) that "if we do understand them we shall not fail to understand other things by them," since

they are the "essential representatives, the exemplary measures, the intelligible forms" of all that has been made (p. 417).

And also
reasonable. Granted, therefore, the possibility, "what reasons are there" for holding it to be the fact? These, reduced to syllogistic form, are all wrapt up in the argument:—

1. That we understand things by their ideas,
2. That the ideas whereby we understand are the objects of science (or truth).
3. But the object of science is necessary, immutable and eternal.
4. Therefore the ideas whereby we understand are so likewise; and this is the same as to say that the ideas, by which we see are Divine (cap. xii., p. 428).

He rather objects to M. Malebranche's expression of "seeing all things in God." "This way of speaking"—he says—"is not altogether unscholastick, * and may, for aught I know, be very right, if rightly understood." For he means no more than that, "as things are in God after an intelligible manner;" and as we perceive or see them, to the extent of our perception, after the same manner; therefore, we see them as they are in God (p. 442). But the danger is that, to "common ears," the expression may mean "that things *as they are in nature* are really in God, and are seen in Him according to those sensible appearances which we have of them by reason of the sensations which always accompany our Ideas in vision" (p. 442). Essentially, however, he and Malebranche are quite at one. The difference between them is purely formal.

What we
really see in
God. For "there are two things which we may, and must, in the very strictness of the expression, be said to see in God . . . viz:—Ideas and Eternal Truths" (p. 444). For "ideas are not perceived by ideas

* e.g. "Utrum videntes deum per essentiam omnia in deo videant, Aquinas

again ; nor are eternal truths perceived after an ideal manner as being self-intelligible objects " * (p. 444). " And, therefore, if we will say anything that is particularly instructive (for to say that they are perceived by themselves is too general), we must say that they are perceived in God " (p. 444). " But as for things that are without—contingent beings, sensible objects, creatures—it may be more proper to say that they are seen by the Divine ideas ". (p. 445).

Thus qualified, then, the 'master's' expression may be adopted without harm ; and the only question is how does he make the notion—that we see all things

XI. Male-
branche's
argument.

in God—"appear reasonable." As follows :

(1) From the simplicity of the Divine Operation. "God acts by the most simple ways that are possible. But to make us understand by the Divine ideas, is the most simple way of making us understand that is possible. Therefore, the Divine ideas are the ideas whereby God makes us understand " (p. 447). (2) It "places created spirits in an entire dependence upon God, and the greatest that can be " (p. 450). (3) The process of thought, in fixing our attention upon any particular object, is always a descent from the general to concentration upon the special. "We cannot desire to see any object but that we must see it already, although confusely and in general. And, therefore, since we may desire to see all Beings, sometimes one and sometimes another, it is certain that all beings are present to our minds ; and it seems that all beings cannot be present to our minds any otherwise than because God is present to them, who, in the simplicity of His Being, contains all beings " (p. 453). (4) 'The Mind perceives the Infinite—"has a distinct idea of God"—which idea is not distinct from God Himself. "Therefore, God Himself is the immediate object of our minds ; and, if so, then it seems reasonable to think that the Divine ideas are so

* "As we have shewn."

too ; and that, as we immediately perceive God, so we perceive things in God by those ideas of His which represent them " (p. 454). (5) " As we love nothing but by that necessary love which we have for God, so we see nothing but by that natural knowledge which we have of God. And so all the particular ideas which we have of creatures, are no other than limitations of the idea of the Creator, as all the motions of the Will for the creatures are only determinations of that movement which we have towards the Creator " (p. 456). (6) The reason " whereof man is partaker " is universal. We " see such and such truths, and are sure everybody in the world may see the same " ; but " we do not see them in the minds of others, nor again do they see them in ours . . . there is, therefore, a sovereign and universal reason which all men consult whenever they enter into themselves " (p. 457). (7) This reason, moreover, is seen to be necessary, immutable, and Infinite—and consequently divine : (p. 458 ff) what else, indeed, but that ' wisdom ' whereof Solomon, and that Word whereof John, speaks ? (p. 462-3). " 'Tis true, indeed, we have upon this hypothesis the very same Word for the immediate object of our understandings that God Himself has ; but this Word is ours only by Union of Presence, whereas it is His by identity of Essence . . . Again, we only apprehend that Word, and that very imperfectly, which God fully and perfectly comprehends. And, again, . . . God sees all things in Himself, whereas we see all things in Him ; and because we do so, though it should be allowed that we both see by the same common Light, yet . . . this does but show " most eminently " (p. 473, 4) our " immediate and entire dependence upon Him, and what blind, unintelligent creatures we should be without Him." (8) The fact, too, that " our Souls have an union with the Divine ideas," explains how it is that " there needs only an attentive application of the mind (p. 484) to discover them, and to let us into the knowledge of them." " In all other truths our senses

are concerned, and we must be beholden to our eyes and ears and hands for the knowledge we have of them ; and a man would be ridiculous that should go to prove, by mere reason, that such a one won the Plate at a Horse Race" (p. 483). But men are brought into communion with the Divine ideas, and their resultant truths, by the mere process of thinking. We see them in God—the place of Spirits—upon whom, as Spirits, we look and gaze. "Divinity, then, is a larger study than men are ordinarily aware of; there is something of it diffused throughout all the sciences, and a good philosopher is a Natural Divine, as well as a Lover of God" * (p. 485).

But let the "reader very heedfully observe" that what we see in the Intelligible world is the *pure and mere Idea of a thing* (p. 494 ff). Our consciousness includes sentiment as well—the sentiment of colour, *e.g.*, as well as the idea of extension. The latter only is seen in God ; the former is the product of sense and imagination, which "so far impose upon our understanding that we confound" the one with the other. We clothe our † "ideas with our sentiments ; or, if you will, assume our sentiments into our ideas, as essential parts of them ; and so, out of both make up, as it were, one entire, sensible object" ‡ (p. 495). This will help us to realise how the material and mutable may be said to be seen in God without imputing to Him imperfection. For 'tis the "immutable, the essence, the idea which is in God"—"though that immutable be representative of something mutable out of Him" (p. 497 f). What God sees, therefore, and what we see in Him, is always the former, even when we are said to see the latter.

God, then, by His ideas (or wisdom) enlightens us objectively. And, "to clear the matter completely,"

* "'Tis St. Austin's saying—*Verus Philosophus est Amator Dei.*"

† See Malebranche '*Conversations Chretiennes, Entretien.*' 3, p. 79.

‡ cp. *Recherche de la Verite* I. iii. 6. (also I. 6-13, 20). (P).

it may be added that He also “enlightens us efficiently by His Spirit, assisting our intellectual faculties, and purging our hearts from those lusts and prejudices which darken and pervert our apprehensions of things” (p. 510). This is “what we are to understand by that Grace of Illumination which is spoken of in our common Theology.” For what is ordinarily meant by grace, is not grace, properly speaking; but our natural way of thinking and understanding—“that whereby we are rational or intelligent Beings.”

Cannot
say how
God exhibits
Ideas to us,
or whether
everything
has its own
particular
Idea?

So much for our general meaning. As to the question “how God exhibits His idea to our minds (p. 511), and particularly, whether there are in the Intelligible World particular and precise ideas for everything—*e.g.*, an intelligible Sun, an intelligible tree, &c.; and whether we see one of those precise ideas whenever we look upon one of those Bodies, or (as M. Malebranche seems rather to think) see things in God by the various and different application which he makes to our minds of Intelligible extension”—on occasion of our different sensations—“this is such an enquiry as belongs to the ‘Reserve of a Theory,’” and “I shall therefore leave everyone to conceive of the matter as he pleases, or as he can” (p. 512). The essential point is this, and this only, “that as God contains in Himself, after an intelligible manner, the perfections of all Beings, both actual and possible, and by these intelligible perfections, or ideas, knows the essence of all things,” . . . so God is also our true light—enabling us to see His works “by the perfections of their Creator, even by those very ideas whereby they were made” (p. 513).

Let the
reader hold
the scales
even
between this
Theory
and Reason.

Such is the theory. And “the competent reader (who, perhaps, is not always the most learned), is desired to judge of it” (p. 515), not only by those reasons urged in its favour, but also by those urged

against every other. "For all is to be taken into the account, and when it is—so I am apt to fancy—it will weigh pretty heavy; always provided that the Hand that holds the Scales holds it even, and that there is nothing but reason in the other end of the Ballance" (p. 515). At the same time, "I will not be thought positive or decretory, but only to propose an hypothesis; and to be considered rather as an enquirer than as a dogmatical assessor." And yet, after all, "I shall presume so far—not upon my capacity, but upon that application of thought which I have bestowed upon these things—as to say (and I say it not rashly), that if this account of Humane understanding, or, of the ideas whereby we understand, be not right, I shall pretty much despair of ever coming to know how it is that we understand, or whence, or what our ideas are" (p. 516).

XII.
Practical
advantages
of the
'Theory.'

In the last chapter, he states some of the advantages to Religion and Morality which may be inferred from the Theory. They are all such as he has already anticipated. (1) It plainly and necessarily postulates the existence of God (p. 553 ff). (2) "As it stands in a diametrical opposition," to atheism, so, also, is it as direct against Arianism, as implying the co-essentiality and consubstantiality of the Divine Word with the Father." (3) It places us in the greatest and most immediate dependence upon God (p. 551). (4) It lays us under "peculiar engagements of Love and gratitude towards God, whom we are to regard not only as our chief but as our only good, the Good of our understandings as well as the good of our Wills" (p. 559). (5) It indicates the "Divine Word or Wisdom"—in which our ideas are—as our only true teacher and master that enlightens our understandings, so that "the most direct and natural way for the discovery of truth is, instead of going abroad for intelligence, to retire into ourselves, and there, with humble and silent

attention, both to consult and receive the answers of interior truth, even of that Divine Master which teaches in the school of the breast" (p. 571). 'Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas.'* (6) In the last place, be it observed that "this hypothesis lays the foundation of humility—which itself is the foundation of all practical religion—as low as is possible, and makes pride appear to be the most unreasonable—I was about to say, the most unphilosophical—sin in the World", Since by it we are supposed to be "all darkness in ourselves, and light only in the Lord."

* St. Austin.

NORRIS AND LOCKE.

Norris and Locke had a common acquaintance in Lady Masham, of Oates, *—(1658-1708)—though Norris seems, after a time, to have fallen out of her ‘good grace,’ while Locke was an intimate friend and her honoured guest for years. The two philosophers, therefore, may have met at her house; there is, however, no reason to think they ever did, or indeed that Norris was ever a visitor at Oates. There is no trace of any direct correspondence between them; and there was everything in their mental idiosyncrasies to keep them apart. But we know what they thought of each other—at least as writers. The ‘Essay on the Human Understanding’ was published in 1690, and was, it would seem, sent at once to Norris by a ‘Friend,” who asked his opinion of it. Norris complied in a ‘Letter,’ which came out the same year. These ‘cursory Reflections’ †—as he called them—were probably the first public notice of the Essay, and are not, by any means, the least considerable. The substance of them is as follows:—(1) He remarks that if “‡ the understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself,” then the ‘Essay’ “must needs be very unaccountably undertaken.”

(2) He thinks that before proceeding to account for the § *origin* of Ideas, the author ought first to have

* Locke settled here in the spring of 1691, and made it his home till his death. Oates is a manor-house in the parish of High Lavis, Essex, about 20 miles from London.

† Published at the end of the first vol. of ‘Discourses.’

‡ cp. Essay; Introduction § 1.

§ Essay: Introduction, § 3.

defined what he meant by them, and to have acquainted us with their nature. "Till that be done, all further Discourse is but talk in the Dark."

(3) He argues that the author cannot fairly *object to innate principles* * on the ground that "there are none to which mankind give an Universal Assent," when he himself admits the existence of "self-evident Propositions."

(4) He shows that Locke's express allowance of subconscious † impressions (or ideas) destroys the force of his plea, that for "Truths to be imprinted on the Soul, which it (actually) perceives, or understands not, is a contradiction." (cap. II., § 5.)

(5) Whether, then, there be any Innate Ideas or no, . . . it does not follow that there are none because they are not necessarily perceived—"which utterly silences an argument taken from the non-perception of them in children."

(6) "And if nullity of Perception will not conclude" against Innate Principles, much less will the lateness of Perception be able to do it. That they do not always ‡ "appear fairest and clearest" in children may be owing to the laws and conditions of the mind, which 'so order' it as to prevent a 'natural' impression becoming 'legible,' till after "a certain period of time." By Locke's own confession, "There is a time when children begin to think," § and why, then, may there not be a set time for the awakening of Particular Thoughts.

(7) As to Innate Practical Truths, when the author dismisses them with the question, "Where is that Practical Truth which is universally received?" || let his own words answer him. "I doubt not but

* Book I, Chapters 1-3; Chapter II, § 4.

+ Cites as instances:—(1) Child receiving impressions before birth, or in earliest years. (2) A man engaged on one thing, and so taking no notice of impressions. (3) Memory—"a repertory of Ideas"—retrieves the consciousness of them, not the Ideas themselves.

† Chapter II, § 27.

§ cp. Essay, Book I, Chapter II, § 25.

|| Chapter III, § 2.

from Principles as incontestable as those of Mathematics, by necessary consequences, the Measures of Right and wrong may be made out to anyone."* How to adjust these two positions, "I no more know than he does to reconcile Morality and Mechanism."

(8) Norris meets the objection that "there cannot any one Moral rule be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a Reason," † by asking "why may not God be supposed, for a further security of our virtue, to implant even those Practical Propositions upon our minds, which are also capable of being demonstrated from Principles of Reason?" and the further objection, "that the generally allowed Breach of a Law proves it not innate," ‡ is met by asking "why may not an Innate Law be allowedly broken as well as a written Law?"

(9) What Locke says about "Innate Propositions approving themselves by being easily distinguishable from other Truths," § leads his opponent to observe "that a man may be sensible of a Truth impressed, and yet not of the impression, and so may not know that it is impressed, but think it came some other way; and so may not be able to distinguish it from some other that does."

These he conceives, are the main arguments on which Locke relies,|| and neither any nor all of them are sufficient for their purpose. Indeed, Locke can never, on his Principle, disprove Innate Ideas. "For since, with those of the Peripatetic School, he allows that Ideas are impressed upon the mind from sensible objects, he cannot (as another might) object against the Possibility of such Impressions." He himself "as little believes" in Innate Ideas, "strictly and properly so called," as Locke. Not, however, for

* see Book IV, cap. 3, § 18.

† Chapter III, § 4.

‡ Chapter III, § 9.

§ Chapter III, § 14.

|| So far as he deals with 'Innate Ideas.' Into the other parts of the 'Essay' Norris does not go.

Locke's reasons ; but because he holds a Theory which compels him to regard all talk of "Mental Impressions, or Characters, written upon the mind"—except in a purely figurative sense—as 'mere jargon' and "unintelligible Cant." All that his Theory will let him admit, is something 'of near Analogy' to Innate Ideas, viz:—That God may, and does, 'exhibit some particular Truths of the Ideal world more early, more clearly, and more constantly to the view of the Soul than others, that by these she may be the better directed to the good of the Reasonable Life, as animals by sensitive Instincts and Inclinations are to the good of sense.'

But, though he finds the Philosopher not to his mind, he can respect the man. "The author," he says, "is just such a kind of writer as I like : one that has thought much and well, and who freely writes what he thinks. I hate your 'commonplace' * men of all the writers in the world, who, though they happen to say things that are, in themselves, not only true but considerable ; yet never write in any 'train' or order of thinking, which is one of the greatest beauties of composition. But this gentleman is a writer of very different genius and complexion of Soul, and whose character I cannot easily give, but must leave it either to the description of some finer pen, or to the silent admiration of Posterity;" only he (Norris) is sure, from his evident "Ingenuity and Candour," "that he will not be offended with that freedom I have used in these Reflections, which were not intended for the lessening of his Fame, but solely for the Promotion of Truth and right thinking." This is the tone of all the References—not a few—to Locke, which I have met with in Norris, and is undoubtedly sincere.

Locke did not, at the time, take any open notice of Norris's criticisms. He left this to others—among

* A 'pet' word of his—he means men who keep a 'Commonplace' Book.

whom certain 'gentlemen' of the "Athenian Society" make themselves visible. To these Norris replied in "a Brief consideration," annexed to the "Reflections" just summarized, and had no difficulty in dealing with them—advancing, however, nothing fresh.

But although Locke took no 'open' notice, he did take notice both of the Reflections, and of "Mr. Norris's Books" generally—in particular of his "*Reason and Religion*."* In 1693 he jotted down some 'hasty thoughts,' which, with more 'leisure,' he meant to complete; but which were found after his death, imperfect, and published as he left them.

Here the inevitable antagonism of the two minds comes out sharply—not seldom in words, and a tone, which betray the common-sense Philosopher's contempt. (1) Norris is one of those who "think they have given an account of the Nature of Ideas, by telling us 'we see them all in God;' as if 'we understood what Ideas are in the understanding of God better than when they are in our own!'. . . Nay: 'What the Divine Ideas are we know as plainly as we know one, two or three!'" . . . (2) Norris is not content to know the phenomenal conditions under which our Ideas arise—he wants to know *what* they are—*i.e.*, "their causes and manner of production in the mind;" and "in what alterations of the mind the perception of them consists?". . . But "no man can tell, or can give any account of any alteration made in any simple substance whatsoever." On this point "our side (his own) have the ingenuity to confess their ignorance; the other side (Malebranche and Norris) pretend to be knowing." "God," says Norris, "does all things by the simplest and shortest ways—*i.e.*, God never does anything in vain." Then, (3) Locke

1689-90. "Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris's books—wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's opinion of our seeing all things in God." At the end—"the finishing of these hasty thoughts must be deferred to another season." Oates, 1693. See Edition of Locke's Works, 1823-10 Vols., printed for Thos. Tegg.

would like to know how this Principle—on which their whole system is built—can be reconciled with, *e.g.*, “the curious structure of the eye and ear?” Such elaborateness is lost labour if it does nothing at all, in the ordinary way of cause and effect, “towards the producing of Ideas in the mind.” “We have a distinct idea of God,” says Norris. “To say that we *see* him” “as he is in himself,” is “presumption,” answers Locke. “God made all things for Himself; therefore, we see all things in Him,” says Norris. “And this is called demonstration!” answers Locke. “If our being made for God,” he adds, “necessarily demonstrates that we should see all things in Him,” this at last demonstrates that we are not ‘half-made,’ since it is confessed by our author that we see no other ideas in God than those of number, extension and essences—which are not half the ideas that take up men’s minds.” “Plainly put,” the notion that God contains all the simple essences in Himself, which are representative of actual existences, simply means that “God has always a power to produce anything that involves not a contradiction, and He also *knows* what he can do,” But what is all this to Ideas in Him, plainly visible by us? God knew from Eternity that He could produce a pebble, a mushroom, and a man. Were those, which are distinct Ideas, part of His simple essence? The Ideas of them existed in God “*eminenter*,” did they? Then the things themselves existed, too, “*eminenter*,” and, therefore, all the creatures, as they really exist, are the essence of God . . . “What is this better than what those say who make God to be nothing but the universe, though it be covered under unintelligible expressions of simplicity and variety, at the same time, in the essence of God?” According to this theory God is all, man nothing; man does nothing, God everything. “A man cannot move his arm or his tongue—he has no power only on occasion—the man willing it, God moves it. The man wills—he doth something; or else God, upon the occasion of some-

thing which He Himself did before, produced this will and this action in him. This is the hypothesis that clears doubts, and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza, by resolving all—even the thoughts and will of men—into an irresistible fatal necessity. For whether the original of it be from the continued motion of Eternal, all-doing matter, or, from an Omnipotent immaterial being, which, having begun matter and motion, continues it by the direction of occasion which He Himself has also made;” as to religion and morality, it is just the same thing.

(4) “But we must know how everything is brought to pass, and thus we have it resolved without leaving anything to perplex us!” “This, therefore, may be a sufficient excuse of the ignorance I have owned of what our Ideas are, any further than as they are the perceptions we experiment, and are conscious of in ourselves; and of the dull, unphilosophical way I have taken of examining their production only so far as experience and observation lead me.” (5) “Ideas,” he admits, “may be real Beings, though not substances.” Motion is a “real being,” and Ideas probably depend on, and are, in some way or other, the effect of, Motion. But this is not to explain Ideas; it throws no light on the spiritual act of perception which accompanies, or follows, the ‘intra-organic and extra-organic’ affections; the explanation is beyond us.

To the same effect Locke criticised Malebranche, in a paper which he did not finish and would not print, partly because the Frenchman’s peculiar opinions seemed “like to die of themselves,” or at best to do no great harm; and partly because, said he, “I like not controversies, and have a personal kindness for the author.”

The sarcasm of the strictures just quoted is not to be wondered at. To Locke Norris’s views were—as his friend Molyneux (1656-98,) put it—“Metaphysical whimsies which infect men’s brains with a spice of madness,” and which the sane man will do his best

to correct. Nor does it seem easy to doubt that, on one point at least, the critic is entirely in the right—viz., when he maintains that the logical outcome of his position commits Norris to a form of Pantheism.

In Descartes, matter and spirit are substances, strictly so called. As such they constitute an absolute dualism. Body cannot act upon mind, nor mind upon body. But, though there is no link of causation between body and mind, there *is* between body and body, and within each mind itself. Thought can produce thought, and one particle of matter can pass on its motion to another. God's immediate action lies, on the one hand, in translating bodily sensations into corresponding perceptions; and, on the other, in translating mental volitions into material movements. Malebranche, followed by Norris, goes much further. "He denies that one moving body can set another in motion, or that one human thought can produce another; in both cases, the consecution is due to the Eternal efficiency of God, repeating at every instant the act of creation, whence each first phenomenon arose." Thought and matter, accordingly, are no longer substances: the sole substance is God. * "God is all Being." "Being, itself"—says Norris—"is the cause of all particular Beings, for all particular Beings are what they are by partaking of Being itself; . . . and if Being itself be the cause of all the degrees of Being that are in particular Beings, then it must have in itself *all* those degrees; for nothing can communicate what it has not. The short is, whatever is in the effect must pre-exist, some way or other, in that cause upon which it wholly depends."

What, then, becomes of the outer world? If its every motion is God's own direct act; and if He, also, contains the Idea—that of extension—which constitutes its essence, what is left? It is not merely dependent upon God, but is wholly lost in Him.

* 'Reason and Religion,' p. 26.

What becomes, too, of human personality? On its cognitive side, the act of thinking, the faculty of apprehension, the object of Thought, are all in God. He is the universal Reason, of which ours is only a 'local' gleam. He is the illumination of all minds. Our thought is ('ad modum recipientis') His thought. Thus, there is nothing in the subjective movement of our mind properly our own; and as to its 'objective term'—that again is in God: in God we gaze with God on God's Ideas. In this way "the Divine and the human Reason are unified. In this way, however, their co-existence as rational is impossible: the human resigns its individuality and lapses into the Infinite element, like a wave which seems to be an advancing body with a horizontal run, but is really but a vertical movement upon a stationary deep. The eternal thought is but the Totality of these infinite undulations, actual and possible; and has its infinitude not in being their other, but in being their *all*,"* The same holds good for the active side of our nature. Norris insists strongly on the fact, and the freedom, of our will in the Malebranchian sense. It is one constitutive element of our mind, as understanding is the other. It is the will that judges and decides on what the understanding lays before it. It is able to 'suspend' judgment, until the perceptions of the understanding are perfectly clear; it is responsible for the 'errors' which are due to rash or wrong judgment; and for all the practical mistakes, failures, and sins which such errors entail. But in truth, where is there really any room for the will's freedom? In another point of view the will, as a principle, is represented as our natural inclination towards good, towards our true good, towards God. That is to say, its own inherent bent is to choose that, and that only, which is "perfective of our Being." But whence comes this inclination? It is an "impression" or "impulsion" immediately de-

* Martineau—"Malebranche" in *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. I.

rived, and perpetually renewed, from God. God is the sole author of it. Its proper movement, however—with God for goal—is checked and deflected by lower influences. These influences spring out of the connection between mind and body. Bodily *παθηματα* passing into sensible experiences, or Imaginations, darken the understanding with delusive notions of the good and pleasurable; and so it comes that the will is led to judge and choose amiss. But, the union between mind and body is maintained every moment by God. Apart from Him, apart from the act by which He interpolates a feeling, or an image, between the last cerebral, and the first mental, change, there could be no transmission of bodily influence. Hence, it appears that both “Dynamic factors” *—the primary force (or inclination), and the modifying condition—are Divine, and they make up the total causality. On all sides, then, the Malebranchian hypothesis—unreservedly accepted by Norris—looks toward Pantheism, and marks a point more than half way on the road from Descartes to Spinoza.

But, after all, the Theory of Ideas does not stand or fall with the Theory of seeing all things in God. The latter is not its necessary consequence, it is rather an excrescence—the perishable product of a solitary thinker. The former, on the other hand, runs back to the “Divine Plato,” and can count on its side a long succession of the noblest intellects. It was the ‘Realism’ of St. Austin and Erigena and Anselm and the ‘Schools’ generally, in their palmy days; and its conflict with Nominalism was not the empty strife over mere abstractions which Locke—in his natural reaction against the scholastic hair-splitting with which he was familiar—seemed to think. That conflict, indeed, concerned questions which, under another name, are just as living and pressing to-day as they ever were. We speak now of ‘Noumena’ and ‘Phenomena,’ things

* Martineau.

in themselves, and things as they appear to us. The change of name is unimportant. The main point is still the same—namely, whether there are any ‘noumena,’ and what they are, and how, or how far, they can be known; and how they stand related to that of which the senses take account. These questions are of perennial interest, and are the vital breath of philosophy. To Norris the interest of them was entralling. He found, or seemed to find, the answer to them in what Plato said about Ideas—Ideas dwelling in God as the Eternal Patterns of all that takes shape, or place, in time. This ‘Theory’ he embraced with all his soul—he read it into his favourite authors; he fashioned his Theology by it; he rose upon it, as upon wings, into poetry and mysticism.

He often let it run him into extremes; and, at last, he took it from the hands of Malebranche* with additions, which make it appear grotesque. But the secret of its essential charm, in his case and in others, is an ‘open’ one. It is that of every theory which promises a reasonable way of escape from subjection to the accidental and the fleeting. It enabled him to rest in the conviction of an absolute and Eternal Order—ruling in all Worlds and over all Beings, even God Himself—the fountain of all light for his Reason, and Law for his conscience—the sure support of all knowledge—the guardian and guarantee of all that makes the real strength and progress and blessedness of man. “The old order changeth, yielding place to

* One distinguished Philosopher, at least—Sir William Hamilton—holds that Malebranche was not the ‘originator’ of his peculiar hypothesis. “I cannot concur in the praise of novelty and invention which has always been conceded to the central Theory of Malebranche. His vision of all things in Deity is, as it appears to me, simply a transference to man in the flesh, to the Viator, of that mode of cognition maintained by many of the older Catholic Divines in explanation of how the Saints, as disembodied spirits, can be aware of human invocations; and, in general, of what passes upon earth. ‘They perceive,’ it is said, ‘all things in God.’ So that in truth the philosophical theory of Malebranche is nothing but the extension of a theological hypothesis long common in the schools; and with scholastic speculations Malebranche was even intimately acquainted.”—“Discussions in Philosophy,” pp. 198-9.

the new." The words of Norris, or even the words of Plato, are not our words; nor are their thoughts exactly our thoughts. But we are one with them in the inextinguishable craving for Reality, and we cannot but honour them for their impassioned witness to its existence, even though others may possibly do more to help us towards its attainment.

NORRIS AND BERKELEY.

“Norris,” says Principal Tullock, * “stands by himself, in the history of English Philosophy, the solitary Platonist of the Revolution era, who handed on the Torch of Idealism into the next century, till it was grasped by the vigorous and graceful hand of Berkeley.” And again, “Norris has comparatively passed out of sight, and Berkeley is a familiar name to every student of Philosophy. But Norris, although a half-forgotten, is really a striking and significant figure in the history of English Philosophy. He was an Idealist of the purest type, sustained by the loftiest inspiration. His fine genius, exquisite spiritual sensibility, and tender exaltation of character, well deserve a niche by itself in the temple of Idealism.” There is some inaccuracy here, so far as the words ‘handing the Torch of Idealism on to Berkeley’ may be meant to imply indebtedness to Norris on Berkeley’s part. Of this there was absolutely none, although Tullock mentions, as significant, that the publication of Norris’s “Ideal World” was completed in 1704; and that Berkeley’s “Principles of Human Knowledge” did not appear till five years later.

“Berkeley,” we are told, “disavowed all community with Malebranche in his thought about the World, and maintained that no two sets of principles about real knowledge were more opposed than those of the French Father and his own.” † He would have said the same as to Norris.

Rational Theology in the 17th century, Vol. II.

Fraser’s Life of Berkeley, p. 110. (Blackwood’s Philosophical Classics.)

I. His earliest teacher was Locke, and Locke formed the starting-point of his own speculations. Like Locke, he uses the term *Idea* in the sense of 'impression' received through the senses; and, no more than Locke, does he attempt to explain how physical impression is translated into mental perception, or what modification of the mind accompanies the change—in other words, he does not inquire into the 'nature' of *Ideas*. His concern is with the fact, that what the senses report, and what is given in *Ideas*, are *Phenomena* and nothing else. Go as deeply, or analyse as closely, as you may, you are still among *Phenomena*. Matter, in the vulgar meaning of the term—as unphenomenal substrate—there is none. Clusters, or aggregates, of *Phenomena*—which we call individuals—are due to 'sense suggestion' and 'custom.' *Phenomena* displayed in a series of individuals, with their uniformities of relation and working—*i.e.*, the *Cosmos*—illustrate the action of Reason, which tacitly assumes that *Phenomena* are "interpretable" and "significant." Even space is relative: it has "no distinct absolute being," and time he takes to be "constituted by a succession of *Ideas*." Thus far, his views point to a negative result. They are mainly destructive of the prevalent notion—maintained by Descartes—that matter is something substantial in itself. They entitle Berkeley to be called not so much an Idealist as a Phenomenalist.

II. At a latter stage, the name Idealist becomes more appropriate. In the '*Siris*' he rises link by link along a chain of reflections which bring him ultimately to a Real cause such as *Phenomena* nowhere reveal. * "The physical hypothesis of the universal efficacy of tar-water—encouraged by daily companionship with Plato and the Neo-Platonists—led him by subtle transitions from the vital essence of plants and

* Fraser's *Life of Berkeley*, pp. 191-2-3. (Blackwood's *Philosophical Classics*.)

animals to the vital spirit of the Universe ; from that to the necessary dependence of all merely phenomenal causation on what transcends nature ; and at last to the intuition of the whole phenomenal world—organic as well as inorganic—as realisable for Reason only in and through spirit.” Hence, we can explain how that what are called Ideas in the “Treatise of Human Knowledge” are in ‘Siris’ called Phenomena. Idea, on the other hand, is used in ‘Siris’ almost always in its Platonic meaning. “The early Phenomenalistic Nominalism is here transformed into a Platonic Realism.” The Ideas of ‘Siris’ are not the the ideas of Locke. “They are most real Beings intellectual and unchangeable ; and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, wanting stability, cannot be objects of Science, much less of Intellectual Knowledge.” In the end, then, Berkeley and Norris touch each other.

III. But Berkeley’s goal is Norris’s starting point. Norris assumes what Berkeley attains. He comes down from the Mount with the Heavenly patterns already in his hands, and knows how to apply them to everything. They are the “essences” of all particular existencies. We really see them when we think we see material objects. We see them in the Omnipresent Reason of which our own is a part. Even the sensations which occasion the sight of them are excited in our mind by the Divine touch. We never step outside the inner world of mental feeling, imagination and vision. What then is to be done with matter ? There is certainly no need, or assignable room for it, if all its supposed effects are the result of God’s immediate working. Visible things can be ‘exhibited’ as well without it as with it. Norris on this point is perplexed. * He will not deny the existence of a Material World, partly because he is too devoted a Cartesian ; partly because he thinks “the Senses, though not intended to instruct us in the exactness of Truth

* Ideal World, Vol. I., pp. 187-8

but rather to serve us for the common uses of life," yet do not entirely abuse and deceive us; and partly because "Reveal'd Religion which relies in great measure upon the Testimony of Sense" would be endangered—not perceiving or at least allowing as * Berkely did that the words of Scripture are not intended to be scientific but popular. Still, it is clear enough that he would fain be rid of it. So far as piety will permit he decries and despises it. He calls it a mass of "mean and ignoble essences as much inferior to our souls as it is superior to nothing" and says, "that were it not for those corporeal Reasons or Ideas† whereby it comes under our cognisance it would remain an unknown unseen and unthought of Being in the World." There are, too, many expressions in his Discourses which sound almost Manichæan in their scorn of the Body and its material environment. He grants, indeed, that since everything has its Idea, and the Idea of everything is in God, the Idea of Matter must also be in God.‡ "The Idea of Matter is in God and therefore God will represent matter and be (in a sense) material. But how an Idea purely spiritual can represent Body, I must confess myself unable to explain the

* "Some there are who think that though the arguments, for the Real Existence of Bodies, which are drawn from Reason, be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist and are something more than mere Ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities and human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles. . . . And I do not think that either what Philosophers call matter, or the existence of Objects without the mind is anywhere mentioned in Scripture."—Fraser's edition of Berkeley's Works, Vol. I., 198.

† Berkeley says precisely the same and draws the logical conclusion—then, why make matter a substance?

‡ "It is indeed the remotest and the faintest imitation of him, his shadow rather than one of his most projected rays and yet, forasmuch as it is a metaphysical unit at least and has some degree of Reality in it, we must allow it to have its ideal counterpart in the Divine Mind (that which Malebranche calls Intelligible Extension), and so, to be eminently and intelligibly contained in it."—Ideal World, Vol. I., cap. 5.

very precise manner of it." Thus, matter for Norris is a 'logical impropriety.' It was a dead weight on his system which he did not dare to cut off.*

IV. There was one man, however, who had the courage—or at any rate, the consistency—that Norris lacked. This was † Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford Magna (1704-32)—a near neighbour of Norris, and a warm admirer. . . . "We can produce no evidence," says Collier's biographer, "of their intimacy." "When, however, we consider that they were both Clergymen of the same Church, living within a few miles of each other on the banks of the same stream, at a time, too, when the want of roads rendered persons in the country so dependent on their neighbours; and in particular, their kindred tastes and studies—it is difficult to conceive them to have been personally unknown to each other." ‡ His favourite, among Norris's works, was the 'Ideal World,' and there seems no reason to doubt that it furnished him with the 'Philosophical Paradoxes' which he set himself to resolve. What he came to is thus described. He did not reject (any more than Berkeley) the testimony of the Senses. "So far from" doing that, "he invariably appealed to their authority; he thought that the existence of the visible, or seen world, was capable of the most strict demonstration—indeed, that nothing but our own existence could be supposed to be more simply evident; but then he argued, that because a thing was seen, it did not follow that it was external to the soul or visive faculty, which perceived it. He denied that being and being

* Sir W. Hamilton says—"It was but little creditable to the acuteness of Norris that *he*, a Protestant, should have adopted the Malebranchian hypothesis without rejecting its Catholic incumbrance." He thinks Malebranche would have rejected 'Matter' only it involved the rejection of transubstantiation.—*Discussions in Philosophy*, p. 193.

† Arthur Collier was born 12th October, 1680, at the Rectory of Langford, Wilts. He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, July 1697. He succeeded his father as Rector of Langford Magna in 1704, and continued to hold the living till he died in 1732.—See *memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur Collier, M.A.*, with some account of his family, by Robert Benson, M.A. (1837).

‡ *Memoirs*, p. 16.

external was the same thing ; or, in other words, that a visible object which was not external was, therefore, nothing at all. . . . Again ; he guarded himself against being supposed to contend that all sensible objects were no more than imaginary, meaning by the word something opposed to real ; and he concluded, generally, that while the visible world existed, it did not exist absolutely, but only dependently, as in its proper subject, on mind or soul.* In this way Berkeley,† starting from Locke, and Collier, starting from Norris, arrived at the same goal, in that they each put an end to ‘matter’—in the Cartesian sense of a ‘dark unperceived back-ground’ of phenomena outside the mind.

Collier, it seems, had worked out his ‘conclusion’ as early as 1703. “Among his MSS, under the date of January, 1708, there remains the outline of an Essay in three chapters, on the question of the visible world being without or not. In 1712 he penned two essays still in manuscript—one on substance and accident ; and the other termed “*Clavis Philosophica*” ; and at length, in 1713, there issued from the press his ‡ “*Clavis Universalis* ; or, A New Inquiry after

* Collier's Memoirs. p. 18.

† See Fraser. “Berkeley started from that love of Experience and aversion to ‘the virginate questions of the Schools’ in which he had been trained by Locke. Collier argued from the abstract assumptions of the cloister in the spirit of a schoolman who was, at the same time, infected with the mysticism of Malebranche and Norris.”—*Life of Berkeley*, p. 105.

‡ Its motto is taken from Malebranche—“*Vulgi assensus et approbatio, circa materiam difficilem, est certum argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur.*” *De Inquir. : Verit. : Lib iii*, 194.

The ‘*Clavis*’ had scarcely any circulation at first. A copious abstract in ‘*Acta Eruditorum*’ (1717) made it somewhat better known—particularly to the German philosophers. In 1756 it was translated, with retrenchment, into German, by Professor Eschenbach, of Rostock, along with Berkeley's “*Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.*” These two treatises constitute his “*Collection of the most distinguished writers who deny the reality of their own body and of the whole corporeal world ;*” and they are accompanied by “*counter observations and an appendix, in which the existence of matter is demonstrated.*”—See Hamilton's “*Discussions in Philosophy,*” p. 189.

Eschenbach says, “If any book ever cost me trouble to obtain it, the ‘*Clavis*’ is that book.” It is now more easily accessible in a volume called “*Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century,*” prepared for the press by the late Rev. Samuel Parr, D.D., 1837.

Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence, or Impossibility of an External World." In the same year appeared Berkeley's Dialogues between 'Hylas' and 'Philonous.' Three years before, Berkeley had published his "Principles of Human Knowledge"; and four years before, his "Theory of Vision." Yet we have Collier's word for the fact that his own thinking owed nothing* to Berkeley. "A more curious coincidence," says Dr. Fraser, "is not to be found in the history of speculative thought than the production simultaneously, without concert, or apparently even knowledge on the part of either author of the opinions of the other, of a theory which implies so great a revolution in the philosophical point of view. . . . It goes to prove that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in England contained elements favourable to such a result. They are both the genuine produce of the age of Locke and Malebranche."†

* *Clavis Universalis*. p. 1. He does not *name* Berkeley, but says "I am at last, after a *ten years pause* and deliberation, content to put myself upon the trial of the common reader," &c.

† Berkeley's Works. Vol. I, p. 253.

NORRIS IN RELATION TO THE SCHOLASTICS AND TO ST. AUSTIN.

Norris often decries the value of scholastic learning. He has little hope that readers, * "whose understandings are cramp'd by the cleaving prejudices of Scholastick Education," will do justice to his 'New Notions.' For, such as these have pinned their faith to Aristotle—or rather to his 'Commentators'—"with whom the truth of what he affirms is supposed, and then all the question is about what the Philosopher means"—which argues, on the one hand, an "obscure writer;" and, on the other, "a superstitious and bigotted reader." He did not speak in ignorance. For he had studied the 'Schoolmen' deeply, and knew them far better than he seems to have known any modern writer except Malebranche, and, perhaps, Descartes.

He mentions—but barely does more than mention—Bacon, Hooker, Hobbes. His familiarity, however, with the schoolmen, crops up in all he wrote; and especially—as might have been expected—in the 'Ideal System.' Here it is seen that his favourites were the Angelical Doctor Thomas Aquinas, † and the 'Great' Suarez ‡: as he calls him—"the last of the Schoolmen." He quotes the former at least forty

* Preface to 'Reason and Religion.'

† 1225 (or 7)-1274.

‡ 1548-1615.

times—often at considerable length, and the latter—often too at considerable length—at least twenty five times. He has, moreover, a good word for “honest Christopher Scheibler”—“one of those good authors,” he says, “which, by a natural prejudice, some may be tempted the less to regard, because they formerly conversed with him in the institution of their younger studies, tho’, I think, he deserves to be read (as well as some others), with more consideration than we commonly use at that time.” Norris, in fact, was devoted to metaphysics “notwithstanding the neglect and disuse, if not contempt of it, amongst those who should be better judges of the worth of things. For sure the stream of philosophy, and divinity too, must quickly run low, if not fed by a Metaphysical Spring.”* He could not, therefore, but feel great respect for Scholasticism, apart from its abuses. “For, however the Physics, or natural philosophy, of the Schools does not please me, as partly proceeding too much upon the false and confused ideas of sense; and partly, as explaining the particular effects of nature, by the general and indeterminate notions of pure Logick—yet, I have a great value and esteem for their metaphysics, and for their Theology. And though *here* they may sometimes start questions, some of which may be too trifling and superfluous, and others too curious and intruding; and may, perhaps, be too elaborate in discussing the former, and a little too bold and peremptory in the determination of the latter, and too much influenced by authority in both; yet, whatever their matter be, their form and method is always excellent, and the terms whereby they express themselves, most happily (indeed admirably) fitted for the illustration and compendious conveyance of their notions And, indeed, I am pretty much of opinion, that nothing of any moment—either in philosophy or in religion—can be either distinctly

* ‘Ideal World,’ Vol. II. “Epistle Dedicatory.”

stately, or well understood without the help of their useful, I might say necessary Distinctions." "For an instance" he cites the controversy * between Bishop Bramhall and Mr Hobbes, wherein the latter, "tho' a man of some natural wit and parts, yet for want of Scholastick education and learning, was extremely confused and defective, not only as to the truth of his notions, but as to the clearness of their delivery; and so—upon the whole—became a cheap and easy Triumph to his acute and learned adversary."

Accordingly, he himself "is not out of conceit with Syllogism" "notwithstanding the late address † wherewith a well known author has endeavour'd to disparage it and bring it into disesteem." Indeed, he enters on an elaborate defence of it, and himself makes the freest "use of it" all through his arguments.

As to the bearing of scholastic doctrines on Norris's philosophy it will be enough to state his own account of it, without adding any of the many quotations by which he supports it. His work, it will be remembered, has two parts. The first deals with what he calls the Ideal World—its 'real' existence, and character, and place in God. The second applies the notion, with a view to explaining how we attain to knowledge, or understanding. Concerning the first Norris finds the witness of the Schoolmen clear—nay unanimous. "Indeed," he says, "the doctrine of the Divine ideas may be said to be with the scholastic what that of justice and charity is with the sacred writers. 'Tis in

* 'For an account of this controversy' see 'Hobbes,' by Professor Croome Robertson (in 'Philosophical Classics') p. 163. It began with an (unauthorised) publication of the treatise 'of Liberty and Necessity' (1654), which led to Bramhall's "Defence of the true Liberty of Human actions from antecedent or Intrinsic Necessity" (1655), to which (in 1656) Hobbes rejoined in his 'Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance.' "Bramhall's performance," says Robertson, "was often clever, and always erudite. It is worthy of being studied, not only as an effective statement of the view it advocates, but as a good specimen of scholastic fence." He was Bishop of Londonderry, and died Archbishop of Armagh (Ireland), in 1663.

† An allusion, probably, to Locke's short treatise on 'The Conduct of the Understanding' (about 1700) "which he appears to have intended as, at least, a partial substitute for the ordinary logic."

a manner their Law and their Prophets, the burthen of their Discourses and the sum and substance of their abstracter Theories, the ground upon which they descant or, if you will, the string upon which—so well do they like the music—they are ever and anon harping. 'Tis, in short, the spirit that breathes in their writings, and inspires them with life, and which, like a brighter vein of rich ore, runs through the bowels of their systems." . . . "Whence I presume upon every* competent reader to conclude with Aquinas—'*quod necesse est ponere in mente Divina Ideas*,'"

Concerning the "latter part of our Theory," he admits that "we have not the authority of the Schools on our side." The schools in fact are inconsistent. They "are for an intelligible World as well as we, and their intelligible World happens to be the very same with ours" . . . "they affirm the Ideas of all things to be in God"; they also "suppose God to make all things," and "to know all things in those Ideas." But when it comes to "the Materials of our thought, or objects of our understanding," then we are presented with "Intentional Species" and an "Intellectus Agens" to "refine those species into an Intelligible state and Temper." What need of this? Why go "to Bodies for the light of their minds and to their own souls for a distinct faculty to refine and spiritualize that light"; why invent so many Ideas (for species are a sort of Ideas) "besides those that are Divine," when it were so natural to conclude, "in pursuance of their own Principles," that—Ideas being necessary to all perception of things—the ideas whereby we perceive are those in God Himself? Especially does "that maxim of theirs, that Science is of necessities and immutables" seem to force them so to conclude. For science is also of Ideas: Ideas are its object. "These ideas, therefore, must be necessary and immutable." And where "can they find any such besides the Divine"? . . .

* *i.e.*, therefore I presume that every, &c.

Indeed, "when all is considered that might reasonably induce them to it . . . it is much to be admired how they came not to adopt our "hypothesis of Human Understanding," especially considering how much "it is favoured by St. Austin, whose authority is so sacred with them on other occasions." *

"And this is the authority (not because I have no other, but because I know no greater) upon which we shall now devolve ourselves for the more advantageous recommendation of the system which is here proposed."

In the Hulsean Lectures † for 1885, the writer shows how "for seven hundred years Augustine's modes of thought and the opinions he held were not so much dominant as supreme" ‡ in Western Christendom; and how, ceasing to command attention by his Philosophy, his influence then underwent a general decline.

But "in after days, when Christendom no longer appeared to be at one, when it was rent in pieces, and the discord had robbed every land and every city of all appearance of peace, one branch of the church was still faithful to the ancient teacher. While Calvinism with all its exaggerations was fixing its hold in France and Switzerland and Scotland, the English Church was not carried away by any novel definition of orthodoxy—not because the leaders were successful in cunningly framing some meaningless compromise which all parties could accept, but because they would not desert the old paths; and alike in rearranging our services, in setting forth Christian truth in homilies, and in the framing of the Articles, they were constantly and consciously influenced by St. Austin." § St. Austin is here set forth as the Great Patron of the English Church, and his influence is said to have reached its

* Quotations are from "Ideal World," Vol. II.

† St. Austin and his place in the History of Christian thought, by W. Cunningham, B.D.

‡ p. 152, Excurses B.

§ Lect. III, p. 107.

height in the seventeenth century.* During that century—so the writer claims—he even supplied “the principles on which action was taken” † with respect, *e.g.*, to Monarchy and Dissent. As regards the latter he quotes a tract entitled “A Plaine Declaration that our Brownists be full Donatists” ‡—having for moral, that as St. Austin treated *these*, so *those* should be treated by the church. This was in the early § days of Puritanism. But “the Bishop of Hippo,” it is added, “was also summoned to justify the civil proceedings which were subsequently taken against non-conformists.” And his opinion carried all the more weight because he had come to it reluctantly. For he once held that || “no man ought to be compelled to the unity of Christ, and that this ought to be done only by argument and the force of disputation.” But at a later time—through “experience of the *working* of the penal laws” ¶—he was led to approve of the Edict of Constantine.

So, too, as regards the Divine right of kings, ** “there can be no doubt,” we are told, “that the doctrines of civil obedience, which were adopted by the clergy of the seventeenth century, were consciously based on the teaching of the Fathers, and, in particular, of St. Austin” (p. 195).

These facts are mentioned because they may help to explain how Norris came to make a special study of St. Austin; and how one result of that study may have been to intensify his attachment to “the church,” and to encourage him in asserting—against the broader principles of his philosophy—“the expediency of imposing civil disabilities upon Schismatics.”

* Cp., *e.g.*, the ‘Translators’ preface to the Reader in the ‘Received version of the Bible (1611).

† p. 183, Excursus G.

‡ p. 183, Excursus G.

§ Elizabeth’s reign.

|| p. 190, Excursus G.

¶ In Joan Ev: Tract, XXVI. 2. cp. also Epistola (93) ad Vincentium.

△△ p. 195, Excursus G.

Mr. Cunningham finds evidence—direct and indirect—through the whole of the seventeenth century, * “as to the weight which St. Austin’s opinion appeared to have with the English public.” But in the eighteenth century he disappears. † “The Philosophy of Locke, and, indirectly, the discoveries of Newton, . . . had rendered disputants more inclined to argue out questions as they appeared to their own individual minds, and less disposed to attach importance to the opinions of bygone ages.” Even John Wesley—‡ “between whose story and that of St. Austin such interesting parallels might be drawn”—“felt no enthusiasm for the African Doctor, and pronounced a judgment on him which is very unsympathetic.” Again, § “Berkeley’s *Alciphron*, both in its form and in its dependence on Plato, may serve to recall the *Contra Academicos* and other dialogues,” but there is no reason to believe that Berkeley had been much influenced by these writings.

The teaching of St. Austin had at last ceased to be a matter of living interest to English Theologians. The single exception he can quote to the contrary, is a lengthy discussion of St. Austin’s Eucharistic doctrine, ascribed to || “a nonjuring Clergyman, named George Smith,” in reply to Dr. Waterland’s “Late charge to the clergy of Middlesex (1738).” But another and a more important exception is Norris. He would, indeed, have been more to the point, as a witness of St. Austin’s influence in the last decade of the seventeenth century, than the writers that are cited. His great work, however, belongs to the early years of the eighteenth century, and this is ‘tinctured’ with St. Austin from end to end. In fact, as Norris was the last, lonely, representative of the Cambridge

* Excursus G., p. 196.

† Excursus G., p. 196.

‡ Excursus G., p. 197.

§ Excursus G., p. 197.

|| Excursus G., p. 198.

School ; so he may be said to stand last and alone in his endeavour to support Philosophy by great names, and St. Austin's above all. This circumstance has been overlooked, because the 'flowing tide' was against him ; and, before long, swept him out of sight.

1. St. Austin—in his opinion (to quote one expression of it out of many)—* “was a man of large capacity and great Thought and reflection, and one—had the sciences been *then* much improved, and the art of thinking reduced to such a method as it is now—from whom we might reasonably have expected the very utmost that the force of human nature could ever have arrived to.” “There are,” he goes on to say, “two sorts of thinking men to be observed among writers, not to mention a third, which amends the defect of each. Some there are that think pretty much while they are actually writing, but not much at other times :” these become Masters of “Sentences laid out in harmonical and proportionably returning periods.”

. . . “Others, again, there are who think much habitually at other times ; but not altogether so much while actually engaged in writing—because, it may be, they write in haste, or cannot well endure the fatigue of thinking intensely and writing at the same time ;” in these “the matter is good and substantial, but they are sometimes a little negligent in the manner. Of this latter I take St. Austin to be. He thought much ; but, writing so much as he did, and being otherwise so much employed as he was, it cannot be expected that he should be always as just and accurate (as men are now) in the disposal and expression of his thoughts. Tho' as to the latter, I think it may be properly remark'd that, as no man has said greater things than he, so none has expressed them more happily than he sometimes does So that upon the whole . . . , I take him to have been a very great, as well as a very good man, and worthy of all that Reverence and high

* All the quotations are from the “Ideal System.”

esteem which has been paid to his name, both in the school and in the church; upon which consideration I the less admire (*i.e.*, wonder) to find him quoted so much as he is, even by those who are the least addicted to Authority; I mean the Modern Philosophers.* For indeed this Father stands them in great stead, some of the best foundations of the new Philosophy being laid in his principles. And my opinion is that if the Schools had follow'd St. Austin more than they have done, and Aristotle less,† they would have left us another System of both Physical and Metaphysical Doctrine than what the world now possesses."

As to his own "Metaphysical Doctrine," the fact that he can back it up at all points from St. Austin gives him (next to its intrinsic Reasonableness) the deepest assurance of its truth. St. Austin is with him both in the "Notional Part" and in its Application—*viz.*, in "that scene of the Intelligible World which Mr. Malebranche has most opened." To establish the first statement he adduces—from all parts of St. Austin's writings—more than a hundred quotations: some of them in clusters which cover several pages.‡ These are confined to Vol. I. To establish the second statement, he brings forward something like forty quotations—many of them lengthy—in the course of Vol. II.; and then, in the closing chapter fills twenty pages with upwards of eighty extracts taken out of as many as twenty-five different 'works.' In connection with these last, he "premonishes the reader"—"that he may have some reason to expect that my quotations should be very choice, and that he should not look upon this as an ordinary commonplace way of writing. I shall not be so vain as to commend any other part of my work, of whose great defectiveness I am not in-

* Malebranche—*e.g.*—quotes him frequently.

† Norris, of course, has Augustine's philosophic influence in mind. This became less and less considerable after Johannes Scotus (Erigena)—(cir. 800-877). But "all through the middle ages his writings were the supreme authority in the study of Theology."

‡ See—*e.g.*—pp. 365-71.

sensible; but I might perhaps, without vanity, be allowed to speak up a little for my quotations, and especially those from St. Austin; and that because, in reading his works, I was at the pains to mark out, and make short references to, whatsoever appear'd to me of considerable importance either in itself, or with relation to the present Theory."

One or two quotations * may be given with reference to some of the points which Norris held to be of the greatest importance :—

(1.) As to the "distinction of an Intelligible world in opposition to that which we call natural or sensible" he quotes "Retract : Lib. I., Chap. 3."

'Nec Plato quidem in hoc erravit quia esse Mundum Intelligibilem dixit, si non vocabulum, quod Ecclesiastica consuetudini in re illa non usitatum est, sed ipsam rem velimus attendere. Mundum quippe ille Intelligibilem nuncupavit ipsam Rationem Sempiternam atque incommutabilem quâ fecit Deus Mundum. Quam qui esse negat, Sequitur ut dicat, irrationabiliter Deum fecisse quod fecit, aut cum faceret, vel antequam faceret, necisse quid faceret, si apud eum Ratio faciendi non erat. Si vero erat, sicut erat, ipsum videtur Plato vocasse Intelligibilem Mundum.'† "This Testimony," he adds, "is so clear and full that to seek for any more would look like quoting for quoting's sake, and 'tis the more considerable because 'tis in a 'Retractation' where he was concerned to use particular caution . . . And indeed I look upon St. Austin to be as great an *Idealist* as any in the world and considering his authority, the greatest Patron of the Ideal Philosophy. The principles of which serve him for some of the noblest and most elevated strains in his Devotional Discourses and are indeed so current and familiar with him that he hardly thinks of proving them. And that

* I have verified most of these in the translation of Augustine's works edited by Dods—consulting, also, Erasmus' edition, 1529, 10 vols., Basle. What edition Norris used I cannot say.

† Cp. Confess. Lib. I., Chap. 6, § 9.

Intelligible world which with other writers is discoursed as a *conclusion*, passes with him as a *Supposition*. So inwardly and thoroughly does he seem to be possess'd with it and persuaded of the truth of it" *

(2.) As to the identity of the Ideal World with the λόγος, and as to *how* all things were made by Him, whether efficiently, instrumentally, or exemplarily—his own view, it has been seen, is the last. And this he says is also St. Austin's. "*In Him was the Life and the Life was the Light of men*"—which emphatic clause St. Austin makes use of as a Key to unlock the former, when to the question—"How were all things made by him, he returns this as the general answer, *that which was made* (for so he chuses to dispose the order of the words . . .) is *Life in Him*, instead of *in Him was the Life*. Which way of reading, as it seems to determine the formation of things by the λόγος to the Ideal, or Exemplary Sense, so it casts a most favourable aspect upon the Ideal Hypothesis in general; for how can those things which are made be said to be Life in Him, any otherwise than as in Him they are Ideas, which Ideas are very spirit and life: and so St. Austin explains it" This occurs in the Preface to Vol. I. (p. 11). He takes up the point, and 'expands' it through sixteen pages (pp. 269-285) in the volume itself. His quotations are from St. Austin's exposition of St. John, cap. i; from De Verbis Domini sermo., 38; De Trin., Lib. IV., cap. 1, § 3; De Civ. Dei, Lib. X., cap. 29; De Trin., Lib. VI., cap. 10; Confess., Lib. XIII., cap. 5; De Genesi Contra Manichæos, XI., 17; In Enarratione in Psalm, 103; In Libro de diversis Quæstionibus—Quæst. 23; In Libro de vera Religione, cap. 44, &c.

"But, not to weary my reader, I shall only farther observe that, in the conclusion of this excellent book† (cap. 55), the Author applying himself to the Persons

* Vol. I., pp. 181-2.

† e.g., The last named.

of the blessed Trinity, and giving to each his proper character, forgets not continually to ascribe to the Son that of *Exemplarity*. Ecce unum Deum colo, unum omnium Principium. Et unam Sapientiam qua sapiens est quæ cunque sapiens est, &c. Quare ipsam quoque veritatem nulla ex parte dissimilem in ipso et cum ipso veneremur, quæ forma est omnium quæ ab uno facta sunt et ad unum Nituntur. Unde apparet Spiritualibus animis per hanc Formam esse facta omnia, quæ sola implet quod appetunt omnia, &c. Quare ipsum donum Dei cum patre et Filio æque incommutabile colere et tenere nos convenit, unius substantiæ Trinitatem, unum Deum a quo sumus, per quem sumus, in quo sumus. A quo discessimus, cui dissimiles, a quo perire non permissi sumus. Principium ad quod recurrimus, Formam quam sequimur, et Gratiam quâ reconciliamur, unum Deum quo Auctore conditi sumus, et Similitudinem ejus, *per quam ad unitatem reformamur*, et Pacem quâ unitati adhæremus. Deum qui dixit, fiat, et verbum * *per quod* factum est omne quod substantialiter et naturaliter factum est omne quod substantialiter et naturaliter factum est, et Donum benignitatis. Ejus, quo placuit et reconciliatum est auctori suo, ut non interiret quicquid ab eo per Verbum Factum est unum Deum quo Creatore Vivimus, per quem reformati sapienter Vivimus, quem diligentes et quo fruantes beate Vivimus. Unum Deum ex quo omnia per quem omnia, in quo omnia." He remarks—"by the way"—"how in some places of this quotation St. Austin intimates the *Eternal Word* to be the form of the New,† as well as of the *old* creation—that *Grace* proceeds by the standard of Nature, and that we are *regenerated* by his Perfect Model, as well as *created*. And, indeed, this seems to be no unreasonable Supposition. . . . Especially considering that our Regeneration († Hoc

* "St. John's expression."

† "As he does elsewhere—De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. I., cap. 5 "

‡ St. Austin De Spiritu et Litera, cap. 27.

enim agit Spiritus gratia, ut imaginem Dei in qua naturaliter facti sumus instauret in Nobis) implies only the *Restoration* of our nature, and is but the recovery of that Primitive Rectitude which originally belong'd to it. And if the State to be retriev'd be the same, why should not the measure be the same too?" (pp. 283-4).

(4) In combating the 'Cartesian account' of truth, Norris lays great stress on "the Identity of truth with the Divine essence;" and he says, as to St. Austin, "that to reckon this Hypothesis among his *opinions* would be but a very sparing and reserved" statement.

"For, certainly, never was a man more entirely possess'd, more thoroughly imbued with any notion than that both devout and (for his time) Metaphysical Father was with this. It enters into the system of his Thoughts, and seems rivetted and ingrain'd into his very soul. It is the pulse that beats almost in every vein of his writings, insomuch that he can hardly mention the name of *Truth* without casting a *Glory* round about it, and joining with it some Divine character or other (generally that of Incommutable), that either proclaims, or at least insinuates it, to be God. . . ." He then cites a *series of passages—more or less to the point—from the 'Confessions'—not, however, appearing to see that they are mostly couched in the 'Rhetoric of feeling,' and so cannot be of any great use in strict argument, *e.g.*, "et Lex tua veritas et veritas Tu" (Confess, Lib. 4, cap. 10). Again, "O æterna veritas, et vera Charitas et Chara æternitas Tu es Deus meus, tibi suspiro die ac nocte, &c" (Lib. VII., cap. 10). "O veritas lumen Cordis mei, non tenebrae meæ loquantur mihi. Defluxi ad ista et obscuratus sum, sed hinc, etiam hinc adamavi te. Erravi et recordatus sum tui. Audivi vocem tuam post me ut rediam, et vix audivi propter Tumultus peccatorum. Et nunc ecce redeo aestuans et anhelans

* 16 in Number.

ad fontem tuam. Nemo me prohibeat, hunc bibam, et tunc vivam" (Lib. XII., cap. 10). To the same effect are the quotations * from other works, *e.g.*, from Soliloq., Lib. I., cap. 1—"Te invoco Deus veritas, in quo, et a quo, et per quem vera sunt quae vera sunt omnia, etc.; Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo, et a quo, et per quem intelligibiliter lucent, quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia."

(5) Norris expatiates on the 'community of Truth' as the possession and light of all. "*For the word is nigh thee*, and thou carriest thy Divine Master and Teacher, Truth, within thy own bosom, as unmindful as thou art of thyself and her, while she teaches thee in the school of the *breast* († docente te magistro intimo in scholâ pectoris) even that eternal and universal Reason that shines upon all minds with a pure, steady, and uniform Light; gives to all men the same common answers; and instructs them while they think they teach themselves, or learn from others; by whose participation they are rational and intelligent; and in whose inward light they see and understand whatever they know: even the uncreated Word and Wisdom of God, whom the Father only possesses entirely, but who communicates itself to all His intelligent creatures according to their respective measures and capacities, and whose 'delight is with the sons of men' (p. 390-1). St. Austin here, too, is the Great Authority. Following his own words—just given—Norris quotes and translates (for the pleasure of my English reader) a long passage from *De Lib: Arbitrio* (Lib. 2, cap 13 and 14) of which he says "I know not whether St. Austin has upon any occasion express'd himself more finely."

He returns to the subject in his second volume ‡—when he is striving to show that "Ideas or Truths, which are only the Relations that are between Ideas,"

* More than 20.

† Confess: Lib. 9, cap. 9.

‡ Vol. II., pp 404-5.

must be something else than the Modalities of our own mind; and, also, when he is intent on proving that Ideas, which are 'Publicum lumen,' must be seen in God, the alone universal light*, *e.g.*, Qua propter nullo Modo nequaeris esse incommutabilem veritatem haec omnia qua incommutabiliter vera sunt Continentem, quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cujus quam hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris Modis secretum et Publicum lumen praesto esse ac se præbere Communiter, &c. †

"Die quia tu tibi Lumen non es—ut multum Oculus es, lumen non es. Quid Prodest patens et sanus Oculus, si lumen desit?" etc. ‡

"Intus in Domicilio cogitationis nec Hebraea nec Graeca, nec Latina nec Barbara veritas." §

(6) As already said, Norris brings together in his last chapter numerous quotations, with a view to making clear "that there is hardly a *side* of our system but what is, some way or other, turned to our view (p. 550), so that you have not only St. Austin's authority, but, as it were, his *comment* and *Paraphrase*." Especially, however, with regard to "the *Hypothesis* of this theory"—*i.e.*—"as to what concerns our understanding by the Divine Ideas," is he sure that he himself has "done little more" . . . "than to find out premises for St. Austin's "conclusion," "to resolve it into principles, dispose it into a right Method, and reduce what lies loosely and at large in the *Sea* of his writings, into the order of a regular system." The sort of passages on which he relies in proof of this contention are these ||:— . . . "Credibilis est enim propterea vera respondere de quibusdam Disciplinis, etiam imperitos earum, quando bene

* Vol. II., pp. 435-6.

† De libero Arbitrio lib. : 2, c. 12 (p. 404).

‡ De verbis Domini, Serm 8 (p. 408).

§ Confess : Lib. 2, c 13 (p. 436).

|| Retract : Lib. I., Cap. 4 (578).

interrogantur quia praesens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, Lumen Rationis aeternæ, ubi haec immutabilia vera conspiciunt, non quod noverant aliquando et oblitum sunt, quod Platoni vel talibus visum est"—where he "retracts" from the 'Platonick Notion of Pre-existence' which he has seemed "to favour"; and "resolves those right answers—which are given by the ignorant concerning certain sciences—into the presence of the Eternal Reason to their minds, wherein they see those immutable truths." Again, "he has another very remarkable passage to the like purpose in the same book." . . . "His words are *Illud quod Dixi omnes Artes animam secum attulisse mihi videri, nec aliud quicquam esse id quod dicitur quam reminisci ac recordari, non sic accipiendum est quasi ex hoc approbetur, animam vel hic in alio corpore, vel alibi sive in corpore sive extra corpus aliquando vixisse, et ea quae interrogata respondet cum hic non didicerit in alia vita ante didicisse. Fieri enim potest sicut jam in hoc opere supra diximus (referring to the place before mentioned) ut hoc ideo possit quia Natura intelligibilis est, et connectitur non solum Intelligibilibus, verum etiam Immutabilibus rebus. Eo ordine facta est ut cum se ad eas res movet, quibus connexa est, vel ad seipsam, in quantum eas videt, in tantum de his vera respondeat.*" *

Again, "In teipsum redeas atque intelligas te id quod attingis sensibus Corporis probare aut improbare non posse, nisi apud te habeas quasdam Pulchritudinis leges, ad quas referas quaequae pulchra sentis exterius." †

Lastly, "Principium creaturae intellectualis est aeterna sapientia quod Principium manens in se incommutabiliter, nullo modo cessat occulta inspiratione vocationis loqui ei Creaturae, cui Principium est, ut convertatur ad id ex quo est quod aliter formata ac

* Ibid cap. 8 (p. 530).

† De lib. Arb. Lib. 2, cap. 18 (p. 536).

Perfecta esse non possit” *—“which excellent words” he asks leave to “present to the English Reader as M. Malebranche translates them.” This there is no need to give.

Norris, it is clear, took a one-sided view of Augustine. He saw in him mainly what he wished to see, and what he wished to see he saw everywhere. But he failed to see the advance and change—not for the better—which took place in his ‘Master’s’ thinking.

In Augustine’s earlier treatises “he speaks, like Athanasius, of Deity as imminent in the world; of the Incarnation as the necessary mode of the Divine manifestation—a necessity inherent in the Divine nature; of the love of God as the ground or determination of His will; of man as having power to read the Divine character, because of an inward light in the reason, which is the evidence of the indwelling God; of the will as free, and having power to follow the right; of the purification of the soul as the way to the knowledge of, and union with, the Divine. But thoughts like these only served Augustine in the epoch of his transition; in his later writings they disappear, giving way to a set of dogmas more congenial to the Latin mind, or more in harmony with the aim of the Latin Church, as Augustine construed it.” † But of this development Norris seems to be unaware. Augustine’s notion of the Church as the sole depositary of grace and truth—of original sin as destroying the Divine Image in human nature, and cutting it off from God—of salvation as conditioned absolutely by the arbitrary will of God, and as extended only to the ‘elect,’ even within the Church—of baptism as the

* De Gen. ad Lir. Lib. 1, cap. 5.

† “The Continuity of Christian Thought,” by Professor Allen, Cambridge, Mass. He refers to the ‘De Moribus Ecclesiæ et Manichæorum’ (388), ‘De vera religione’ (390), ‘De libero arbitrio’ (388-395), ‘De utilitate credendi’ (391), for Augustine’s earlier views; and says “It is in his famous treatise ‘De Civitate Dei’ (413-426), and in his ‘ante-pelagian writings’ (412 ff)—passim—that Augustine’s matured theological convictions are to be found in their complete form.”—id., p. 156. (I have added the dates.)

necessary means of communicating grace to the soul : these notions, so prevalent in his later teaching, and so determinative of the influence he attained, Norris seems to ignore. Remembering some of his language, indeed, one is almost led to say that he did not realize their existence. For what they virtually do, is to pass a sweeping condemnation on his earlier views ; and on anyone who, like Norris, might afterwards give them prominence. Had Norris applied the historic method to his study of Augustine, he must have seen this ; but he treated him as many treat the Bible—giving to all passages from any and every book an equal measure of authority. Still, however much we may differ from him in his interpretation of ‘St. Austin,’ he wins our sympathy when he assures us, “In the language of the Father whom I love to speak after,” that* “where I stick I shall not be uneasy to seek, nor where I err, ashamed to learn. And, therefore, whoever reads this, where he is alike certain, let him proceed with me ; where he alike hesitates, let him inquire with me, where he acknowledges his own error let him return to me ; where mine, let him recall me. And so we shall go together in the way of charity—that more excellent way which is of greater consequence than the greatest knowledge we can pretend to in this life, and which shall remain when the other shall vanish away.”†

* De Trinit. Lib. 1, cap. 2-3.

† Vol. I. ‘Ideal World,’ p. 16, ‘to the reader.’

NORRIS AND THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS.

So far as I have observed, Norris shows no acquaintance with Benjamin Whichcote (1610-1683), the founder of the Cambridge School, nor with his disciple John Smith (1618-1652), its most shining ornament. * Once or twice he quotes Ralph Cudworth's (1617-1688) "Intellectual System of the Universe" in confirmation of his own views. (The "Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality"—which would have delighted him—did not see the light till 1731).

But there is nothing to prove any great indebtedness even to him—still less any personal intercourse: though the old philosopher at Cambridge could hardly have been ignorant of the correspondence between Norris and his daughter, or of the writings which called it forth. The one member of the school whom the young Oxford Student evidently and ardently admires is Henry More. One of his early poems is "an Ode to Dr. More" †—in a most laudatory strain. He is charmed with the sort of life the Doctor has chosen—so far from "noise, impertinence and State," so indifferent to the "censures" and "Applauses" of the World.

How calm thy life, how easie, how secure
Thou *Intellectual Epicure*.

* See, *e.g.*, Vol. I, "Ideal System," p. 401.

† See, too, the "Dedication" of his sermon—preached March 29, 1685—to More, in which he says, "I intend only hereby to express my great veneration for your worth, and my gratitude for that particular share which you have been pleased to vouchsafe me in your favour." The last words refer, no doubt, to the correspondence in the course of which the sermon was preached.

But he is yet more impressed with the range and wealth of his knowledge.

Thou our great *Catholic Professor* art,
All science is annex'd to thy unerring chair.
Some lesser Synods of the wise
The Muses kept in Universities ;
But never yet, till in thy Soul,
Had they a Council Oecumenical.
An abstract they'd a mind to see
Of all their scatter'd gifts, and summ'd them up in
thee.

Thou hast the arts whole Zodiack run,
And fathom'st all that here is known ;
Strange restless curiosity.
Adam himself came short of thee,
He tasted of the fruit, thou bear'st away the Tree ! *

Excessive praise was the incense with which More's enthusiastic sympathisers usually regaled him. So Norris in this respect was not singular. Neither was he singular in directing his praise chiefly to More's learning, or in failing to see that much of it was "wood, hay and stubble." To many no less than to him it all seemed as "golden" as it was vast ; and they thought it well worth while to read and read again his numerous folios.

That Norris did so is ascertained from his own confession. For, on January 8, 1634, he opened a correspondence with More, and near the end of the first letter he begs to be regarded not as a "gainsayer," but an "enquirer"—one in fact "who has read all the Doctor's works," in the Latin Edition of three volumes, diligently ; and has seen that a place was given them 'in *Bibliotheca Nostra*'—meaning, I suppose, the Library of "All Souls."

The first letter was composed in Latin out of the feeling, perhaps, that the learned language best became him in addressing so learned a man. If so, More gave

* This is in the style of Cowley—cp. his lines on Falkland—*e.g.* :
"How could he answer't, if the state saw fit
To question a monopoly of wit."

him a "gentle fall" in the opening sentence of his answer, where he says "I have received your very civil and elegant Latin letter, but answer you according to my constant use to our own countrymen in English." The Correspondence is of great interest, both for what it discusses, and, still more, for what it reveals of the writers—the one a gracious old man of three score and ten (1614-1687), the other a man of twenty-seven, deferential in his tone, but a keen disputant, and firmly retentive of his own opinion when he thinks it correct. As this does not appear to have been done before, I will give an abstract of the main points—premising that there are nine letters—five from Norris and four from More; that they extend over thirteen or fourteen months—from January 1684-5, to February or March 1685-6 (Norris's last letter has no date); and that Norris says he had three reasons for publishing them: (1) the 'importunity of friends,' who had got to know of their existence; (2) the fact that "some of the letters have a near relation" to certain parts of the Book—on the 'theory and Regulation of love'—at the end of which they are printed; and (3) because he has herein 'vindicated' his discourse on the "root of Liberty" even against "so severe a Speculatist" as the revered Doctor. The discourse referred to was one preached* by Norris during the course of the correspondence, and dedicated to More. As will be seen, the latter took exception to its statement of what constitutes liberty, and this drew out Norris in its defence.

1. The first letter—ad Clarissimum Virum Henricum More—is occasioned by two difficulties which have occurred to Norris in reading the 'Enchiridion Metaphysicum'—(a) that space (defined by More as immobile quoddam extensum á mobile Materia distinctum) is on all sides Infinite. For space, objects Norris, is 'quantitas permanens,' all of whose parts—quotquot

* At St. Peter's Church in the East, Oxford—on Mid-Lent Sunday, 29th March, 1685, on Rom. XII. 3, and printed at first separately and then in the "Miscellanies."

sunt vel esse possunt—exist at one and the same time ; and, therefore, it seems a contradiction for anyone to say that space is infinitely extended ; the case, indeed, is otherwise with ‘*quantitas successiva*,’ whose parts follow on one another. (b) Another difficulty is “*de Penetrabilitate Spiritus*.” You say that spirits—their ‘extension’ being no hindrance—can penetrate each other, *i.e.*, can occupy one and the same space. And yet you explain “Penetration” as ‘*per sui contractionem*,’ and you illustrate it by the case of wax rolled up into a smaller space : which seems to indicate that Penetration in your sense means simply that two spirits reduced to narrower compass by change of state, may occupy the space which one filled before the change. Itane? But this is ‘*Juxta positio in eodem loco communi*’ not ‘*coexistentia Dimensionum in eodem ubi*’ (according to the schools).

Rogo ut in tenebris hisce . . . facem mihi accendere non graveris. . . . And ‘Oh that you would finish the *Metaphysicum*,’ He longs earnestly to know what More intends to do ‘*de ista re*.’ It would be such a pity for so admirable a work to be left ‘*mancum et imperfectum*.’ And yet so it must remain unless More carries it through himself . . .

“For the rest, I heartily pray God that He will long hold you—the brightest star in our literary world—from setting ; and that after your course is done, He will grant you to join the choir of the blessed, and will, from the fountain of His own wisdom, give your boundless thirst for knowledge a full satisfaction.”

Sic exoptat

Devotissimus Tui et Tuorum Scriptorum Cultor,

JOHANNES NORRIS.

Dabam Oxon. Ex Coll. Om. An, Jan. 8, 1684-5.

2. More’s answer is dated 19th of the same month. (a) As to the first difficulty, he explains that space, or ‘*immobile extensum*,’ is really a substance *Incorporeal*, so that the term ‘parts,’ in a physical sense, does not

properly belong to it. Further, he uses "omne" and "totum" in the only true logical sense: viz., that, whatever the subject may be, there is no part left out; and so, if 'totum' or 'omne,' or 'omnes partes,' be pronounced of a subject Infinite, it leaves nothing of that Infinite subject out, nor omits any parts; and, consequently, implies the perfect infinity thereof. In fine, "it is the subject of the term 'omne or totum' which determines their signification, not the 'intrinsic sense of the terms themselves.' He would say, too—contrary to Norris—that it is only permanent quantity whose parts are all at once capable of an absolute infinity: as for successive quantity, it is not so capable, either 'a parte ante' or 'a parte post.'

(b) In regard to the second difficulty, he thinks Norris has missed his meaning. "For by the contraction of spirit I mean that of the *same* spirit, whereby it may occupy a less Ubi (what he calls 'essential spissitude' . . . the fourth dimension), and not of several spirits so contracted that they may take up no more space than any one of them did before contraction."

As to the 'Metaphysicum,' he has no purpose of finishing it. For he is now of great age, he has other designs, and he has in the first part done what is most difficult, viz., demonstrated the existence, nature and essence of spiritual substance. For more light, let him consult the 'Cabbala Philosophica' and "Exposition of Jewish Mercada, or Ezeckiel's Vision," "the right understanding whereof contains the choicest secrets of the Jewish Theosophy or Metaphysicks."

"This is all for the present, but the repeating of my thanks for the great kindness you seem to have for,

Worthy Sir, your affectionate Friend to serve you,

HENRY MORE."

C. C. College, January 19, 1684-5.

3. Norris "acknowledges the civility, and profound subtilty, of your letter," and finds his "satisfaction

increase with the perusal of it." He ventures to lay before him something else. He has felt perplexed—and this is the point of contact with his 'book' (*i.e.*, "The Theory and Regulation of Love")—"concerning the Moral Turpitude of Sensuality." On the one hand, (1) so many great Moralists (especially among the ancients) say there is turpitude in sensuality 'per se'; (2) some acts of sensuality, such as voluntary Pollutions, though really separated from ill effects, are generally condemned; (3) the Platonists and Stoics, professing to follow the pure dictate of nature, inveigh against it; (4) there is the instinct of 'natural shame' in the mere act." On the other hand (1) the more modern Masters of Morality—*e.g.*, Grotius (1583-1645), Dr. Cumberland (1632-1718), Puffendorf (1632-1694)—resolve the Immorality, even of Adultery, wholly into its pernicious effects. (2) Again, if there is "Turpitude" in Sensuality, as such, then, there is turpitude in Marriage. (3) Besides, "Is not sensuality, as a mere gratification of sense, neither better nor worse than many other things which are allowed?" (4) And, lastly, how can it be shown to be wrong—in any absolute sense—for a man to please himself. Is it, after all, just a case of Positive Law?

Sir, I desire your unerring Hand to lead me out of this labyrinth . . . and to pardon the boldness of,

Most Worthy Sir,

Your most real Friend and most humble servant,

All Souls' College,

J. NORRIS.

January 28, 1684-5.

4. More does not write again till April, for "he has been much hindered by abundance of business." His correspondent, he thinks, has "shewed a great deal of, not only wit and eloquence, but Solidity of Reason" in "pleading pro and con in the case" he propounds. But he might have proceeded more clearly had he first defined the term "Sensuality"—

viz. :—"a Pleasure of what Julius Scaliger—in his 'Exercitationes'—calleth the Sixth sense: the 'Tactus Venereus.'" Has such pleasure any Moral Turpitude? No. "But to be captivated to that Pleasure so as to make us less capable of that which is better, or to break the laws of what is just and decorous, this is the Turpitude which is contracted therein, and argues him that is captivated to be brutish and sensual in the ordinary sense of the word." As to the sense of shame connected with the enjoyment of sensual pleasures, that signifies "that though these things, rightly circumstantiated, have no Moral Turpitude in them; yet, such is the Nobleness of the Soul of man, that such gross enjoyments are exceedingly below her who is designed for an Angelical Life, where they neither marry nor are given in marriage; and, therefore, even Nature has taught her to 'sneak,' when she, being Heaven-born, demits her noble self to such earthly drudgery. "Thus"—with more to the same effect—"in some haste committing you to God's Gracious keeping, I take leave and rest,

Dear Sir,

Your affectionate Friend to serve you,

HENRY MORE.

C.C.C., April 13, 1685.

5. Norris has been into the country, and has just returned. He is grateful for the answer so far as it goes, but it leaves untouched the difficulty—"how, if there be no moral Turpitude in the simple Perception of Veneral Pleasure, abstracted acts, such as Voluntary Pollutions," can be unlawful.

Sir, I humbly crave your sense in this point . . . which, if you please to vouchsafe me, you will no less engage the affections than inform the Judgment of,

Most worthy Sir,

Your most real and obliged

Friend and Servant,

J. NORRIS.

No date (but towards the end of 1685).

6. The Doctor's next letter written—as the opening sentence informs us—about a month later, ‘advertises first’ to Norris’s sermon (of the preceding March) dedicated to himself. In this Norris discusses free agency—whether it lies in the will or the understanding, and concludes that the Soul necessarily understands as the object appears to her, and necessarily wills as she understands—“so we are frozen up in a frigid fatality and necessity.” More, forgetting logic, or not feeling it congenial, runs off into an eloquent outburst on the necessity of being Regenerate, and a Partaker of the Divine Nature, in order to be truly free; and on the perfect freedom which results from a ‘perfect exinanition’ of ourselves. He does, however, meet Norris directly, when he says:—“But the true ground of our being able, and free, to chuse what is best, consists rather in the purity of the Soul from Vice than in advertency and attention to the object, while the mind is vitiated and obscured for want of due Purification.”

As to the point on which his correspondent has craved light, he says:—“Since the Pleasure of the Sixth sense is in order to the end of propagation, it is most manifestly a gross abuse of the pleasure to affect it and excite it merely for the Pleasure’s sake, the end of God and Nature being frustrated at the same time, and the due use of that sensation grossly perverted.”

Dear Sir,

Your faithful and affectionate
Friend to serve you,

HENRY MORE.

C. C. C, January 16, 1685-6.

7. Norris, in his reply, “begs leave to return something in defence of his hypothesis.” “Your authority is so sacred with me, that nothing less than the desire of Truth should engage me to oppose it.” Now we both agree that there is “‘τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν,’ some Principle of the free agency of man. The question is,

whether it lies in the Soul as Intelligent, or Volent. Not in the latter, if it can be made out . . . that the Soul *necessarily wills as she understands.*" For the demonstration of this he asks but one "Postulatum"—viz, "that the object of the Soul is *apparent* good, or that the Soul cannot will evil as evil." But "apparent" here means "apprehended or Judged" to be good or evil respectively. Therefore, the soul wills as she understands. . . . How a thing appears (and so is judged, apprehended or understood) depends upon the degree of advertency or attention, . . . and here "I place the seat of free agency." (a) But is it not true that "Video meliora proboque Deteriora sequor?" In a sense, yes: for one may judge a thing good either by a "Speculative or Practical knowledge"—either as it appears to the philosophic mind, or to the mind arrested by some immediate claim. In the latter case, a lower good may seem the greater, and, if so, will be followed. (b) And what then of sin against knowledge? "A man sins knowingly inasmuch as he knows in the Theory, or by an Habitual Judgment, that such (or such) a fact is a sin. (c) Still "Moral corruption" does "divert the soul from attending to the Beauty of Holiness?" No doubt; but 'attention' duly applied (*i.e.*, so far as it can be in the present state of the soul) is "not defective" towards true illumination.

As to the pleasures of the sixth sense, "if abstractedness of this pleasure from the natural end of it be its essential Turpitude," what of persons who marry when "'tis impossible, according to the course of Nature, that this end should be served?"

Most honour'd and Dear Sir,

Your most obliged Friend and servant,

J. NORRIS.

No date.

8. The Cambridge Divine's last letter is perhaps the finest. He admires his friend's "Ingenius Dexterity" in managing the argument. But he "sticks" where

he was. For (1) Volency is implied in attention or advertency. Moreover (2) "though the soul does not chuse according as the betterness of the object appears to her understanding, it does not thence follow that she will chuse evil as evil, but that she will chuse a natural good and prefer it before the Moral." (3) *Omnis peccans ignorat?* True: but this means that whoever sins "does so out of defect of either Notional Knowledge or inward sense, such as accompanies Real Regeneration." "Life and sense can only counterpoise life and sense: not *mere notion*." (4) We agree in "placing the *ἀντεξουσιον* of the soul in her immediate power of using the best means she can, to find out what is her best good, or readiest means to true happiness and riddance of sin and error." "But mere attention of itself, in a morally corrupt mind, let it be never so great, can no better discover the moral object than the vitiated eye the natural. It is the purity of the soul, thro' Regeneration, that enables her to behold the Beauty of Holiness . . . There is no seeing God but by being purified and Regenerate into His Image. *εἰ γεγονας τοῦτο καὶ εἶδες αὐτό*—as Plotinus somewhere has it touching the Divine 'Pulchritude.' 'If thou beest it thou seest it.' If we be regenerate into the Image of the Eternal Pulchritude we then shall see it, having (if I may use the Poet's expression here) *Incoctum generoso Pectus Honesto*."

But, if this Principle of Life be not sufficiently awakened in us, no attention is sufficient to make us rightly discern the Beauty of Holiness but only "a *shadowy notion* or *Meager* monogrammatical Picture thereof," which will not avail, though you use "all the attention in the world, against the Dictates of the animal sense and life unmortified, in the day of trial. May the elderly marry? Yes: "they may live chastly and comfortably (for Mutual Society, Help and Comfort) without any 'frustaneous' abuse of their bodies upon the Titillation of lust, which exact Christian Tem-

perance and holy Meditations and discourses together, of their joyous change into the other near approaching State, ought to prevent."

Sir, I have told you freely my statements touching all the things you have propounded, but I dictate nothing, but leave all to your own free Judgment, and so, wishing you good success in your virtuous studies,

I take leave and rest,

Your affectionate Friend to serve you,

HENRY MORE.

C.C.C., February 22, 1685/6.

9. The close of the Doctor's last letter seemed to mark a full stop, so far as he was concerned. But Norris returns to the charge. "Your learned and ingenious answer—he says—"is spun throughout with a very fine web, and richly fraught with curious and retired sense." He is, however, not convinced. (1) He must still maintain that *attention*, which means a general wakefulness of the understanding, or application of mind, to the consideration (speculation, he calls it) of a Truth, habitually known, will make it actually present in such wise as "to determine the Practical Judgment," and "by that the will." (2) He must hold, too, that the principle which rules our choice—what he calls 'the question of Eligibility'—is the *degree* of evil, or seeming evil, in things, not whether they are "Natural" or "Moral." He is ready to be corrected; but he, too, 'sticks,' to his opinion. "I am," he concludes, "very sensible what interruptions I have already given you, but I hope you will easily pardon me when you consider that 'tis the peculiar Reverence I have for your Judgment which has brought this trouble upon you from

Dear Sir,

Your most highly obliged

Friend and Servant,

J. NORRIS.

No date.

Thus ends a notable correspondence between two friends who, so far as we know, had never met and never were to meet. In less than two years the saintly recluse of 'Christ Church, Cambridge,' was dead (1 Sept. 1687), and "interred in the Chapel of his College." In the following spring Norris gave the nine letters to the world; and, to show that he still 'stuck to his opinion'—as well as to make the 'matter' quite clear—he added an appendix summarizing his Theory as to the "Seat of Liberty," in seventeen propositions. As they offer a fair specimen of his method and expound an element of his thinking which influenced it very considerably, I will give them :—

1. That a creature void of Liberty cannot be capable of Law or Obligation, Virtue or Vice, Reward or Punishment, is certain.
2. That man is capable of all these, is certain.
3. That man is endowed with Liberty, is certain.
4. That Liberty is a Rational Perfection, or a Perfection belonging to an Intellectual Nature, is certain.
5. That, therefore, this Liberty must be subjected in the understanding or the will; or, to speak more properly, in the Soul as Intelligent, or in the Soul as Volent, is certain.
6. That it cannot be subjected in that part which acts necessarily, is certain.
7. That the Will necessarily follows the dictate of the understanding; or, that the Soul necessarily wills according as she understands, is certain.
8. That, therefore, this Liberty cannot be immediately subjected in the Will, or in the Soul as *Volent*, is certain.
9. That, therefore, it must be subjected in the Soul as intelligent, is certain.
10. That even the Soul as intelligent, so far as it acts necessarily, cannot be the immediate subject of Liberty, is also certain.

11. That the Soul as Intelligent necessarily judges according as the object appears to her, is certain.
12. That, therefore, the Soul as judging, or forming a Judgment, can no more be the immediate subject of Liberty than the Soul as *Volent*, is certain.
13. That—since the Soul necessarily wills as she judges, and necessarily judges as things appear—we have thus far no glimpse of Liberty, is certain.
14. That, therefore, our liberty must be founded upon the No-necessity of some certain things appearing determinately thus or thus. or that we have no liberty thus or thus, or that we have no liberty at all, is as certain.
15. That things appearing thus or thus (unless in self-evident Proposition) depends upon the various degrees of advertency or attention and nothing else, is certain.
16. That, therefore, we have an immediate power of attending, or not attending, more or less, is certain.
17. That, therefore, this *Indifferency of the Soul* as to attending, or not attending, or attending more or less, is the Prime Root and immediate subject of Human Liberty, is no less certain—which was the Point to be demonstrated.”

II. There is no great need to enlarge on the points of agreement between Norris and More, and the other Cambridge men. But some of them may be briefly noted—not as proving direct obligation on the part of Norris, but common sympathies.

They are such as these:—Love of Plato and the Platonists; reverence for reason; the use of Reason as a handmaid of Christian faith; rejection of Calvinism; the assertion of ‘Morals’ as a necessary outcome of religion; attachment to the Church of England, and indifference towards public affairs. A

few words under each of these heads will suffice:—(1) Norris's Platonism showed itself early. He claimed, in his essay on Plato's ideas, "a more than ordinary acquaintance with his works." One of his first literary ventures was a translation of the 'Divine Moralist'—as he calls him—Hierocles (cir. 430-90). He quotes Plotinus (204-269), Porphyry (232-304), Proclus (411, cir. 485), with evident ease. With Marisilius Ficinus (1433-99) he seems to be specially at home. No doubt the quotations occur most often in the earlier works, and are outnumbered by references to Malebranche and St. Austin, &c., in the later. But he never escaped from Plato's influence, and never wished to escape. His confession, in 1684, that he had already read all More's works, leaves no doubt as to the medium through which the influence first reached him. (2) His reverence for Reason is obvious even to a casual reader. To him, as to all of the Cambridge School, Reason was 'the candle of the Lord' within man. Like More, "he was proud to adorn himself" as a writer with "the sacerdotal breast-plate of the λογιον or Rationale" He put everything to a Rational test, though he held it reasonable to accept and believe many things which cannot be proved. Authorities had no weight in his view save so far as their ground and claims are approved by the authority within. His aim and effort, whatever theme he may be handling, is so to state, and argue it, as to carry the understanding with him step by step. He depends on nothing else for the support of his Philosophy save the fact that it seems to him "an intelligible" system; and all he ever asks of his reader is a sincere desire to seek and see and welcome the Truth for its own sake, and as it 'shines in its own light.' Adequately to illustrate these statements would entail the quoting of the greater part of all he wrote.

(3) His use of Reason in the service of Religion is equally evident. He was entirely of More's mind,

“that Christian and Philosophic genius” should “mix together;” and that “The Christian religion, rightly understood,” is “the deepest and choicest piece of philosophy that is.” Thus he says, “Religion is so very agreeable, both to the inclinations and discourses of Human nature, that as none is capable of being Religious but a rational creature, so ’tis almost impossible for a creature to be indued with Reason and not to be religious.” Natural Religion—he adds in the same place—is so called because its ‘fundamental’ and ‘Substantial’ Maxims bear a strict ‘correspondency to our Rational Natures.’ And so with Revealed Religion;” for God, in all His intercourses with us, does accommodate Himself to our Natures; and as He will not forcibly determine us to good, because He has made us free, so neither does he require anything from us but what is good and consistent with Reason, because He has made us Rational.* Again, therefore, he would agree with More, “that to exclude the use of Reason in the search of Divine Truth was simply to destroy the light by which divine truth can alone be recognized.”† He admired the “Noble Divinity which may be dug up out of the mines of Philosophy;” and because he was sure that ‘Christian Morality’ “has its Bottom and Foundation” in the Nature of things, and is, accordingly, as “capable of demonstration as any Theorem in that Science whose character is Evidence and Certainty,”‡ he could not rest till he had succeeded, to his own satisfaction, in linking every part of his Theology to some ‘fundamental’ principle of the Reason.

For “we cannot do better service to Religion than by resolving the Practical Duties of it into Principles of Philosophy; or make a better use of Philosophic

* See “The Christian Law asserted and vindicated,” in *Miscellanies*, pp. 176-7; also “Reason and Faith,” *passim*, &c.

† Said of More by Tulloch—“*Rational Theology*”—Vol. II., 355.

‡ Discourses, Vol. III., p. 70.

Notions than to employ them in the service of, and for the interest of, Religion." *

(4) Dislike of Calvinism was a 'note' common to all the Cambridge Divines. They were not, on that account, distinctly Arminian. When Whichcote was charged with indebtedness to the Dutch Arminius he denied it—"he had not even read Arminius." He owed his revolt from the dominant Theology to principles which he had reached mainly for himself. Much the same might be said of those who followed him. Their conception of 'Reason,' and of the ethical relation between man and God, precluded acceptance of the leading dogmas with which Calvinism was associated.

More—though his parents, and earliest tutor, were "great Calvinists"—"could never swallow that hard doctrine concerning Fate." Neither it seems could Norris. It has already been said that one of his first writings was an Essay against the "Decretum Absolutum." † I have not succeeded in getting hold of this, but, judging from the tone of his later references to the 'Decree,' the earlier onslaught must have been anything but mild. Those later references are numerous, and always turn on one or other of the two 'fixed points,' either—(1) that Predestination (for Calvinism is usually spoken of by Norris and the Cambridge men as if it meant little more than this) tends to loose morality; or (2) that it is opposed to the "discoveries" of God's own light in Reason and Conscience.

(5) The mention of Morality suggests another point of likeness between Norris and his predecessors—I mean their insistence on the Ethical side of Religion. They did not say that Morality could do without Religion. But neither did they say that Religion could do without Morality. The former stands to the latter as root to fruit, or as means to end.

* Epistle Dedicatory to Vol. III. of Discourses.

† Since writing this I have succeeded.

Man's "last end," says Norris, is God Himself: here alone does he find his 'Bonum Jucundum'—his true happiness. But the means to the end, 'the Bonum Utile,' is virtue or goodness. And the worth, the importance, the glory, of Religion lies in its power to commend the love and practice of goodness in all its forms.* Hence, he was not likely to 'spare' those who divorce Religion or Christian Doctrine from the duties of life.†

He condemns three sorts of men:—(a) the Antinomians, "who are Impudent and Ignorant enough in express terms to assert that the sacrifice and satisfaction of Christ does wholly excuse from all manner of duty and obedience"; (b) "those who make Christianity a matter of bare speculation, and think all Religion absolved in orthodoxy of opinion" . . . "little considering that opinion is purely in order to Practice, and that orthodoxy of judgment is necessary only in such matters where a mistake would be of dangerous influence to our actions, *i.e.*, in Fundamentals"; (c) "the 'Solifidians,' who, under a pretence of advancing the merits of the Cross and the freeness of the Divine grace, require nothing of a Christian, in order to his Justification and acceptance before God, but firmly to rely on the satisfaction and Merits of Christ"—teaching which is "against Logick and common sense." No: "the advantage of Christianity" does not consist in having any abatement of duty; for Christ was so far from diminishing, or retrenching, the Moral Law . . . that he improved every part of it to higher senses than the most exquisite of the Jewish Doctors understood. . . . He was to make us better men; and, accordingly, it was fit he should give us a better Law: a Law that will not be satisfied but by such a Righteousness as

This, in a sentence, is the argument which Norris elaborates in his treatise "of Christian Prudence."

* See the Discourse in Miscellanies on "The Christian Law asserted and vindicated," and precisely to the same effect is the Discourse in Vol. III. on "the Law not made void through Faith," preached before Bishop Burnet, September 2, 1692. So his sermons, *passim*.

should exceed even the strictest among the Jews—that of the Pharisees. So that we are by no means Released, but rather more deeply engaged in Duty by the Gospel, as 'tis a Law." This quotation, taken from an early discourse, expresses the spirit of all his teaching, and might be matched, it need hardly be said, by many quotations to the same effect from any, and every, one of the Cambridge Divines.

(6) The words "orthodoxy of judgment is necessary only . . . in Fundamentals," point to a further resemblance, viz, in what, for the times, was Latitudinarianism. "Since our Religion is so Reasonable a Service, 'twill follow hence, in the first place, that there may be a due exercise and use of Reason in Divine matters; and that whatsoever is apparently (*i.e.*, clearly) contrary to Reason ought not to be observed as of Divine Authority, nor be accounted as any part of the Christian Religion." . . . "'Twill follow, secondly, that no man ought to be Persecuted, or have any external violence done him for his Religion, supposing that by overt acts he gives no disturbance to the public. For, since God has required nothing of us but what is agreeable to our Reason, why should man?"

This is exactly in the strain of the Cambridge Teachers, both as to the ground of Toleration, and its scope. They could not endure 'the Papists;' Quakers seemed to them almost as bad; and Dissent generally was an 'offence.' In these limitations Norris entirely agreed. He was specially hard on the 'Sectaries,' as he called them. But it is to be noted that his reason for denouncing them was just that which moved More, *e.g.*, to do the same—the firm belief, viz., that the 'differences' were *not* such as to justify separation; were not even worth the serious regard of a truly 'Reasonable' man; and yet were pressed forward so hotly, exclusively, and obstinately, as to become the means of 'rending' the Church, and vexing the 'Public Peace.' The question here is not whether this view is right or wrong. I merely point out its consistency

with Norris's general principle—that men should be left free to think as they like, unless, and until, they embody their 'opinions' in 'overt acts' which "give disturbance to the public." The principle is vague, much turning on who shall judge of 'overt acts,' and what is meant by 'Disturbance'; but it sounds 'broad,' and really did spring from a breadth of thought which was comparatively rare, in those days, outside the Cambridge movement.

Two other facts may be mentioned as connecting Norris with the Cambridge men, though in an accidental way. The one is (6) their common attachment to the Church of England. Than its "decent grandeur and splendour," More loved nothing more, and desired nothing better. So, in effect, said Cudworth, Smith, and Whichcote. As to Norris, his Churchmanship was more pronounced than theirs. Sometimes he seems to be thinking of the Church first, and of Christianity second. But he did not mean to do so. He would very likely have echoed More's words, "I am above all sects whatsoever as sects; for I am a true and free Christian, and what I write and speak is for the interest of Christ, and in behalf of the Life of the Lamb." More, however, would not have put Norris's fervour into the following:—"I write neither for favour nor for Preferment, but only to serve the cause of Christianity, and the interest of that Church which is so great a Friend to it, and Maintainer of it, according to its purest and most primitive State of Apostolical and Evangelical Perfection, of whose communion 'tis my happiness to be a member, my Glory to be a Priest; and that I had better Abilities to do her service, my highest ambition. . . ."*

(7) Lastly, Norris, like the Cambridge men, held aloof from Politics. Great events were taking place in England all through the seventeenth century—events

* Preface to "Reason and Faith." See also closing §§ of 'Christian Prudence,' 394—8 pp.

which stirred the deepest passions of men, which split the nation into fiercely contending parties, which filled the air with the din of conflict, and which wrought changes in Church and State of momentous consequence.

But one might read the writings of Whichcote, Smith, Cudworth, More, or Norris, and hardly be made aware that anything unusual was going on. As regards Norris, indeed, one is not left to guess *which side* he favoured. But neither he nor they seem ever to have experienced any degree of that intense concern for the issues at stake, and sorrow for the sufferings involved, which broke Falkland's heart, and drove Milton into the midst of the fight. They were not of the stuff which makes the Practical Reformer. This world, with its pressing tasks, and its problems demanding immediate solution of some sort, did not greatly trouble them—did not trouble them enough. Norris could not spend even "his looser hours" "in beating about after news, or holding tedious and impertinent chat about State concerns." *

Let Plots and News embroil the State,
Pray what's that to my Books and Me?
Whatever be the Kingdom's fate
Here I am sure t' enjoy a Monarchy.
Lord of myself, accountable to none,
Like the first man in Paradise, alone.

While the ambitious vainly sue,
And of the partial stars complain,
I stand upon the Shore and view
The mighty labours of the distant main.
I'm flushed with silent joy, and smile to see
The shafts of fortune still drop short of me. †

Thus he wrote at an early stage of his career, and from this dignified, but rather selfish attitude, he, like the Cambridge Philosophers, never felt called upon to recede.

* Preface to Discourses, Vol. III.

† The Retirement.

NORRIS'S MYSTICISM.

In what sense was Norris a mystic? "However absolute, it has been said, * "a philosopher's Idealism may be, he is erroneously styled a mystic if he moves towards his conclusions only by the patient labour of the Reason." Now, at first sight, nothing seems more clear than that Norris moves towards his conclusions only by the patient labour of the Reason. His logic is always at work, clearing the ground for the 'premises' of his argument, or trying to make them perfectly distinct, or guarding them from wrong conclusions, or deducing carefully the right ones. Even in his 'contemplations' or 'meditations,' whose sole purpose is to kindle or foster devotion, it is just the same. He assumes a proposition, which he takes to be quite clear: *e.g.*, that † "'tis necessary man should have some end"; then he goes on to another, which seems equally clear, as that "'tis impossible man should be his own end"; and so, step by step, he rises to the intended result—*e.g.*, "that God, who is the Author of man, is likewise his true end and center." He does not in the least believe that ignorance or undirected feeling is the "Mother of devotion." ‡ "Devotion," he says, is an act of the will, but "the object of the will is good apparent, or good understood; and consequently, every act of the Will is influenced and regulated by *consideration*. Devotion, therefore, is as much influenced by consideration as any other act of the will is; and so I cannot but admire at the Dis-

* Article on 'Mysticism' in 'Encyclopædia Britannica.

† Cp. *Miscellanies 'Contemplation and Love'*, p. 232 ff.

‡ Reason and Religion. p. 6.

posers of the Angelical Hierarchies for making the *Seraphim* excel in *Love* and *Devotion*; and the *Cherubim* in *Knowledge*. As if knowledge were not the best preparative for *Devotion*."

Norris, then, it may be granted, was far from being a mystic of the Oriental sort, who expect to dream, or gaze, or 'feel' themselves away into the infinite. Neither, in all respects, was he a mystic like Henry More. For More had what may be called the 'mystical temperament.' "He had a rich ethereal sort of body," says his biographer, "a singular constitution both for soul and body. His very temperature was such as fitted him for the greatest apprehensions and performances." "I, myself, once accidentally meeting him, saw that air in his countenance, so angelical and divine, that I never before beheld in man. He seemed to be full of introversions of light, joy, benignity, and devotion at once; and as if his face had been wholly overcast with a golden shower of love and purity." *.

Something very similar is said of Plotinus and Proclus. Thus, of the former, we read, † "In speaking, the life of intellect diffused itself as far as to his countenance, which was, indeed, at all times lovely, but was then particularly beautiful. For then a certain attenuated and dewy moisture appeared on his face, and a pleasing mildness shone forth;" and of Proclus, we are told ‡ that, "not only did his body possess great symmetry, but a living light, as it were, beaming from his soul, was efflorescent in his body, and shone forth with an admirable splendour which it is impossible to describe." Of any such natural aptness for mental exaltations, there seems to be no trace in Norris. We must not speak positively. But one always has the impression, in reading him, of a man in

* Ward's *Life of More*. Cp. "He hath said that his breast and body would of themselves send forth flowery and aromatic odours from them," &c. *id.* p. 124.

† Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*.

‡ *Life of Proclus*, by his disciple Marinus.

whose constitution the 'elements' are evenly balanced; a man not subject to moods; a man unfailingly master of himself, cool, sober, rational. Hence it is difficult to imagine him being led away by the 'theosophic' speculations with which Neo-Platonism is associated, and which had so great a fascination for More in his later years. Hence, too, it is difficult to picture him so raised and absorbed as not to know *where* he was intellectually, or *why* he was there. More "was once for ten days together 'nowhere' (as he termed it), or in one continued fit of contemplation, during which, though he ate, drank, slept, went into the (College) Hall and conversed—in a measure, as at other times—yet the thread of it, for all that space, was never broken or interrupted, nor did he animadvert (*i.e.*, turn his mind) on the things which he did."* This, in More, was natural; and so were the visions and ecstasies which in that 'supernal frame' he might experience. But Norris did not, and could not, rise so high above the earth. He might try. † "In the depths of solitude and silence, and having withdrawn" himself "not only from all worldly commerce, but from all thoughts concerning anything without" his own "sphere, he might retire wholly into" himself, "and there speculate the composition of" his "Intellectual nature." The sense of strain, however, and of effort, is unmistakeable; and we feel sure that the mystic 'absorption' he aims at is not for him.

Still, it is quite true to say that Norris was a Mystic. For mysticism has a double aspect; it may be viewed either as a theory, or as a practice. As a practice, it expresses the striving of religious souls to break away from all lower ties, that they may realize those alone which bind them to God, and, at last, to lose in God even the consciousness of self. In this respect, as we have said, Norris did not succeed in becoming a mystic.

* Ward's Life of More.

† Opening sentence of 'Contemplation and Love.'

But where mysticism does not enter, or enters imperfectly, into practice, it may yet be held as a Theory. In this respect, Mysticism adheres to everyone who, on the one hand, denies the sufficiency of Reason * to compass the highest truth ; and, on the other hand, claims that the highest truth may be reached by other means than the purely rational. So regarded, Mysticism cannot be absent from any philosophy which is really Christian ; and, it may be added, that so regarded, it is present in much of the Philosophy, especially since Kant, which is not professedly Christian. Of course, the mystical element may vary in degree and form, according to the *extent* of the province withdrawn from Reason and handed over to other powers, as well as according to the nature of the powers on which reliance is placed. But, in principle, he is a Mystic who, at any point in the quest of Truth or God, deserts his reason for a higher, or seemingly higher, guide ; and on this showing Norris was *emphatically* a Mystic. Reason he could trust to prove, not merely the existence, but also the essence, the attributes, the character of God. He could even trust Reason to prove its own incompetence after a certain point—the point, namely, where *formal* gives place to *real* knowledge of God. But, from that point, he commits himself to the wings of aspiration, upborne by faith and love, purity and prayer. And if the flight towards God be steady, eager and continuous enough, in the end the soul, he is sure, will taste and enjoy that essential oneness with Him, which is called the mystic union. “ When a man, after many degrees of abstraction from the animal life, many a profound and steady meditation upon the excellencies of God, sees such a vast ocean of Beauty and Perfection in Him that he loves Him to the utmost stretch of his power ; . . . when he consecrates and devotes himself wholly to

* Reason here, of course, is not used in the “transcendent” Coleridgean sense, which begs the point in question.

Him, and has no passion for inferior objects ; when he is ravished with the delights of His service, and breathes out some of his soul to Him in every prayer ; and when the one thing he desires is to “see Him as He is in heaven ; then does he know the meaning of ‘seraphic love,’ and this, with contemplation, makes up that which the Mystic Divines style the unitive way of religion, because it unites us to God in the most excellent manner that we are capable of in this life.” * “It is characteristic of full-blown Mysticism not to distinguish between what is metaphorical and what is susceptible of a literal interpretation. Hence, it is prone to treat a relation of ethical harmony as if it were one of substantial identity, or chemical fusion ; and, taking the sensuous language of religious feeling literally, it bids the individual aim at nothing less than an interpenetration of essence.” † This is what Norris did. For “the union, of which I speak, is not *local* or *presential*—for God is omnipresent ; neither is it an union of grace (as they call it), whereby we are reconciled to God ; nor an union of charity, whereof it is said, ‘he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God and God in him.’” It is a “union between the faculty and the object,” consisting “in some habitude or operation of one toward the other. The faculties here, are the understanding and the will ; the object, God ; and the operations, contemplation and love. The result of which two, is the mystic union.” ‡ Thus he wrote in one of his earliest essays. About the same time he also wrote poems which, at least, show how strongly the ‘theory’ attracted him, and how he tried to act upon it.

“Take wing (my soul) and upwards bend thy flight,
To thy originary fields of light ;
Here’s nothing, nothing here below
That can deserve thy longer stay ;

* Letter on ‘Idea of Happiness.’ (1683.)

† Article ‘Mysticism,’ *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

‡ ‘Idea of Happiness.’

A secret whisper bids thee go

To purer air and beams of native day ;
Th' ambition of the low'ring lark outvy,
And like him sing as thou dost upward fly." *

In these early days 'contemplation' was the favourite medium of "ascent to the supreme good;" and one can fancy that, as he read of what others had attained—Plotinus, for instance, who not merely aimed to "raise himself by his conceptions to the supreme good who is above intellect and all things," but even gained his end, time after time, by an "ineffable energy" of thought; †—his faith in the efficacy of 'contemplation' would be great. Nor did his faith in it ever pass away. But eleven years later, when he wrote (1694) "Letters concerning the love of God," contemplation has taken the second place. He has learnt to prefer a 'more excellent way.' For, "after the greatest elevation and soar of thought, our conceptions of God are but faint and shadowy, and we see Him but in a glass darkly; and if we would make this glass more transparent, 'tis love that must clarify and refine it. An affectionate sense of God will discover more of Him to us than all the dry study and speculations of Scholastic heads. The fire of our hearts will give the best and truest light to our eyes, and when all is done the love of God is the best contemplation." ‡ Words which recall those, even more beautiful, of Henry More,

"Far have I *clambred* § in my mind,
But nought so great as love I find;
Deep searching wit, mount moving might,
Are nought compared to that good spright.
Life of delight and soul of Bliss!
Sure source of lasting happiness!
Higher than heaven, lower than Hell,
Where is thy tent? where mayest thou dwell? ||

* The 'Elevation.' Cp. 'The Aspiration, Beauty,' etc.

† 'Life' by Porphyry, who says "he attained 'his end' four times while I was with him."

‡ In preface to 'Letters concerning the Love of God.'

§ *i.e.*, climbed up.

|| Quoted by Ward in his 'Life.' Cp. More's motto on 'coat of arms,' 'Amor Dei lux aniræ.'

And as with lapse of time he had come to put love of God before contemplation, so one gets the impression that towards the close of his life he grew to see, or at least to feel, that even 'love of God,' in the sense of an exclusive devotion, "rising into extasies, raptures, suspensions, apprehensions beatifical,"* is too rare and fine a thing to be the 'daily bread' of life. He may never have wished to retract any of his mystical utterances; he may have been in theory—there is every reason to think he was—a strict Mystic to the last; but the longer he lived, the less does he seem to have concerned himself about the heights and heats of feeling where the practical Mystic pants to dwell, the more does he seem to have valued the affections and duties of common life.† And this he did perhaps because he realized increasingly with More, when he said "God forbid, Philopolis, that the sweet of contemplation should ever put your mouth out of taste with the savoury usefulness of secular negotiations. To do good to men, to assist the injured, to relieve the necessitous, to advise the ignorant in his necessary affairs, to bring up a family in the fear of God, and a cheerful hope of happiness after this life, doth as much transcend our manner of living, if it ended in a mere pleasing of ourselves in the delicacy of select notions, as solid goodness doth empty fantasy‡ or sincere charity the most childish sophistry that is."§

* Idea of Happiness; quoted from Bishop (Jeremy) Taylor.

† Cp. for illustration the generally practical character of his later books.

‡ i.e., fantasy.

§ More's 'Divine Dialogues.' No. V. §. 42.

REMARKS ON THE IDEALISM OF NORRIS.

1. Norris has been called the English Malebranche, and, in the main, the description is just; for it is true that the later books of the Englishman are little else than a reproduction of the Frenchman's teachings. Allowing for occasional differences, which are of slight importance, he became the most admiring and docile of disciples. Not only did he accept Malebranche as a Philosophic guide, but quite as much, or even more, as a pattern for the 'conduct of life.' Under his influence he discarded old subjects of study, and confined himself to such only as could 'improve' his understanding and morals; he renounced every lower aim, and set up the 'Love of God' as the all inclusive virtue, the chief good, the sole spring of happiness; he found, also, in the retired and meditative habits of Malebranche, a type to which he would fain conform his own. "The life of Malebranche was essentially that of a thinker, not of an actor, or even of a scholar. A despiser of mere learning, without historical curiosity, impatient of critical studies, careless of politics and social affairs, he communed with himself, with nature, and with God; and was never tired of sounding the speculative depths to which the problems regarding them descended. For quiet meditation on them, he frequently retired to the country, alternating his walks in the wood with seclusion in a room shaded by drawn blinds. Not that he was an austere recluse, for he was always accessible and affectionate to his many friends, and, when he could unbend, enjoyed

nothing so much as to talk and play with children. His ecclesiastical training had done nothing to spoil his pure and open love of truth ; and his habitual piety imparted at once an elevation and a winning modesty to his character, which made him universally beloved.”* Here evidently, in most of its features, we have the original of that character and life which earned for Norris the name of the gentle recluse of Bemerton. For myself, I would extend the comparison even further, and say of him, as of Malebranche, that “few philosophical writers present their thoughts in so lucid and attractive a style.”†

2. But with reference to the Idealism of Norris—which is our present concern—we ought not to magnify his indebtedness to Malebranche unduly.

The outlines of his mental history are fairly clear. First, there was the early period of reaction against the rigid Calvinism in which he had been trained. The effect of this, in his case, as in that of the founders of the Cambridge School under similar influences, was not merely an abandonment of the early creed, but a certain emancipation of the Reason. Then came next, it would seem, the attraction of Henry More, whose works he read completely ; and who, like Whichcote, in relation to John Smith and others, may well have ‘set him on the reading of Plato, Plotinus and Proclus.’ As a result—a result made abundantly manifest by what he wrote, read, and translated—he embraced the ‘Theory of Ideas’ with passionate ardour. Then, or perhaps simultaneously, came the knowledge of Augustine, the Father recommended to his reverence by the fashion of the ‘schools ;’ and still more, as he grew intimate with him, by the many passages which confirmed, or seemed to confirm, his own Platonic views, especially in their bearing on Christian Theology. So far, at least, Malebranche is not needed to account for the Philosophy of Norris. Moreover,

* Martineau—in *Types of Ethical Theory*. Vol. I., p. 153.

† Martineau.

even when we look to the peculiar phase which links it to Malebranche, we have still to bear in mind the fact that Norris claims, in so many words,* to have reached it essentially by his own thinking. How far he may have been unconsciously self-deceived, of course it is hard to say. Looking back through a mist of years, he may, perhaps, have failed to measure the exact amount of his obligation. But we cannot doubt that he made the claim sincerely; and, if we admit its truth, we understand at once the enthusiasm with which Malebranche inspired him. For it would be the enthusiasm of a mind that sees in another its own dim, groping, undeveloped conceptions perfectly matured and expressed.

3. Still, it is an interesting question how Norris may have reached the Malebranchian Theory, in any form, without Malebranche; and the answer seems to lie in two plain facts.

(1.) On the one hand, he held positively that the 'Ideal World' is in the mind of God, is the mind of God, is identical with God himself,† Otherwise he

* In his 'Reason and Religion.' I have quoted the passage under notice of the book.

† Whether this was really Plato's view is very doubtful. "The balance of evidence"—says Martineau (Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. I., p. 32-3) as against "eminent critics like Brandis and Stallbaum"—"appears to me decisively on the other side. True it is that in several of the poetical and semi-mythical passages of the Phaedrus, the Timæus, and the Republic, dealings are described between God and the *εἰδῆ*, which seem to subordinate them to his disposal; he knows them; he contemplates them; he gives them place in the system of the world; nay, in a single instance, he is even spoken of as the Maker of them (Rep. 597). But in none of these relations are they presented as psychological phenomena of himself; on the contrary, they are data on which a transitive activity is directed. He knows them because they are already there; he contemplates them as infinite models of all finite order and beauty; he sets them in the cosmos by mingling with them the conditions of visible and temporal existence; and if, for a moment, he is conceived as *making* them, it is still as an artist creates an external work, and not as a thinker experiences his inward thoughts." &c. But if the view held by Norris was not Platonic, it was certainly Neo-Platonic—cp. e.g., Plotinus, Ennead, v. 5, 'that the *νοητά* (Intelligibles) do not exist outside of the Nous'; and, Ennead, v. 9, "on the Nous, the Ideas and the existent;" where he says, "The artificer of the Universe is full of all Intelligibles, and the causes of all things subsist in him, distinctly and intellectually separated from each other," &c. Cp. too, the controversy of Plotinus with Longinus (213-273), which turned on this point. Norris, like More and the rest of his school, did not carefully distinguish between Plato and his successors; and was sometimes indebted to them, when he thought himself speaking the mind of the 'Master.'

asks, how could God and 'Ideas' become a subject for the same predicates—infinite, eternal, unchangeable, &c. The contrary notion, which sets the 'Ideas' in some sense outside the divine mind—χωριστά—he scouts as a 'monstrous' birth due to the malice of Aristotle. *

(2.) On the other hand, he held positively the Cartesian antithesis between mind and matter. The two can never act upon each other, or come into the least contact. For the definition of the one, as a purely spiritual thinking principle; and of the other, as mere extension, puts them absolutely apart.

(3.) Holding firmly, then, by these two views, suppose him to ask how do *we* become possessed of 'Ideas'? One answer might be, they arise from the intercourse of our mind with the external universe, an ordered system, a cosmos, for which the 'Ideas' have served as models. But Norris is shut out from this answer by his notion of matter, which forbids intercourse between the external world and mind. Another answer might be—Ideas lie before all minds, human and divine, on a common field of vision. The Divine mind knows them perfectly, because its intelligence is perfect. So far as it is awake and attentive, the human mind may also know them in its measure. But Norris could not admit this answer, because the subjective seat of Ideas was, according to him, nowhere outside, but altogether inside, the Divine mind itself. What remained? If "Ideas," as embodied in the material universe, are beyond our reach, and if the only other place of them—their true Eternal Home—is the mind of God, did it not follow that to *see* them at all, we must see them in God? Thus, by a natural, not to say a necessary, process Norris may be supposed to have reached the point at which Malebranche found him. Had he been able to say, with Descartes, that Ideas, like everything else, are a 'creation' of the

* See his 'Letter on Ideas.'

Divine Will, he might then, indeed, have inferred that their presence in the human mind is due to a creative act of God, exercised on occasion of man's thinking. But, since he maintained that, though in the mind of God, 'Ideas' are uncreated and immoveable; and, since he had barred the way to their admission, under any form, through the senses, there was nothing left but to place the point, and scope, of vision within the Divine mind itself.*

(4) Obviously, the great difficulty here is—how it is possible for a mind to think ideas not its own, ideas which are wholly in the mind of another, and are its very essence. In other words, the difficulty is—how to retain the mind of man, in any sense or degree, as a *real* subject. But, probably, this was a difficulty which Norris did not feel. He was so busy on the side of Metaphysics, that problems of psychology had small chance of getting adequate attention, or even suggesting themselves. Just the same was true of Malebranche; and, with modifications, of Locke †—indeed, of philosophy generally, till Kant arose. This fact serves to explain, amongst other things, the curious treatment by Norris of the Eternal word, or λόγος. He meant, undoubtedly, to be orthodox; he lays it to the credit of his 'Idealism' that, in the light of it, he is enabled to do full justice to the teaching of Scripture and the Church concerning the "word which was with God from the beginning, and was God." But he fails entirely to perceive that, by insisting on the λόγος as simply an abstract name for God's storehouse of patterns, according to which he made all things, the personality of the 'Word' is ignored, and virtually

* Criticism of Norris from this point onward would be nothing more than criticism of Malebranche. I have dwelt on one aspect of their 'common' doctrine, under the section Norris and Locke. For an exhaustive "estimate of the system," see Martineau—'Types of Ethical Theory.' Vol. I., 194ff.

† This means, that even Locke was more concerned with the question, 'how Ideas arise,' than with the question, 'how they are conditioned by the mind,' or 'what the mind is that conditions them.'

denied. Personality, however, whether in God or man, was not a matter he felt called upon to define.

(5) This reference to the 'λόγος' suggests a further point. How did his Idealism affect the theology of Norris generally? For, with him, no less than with the Cambridge men and with Malebranche, Theology stood first and philosophy second. Philosophy had its source, its support, its end in Theology. Its ultimate questions must be about God, about the Being of God, about the relation of God to man and the universe. And only so far as it tended to awaken true thoughts, and holier feelings towards Him; was it worth cultivating. Norris, therefore, cherished his theory of an Ideal World—laid open, and close, to the mind of man—mainly on account of what seemed to him its religious significance. And that significance was not small. It is apparent, especially, in the fact that he could recognize the Divinity of all truth. When he meets with language—in the 'heathen' Hierocles, *e.g.*—which comes home to his reason and conscience, he has no need to explain it away; to trace it, somehow, to the Jews or Christians. He holds the key to it, and to every other good and true word, deed or life—wheresoever it may be found—in his belief that the so-called 'natural' reason borrows its light continually and universally from the Divine. So it was that he could not help sympathising with the principle of Quakerism, although he contrived to change sympathy into antipathy, by ascribing to it a superstition which seems to have been more fancied than real. In fact, he differed from the Quakers not in the way he supposed—viz., by making the 'Inner' Light a purely spiritual thing; but, by giving it a larger meaning. For "the Quakers . . . confine their light within to some certain objects, namely, Moral and Spiritual truths, in order only to the direction of practice; and, accordingly, make it a supplement to Scripture, which they say is not sufficient without it; . . . but I do

not appropriate this Divine Light to Moral or Spiritual things, but extend it as far as all truth, yea, as far as all that is Intelligible." * . . .

Here, at any rate, his 'theory'—used to interpret the words of John †—has led to a noble application. And, on first thought, one might expect to see Norris going on to take a noble view of revelation as a whole. But he did not, and even could not, do so. For, indeed, the 'theory' left no place for a merely historic Revelation. He accepted, for example, the Incarnation. But how could he suppose the Eternal Word—conceived, not as a Person, but as a name for the 'World of Ideas'—to become flesh and dwell amongst men; or again, how could he regard the 'Word made flesh' as necessary to reveal God, or the laws of God, seeing that the same Word in all fulness is intimately present to every mind, and unfolds to every mind, if consulted, all the truth it requires to know. Nay, how could he escape the feeling that between the 'Word' and 'Flesh' there is an incompatibility; that the 'Word' must be hindered, not assisted, in its shining forth on men by a material embodiment? More than once we find him classing 'histories' among the un-informing and un-profitable studies—because acquainting us, in their array of facts, with mere blurred copies of truths whose clear originals are within us. Why, then, should he except the 'supreme' history? Why go to it for the knowledge which we may learn, at first hand, in the 'School of the breast?' I do not say that Norris ever in the least realized this consequence of his Theory. But, certainly, it seems to furnish the latent reason why he took no account of 'Revelation considered as light,' and regarded Christianity, pure and simple, as synonymous with its mysteries. The Moral law there is no need to reveal: it is written, clearly and fully, within. The being, character, mind of God there is

* Appendix to 'Conduct of Human Life,'

† John i., 9.

no need to reveal : for this, too, is given to the reflecting mind. But there are certain facts, such as the Trinity, the atonement, the state of the blessed and the fate of the impenitent beyond death. These are mysteries. Their characteristic is to be above reason, too high for its unaided grasp. And these constitute the essence of Christianity. "Unbowelled" of its mysteries, he says, it is a "poor, lank, slender thing, having no signs that may infallibly set it above a human institution?"* The basis on which such mysteries stand are miracles, which—except to support them—"are not needed."† The office of reason here, is twofold. On the one hand, it distinguishes the things above itself and contrary to itself, rejecting the latter under all circumstances as false ; and, on the other hand, it determines whether the miraculous evidence for things above itself is sufficient to prove that the authority by which they are imposed is really divine. Having done this, it gives way to faith—a blind guide, whose entrance cannot take place until reason has retired. How far this view of Christianity may be justified is not now the point. The point is, that, before adopting it, Norris had left his Philosophy behind. It is a conventional view, taken up, though quite sincerely, out of deference to his Church and position.‡ (7) Bishop Warburton once wrote to a friend §—"All you say of Malebranche is strictly true. He is an admirable writer. There is something very different in the fortune of Malebranche and Locke. When the first appeared, it was with a general applause and admiration. When Locke first published his essay, he had hardly a single approver. Now Locke is universal,

* Reason and Faith, p. 333.

† Locke took much the same view in his 'Reasonableness of Christianity,' but, with his presuppositions, it was more natural.

‡ Here, too, he recalls Malebranche. Cp. the warning against seeking novelty in matters of faith which are withdrawn from the cognisance of reason—*De inquirenda veritate*. IV, 3-4.

§ 'Letters from a late eminent prelate to one of his friends,' March 3, 1759. The prelate is Warburton, the friend is Hurd.

and Malebranche sunk into obscurity." For this change he goes on to give two causes—one, that the 'philosophy in vogue' when Malebranche wrote has been supplanted by the Newtonian; the other, that Malebranche "debased his noble work with his system of seeing all things in God," whereas, "the sage Locke supported himself by no system, on the one hand; nor on the other, did he dishonour himself by any whimsies." So far as this explains the decline of Malebranche's popularity, it may explain likewise why Norris, as a philosopher, never had any. But something further may be added. To have gone with Norris would have meant, in a sense, going out of the world. For his doctrine—that all necessary truth is within, and may be better ascertained by consulting the secret oracle of the spirit than by searching into the phenomena of experience—entailed on those who believed it a self-secluded life, a life eschewing action, and given up to meditation. Such a life the great majority of men will never be persuaded to choose; least of all were men likely to choose it at a time when Locke, in philosophy—following Bacon in science—had set them on another path, a path which led them into the midst of everyday facts, a path on which they were already learning the delights of multiplied knowledge. Norris, therefore, 'charm he never so wisely,' preached to deaf ears. He was left alone. "One half of his readers out of folly, the other out of malice, dwelt only on the unsound part" * of his teaching. The sound and true part they forgot. (8) For the sound part was just that ideal element in the universe and man which, under the influence of Locke, it became the fashion, notwithstanding the protest of Berkeley, to ignore; and the ignoring of which led surely to French 'illumism.' But the true, however it may be forgotten, is never lost. In forms better fitted to its nature, it is sure to reappear. And so it has fared

* Warburton on Malebranche, in same letter.

with Idealism. We do not *now* speak of abstract ideas dwelling in an abstract mind, any more than we speak of 'dead' matter. We have come rather to speak of reason * transcendent, yet immanent—over all, yet everywhere present, active, progressive. And, as to man, we have ceased to speak of him as a passive subject of ideas, impressed upon him by matter or by spirit. We give its full force to the description of him as made in the 'image of God.' We conceive him as a reasonable being, adjusted to a reasonable system; capable of spelling out and interpreting its thoughts, whether the sphere of them be 'nature' or his own experience; and so, capable of framing the ideas thus gained—yet given—into ordered knowledge. We can see, too, if we are loyal to facts, that his development has not been normal; that by deflections of his will—in which, also, he shares the likeness of God—it has been arrested and confused; that, consequently, there was need and room for the fuller light and power which came to their culmination in Christ. We see, lastly, how the goal of history—the "increasing purpose which through all the ages runs"—is to restore, enlarge, complete harmony of mind and will between man and God; and, in this way, we seem to see how the 'Ideal element' of Philosophy may coincide with the sublimest hope of Christian faith.

* Used here in the Hegelian sense.

LIST OF WORKS BY JOHN NORRIS.

(Arranged Chronologically, with Notes.)

- I. 1682 —“PICTURE OF LOVE UNVEILED.” This was a translation of ‘*Effigies Amoris*’ (sive quid sit Amor efflagitanti responsum).

It was first printed “at London, in 1649,” the author’s name being concealed “because of his loyalty.” A third Edition came out after the Restoration, and a fourth in 1668. In 1682 an English edition appeared, “done by John Norris, who, in his preface to it, saith that the author of it is ‘admired by him for sweetness of fancy, neatness of style and lusciousness of hidden sense, and that, in these respects, he may compare with any other extant,’ &c.*

The author was Robert Waryng, born (at Lea, in Staffordshire), 1613; died (in London) 1658.

(He began his education at Westminster School; entered Christ Church College, Oxford, 1630; was Proctor of University College, 1647, and the same year deprived; he then withdrew to France).

A few of the headings of paragraphs will illustrate Wood’s description of it as a ‘Rhapsody’:—

- † 1. Omnia vel ultra vires posse amatores.
2. Mysterium amoris est nec exprimi fas nisi sese Interpretari.
3. Colloquia ut Angelorum intuitu peragunt (se amatores) non intellectu sed voluntate sese explicanti.

* Anthony à Wood’s *Athenæ Oxonienses*.—Waryng.

† Taken from the fourth edition in the Bodleian (Huic quartæ editioni præfigitur ejusdem Autoris Carmen Lapidarium Memoræ vatium Principis Ben Johnsoni sacratum). Of Norris’s translation there is no copy either in the ‘Bodleian’ or the Library of his College, All Souls.

4. Problemata amatoria.
5. (Amor) mollis simul et fortis.
6. Amor circulus est—res perpetua—mors amoris.
7. Excluduntur pueri—senes—feminæ ut diversi ab homine generis, animalia.
8. Mulier inter peculia est numeranda—mensæ ornamentum.
9. Vir malus non est sociale animal.
10. Ut amare neminem item amare non optimum nefas est.
11. Amicus et uxor dignitatis nomen.
12. πολυφιλία—circulus a bono per bonum ad bonum rediens.
13. Amor deus est—amor ignis, &c.

II. 1682.—‘HIEROCLES UPON THE GOLDEN VERSES OF THE PYTHAGOREANS.’ Oxford, 8vo.

Hierocles—a pupil of the celebrated Neo-Platonist Plutarch—was born (apparently in Alexandria) about the beginning of the fifth century A.D., and died about 490. The commentary on the ‘Carmen aureum’—the only complete work of his which has come down to us—was translated into Latin by Aurispa, 1474; the Greek text was first given by Curterius, 1583; later editions (including the ‘Fragmenta’) appeared in 1654-5, 1673, &c. “The Commentary contains many remarkable utterances, and is written with much elegance.” Its main points seem to be these:—

- (a) Philosophy is regarded as a discipline for purifying and elevating the soul, by inculcating virtue and leading to truth.
- (b) The activity of the Supreme Being—although Eternal and all reaching—is viewed as extending, specially or immediately, only to spiritual existencies, or rather to the genera of such existencies.
- (c) The perfect Freedom of the individual Will is maintained. All that is pre-ordained is

the connexion between volitions and their natural consequences.

- (d) It is Neo-Pythagorean as to its view of the soul—transmigration, pre-existence, an Ethereal body being purified by trial along with the soul, the world a means of carrying out Judgment upon the past actions of the individual spirit.*

The title page of the Translation is:—

‘Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans,’ translated immediately out of the Greek into English.†

O vitæ Philosophia dux, O virtutum indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum! Unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus peccandi immortalitati est anteponendus.

Cicero.

London : Printed by M. Plesher, for Thomas Fickus, Bookseller in Oxford, 1682.

The Dedication—(a “monument of my gratitude”) is to “my most worthy Friend F.B. of the Middle Temple, Esq. (to whom also the letter—in the ‘Miscellanies’—“concerning the death of my dear niece, M.C.” is written, but otherwise unknown)—a friend whose “breast” is ‘the Hospitable Retreat of all the virtues celebrated by Hierocles, and the ‘Inscription’ of whose Name ‘will procure them value and esteem among all men.’”

In the Preface, he says that belief in “the great excellency and usefulness of this Divine Book to the World,” has made him translate it. He could “have willingly left both the honour and trouble of it to a better Hand,” but, “doubting whether a work so long unattempted would ever be performed,” he “grew impatient,” and resolved to undertake it himself.

* See Article on ‘Hierocles’ in *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

† Published, it would seem, anonymously at first: for the words ‘by John Norris, of All Souls’ College,’ are written here in (faded) ink, in the ‘Bodleian’ copy.

‘Some ill-natured Christians,’ he knows, “may think the Epithet Divine too honourable for the writing of a Heathen. To them he is a “Profane Author,” and they would assent to the opinion that “the Heathen Judge, who in giving sentence and dividing Possessions does Judge equally and well, is no more just before the Tribunal of God than the Thieves who equally and justly divide the Prey among themselves.”* But Norris, on the contrary, holds and maintains (*a*) concerning the ‘Theory’ of virtue, “that ’tis possible by due advertency to the light of nature, or the dictates of Natural Reason, sufficiently to discern between good and evil; and (*b*) concerning the ‘Practick,’ that the ‘actions of the Heathen,’ which were conformable to this light of nature, were *not* ‘splendida peccata’ but truly and properly virtues.

In proof, he appeals to Scripture and Reason, and the writings of the Heathen themselves—“in which is contained the whole Moral Law, and that not only in its integral parts, but in its utmost intention. There is not one precept of Christianity so exalted and heroical but may be paralleled in the Heathen. No man can deny this who has ever read the morals of Plutarch, Seneca, Epictetus, Cicero, and the rest. They teach not only outward conformity, but also inward purity.” . . . They “recommend and enjoyn” the love of enemies. Sometimes “they discourse so much like Seraphims, and the most ecstasized order of Intelligencies,” that the reader seems lifted toward the “third Heaven.” They are “most defective” in their idea of God, but “even here the wiser Pagans were accurate enough in their conceptions, and (except only the inconceivable mystery of the Trinity) thought as well of God as any Christian whatsoever, and better than a great many of them doe.” Polytheism was really a “plurality of inferior Deities, subordinate

* Norris quotes these words from Du Moulin—*Anatomy of Arminianism*, p. 288.

to one Supreme, who was called King and Father." Even of the Egyptians this was true, as Plutarch's record of the Inspiration on the Temple of Sais bears witness—"I am all that hath been, is, or shall be; and my veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered."*

Norris then describes the 'scope' of the book, stating that it treats (1) of the offices due to God, our parents, friends, and neighbours; (2) of the manners and institutions of our private life—these embracing the virtues of 'action'; the 'civil' and the 'purifying'; and the virtues of 'contemplation'—which end not in deliverance from sin, but in identification with God.†

He concludes—"I know that those who are unacquainted with the inexpressible exaltations of contemplation and seraphick love, will think this downright raving nonsense; but without question there is such a thing as is here described—though I confess withal 'tis a kind of Divine madness."

As to his translation, he has (1) "done it immediately from the Prototype," Curterius, the Latin Interpreter," being "often mistaken"; and (2) he has "followed the Platonick air and mode of speaking," in harmony with the original, however it may be "something mystical and enthusiastick."

It is clear, from the opening words of the preface, that Norris was quite unaware of his having been forestalled. But such was the fact. For, twenty-five years before his own translation, the following was published:—

Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of Pythagoras:
Teaching a virtuous and worthy life. Englished
by J. Hall, Esquire. Opus Posthumum. London:

* The preface, of which the drift is here given, extends to more than 50 pp. 8vo.

† *ep.* Plotinus—from whom the classification is taken:—*Ennead* i. 2.

1. *πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί* (=practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice),

2. *καθάρσεις* (which deliver man from all sin).

3. *ἡ του αγαθοῦ εἴτε γνώσω εἴτε ἐπαγῇ.*

Printed by John Streater, for Francis Eaglesfield, at the sign of the Marigold, in St. Paul's Church-yard, 1657.

The work is dedicated (on July 5, 1655) to "my learned friend Mr. William Retchford, at St. Albans," because it was "a birth of seven months" spent there under "your roof"; and because, during that time, "I found you always doing the same things (though from a higher maxim) that my author prescribes."

In the curious memoir, prefixed by the Editor, J. Davies (Nov. 5, 1656), we learn that Hall was born in August, 1627, that he was distinguished by great talents and learning; but that, after an erratic, quarrelsome, aimless sort of life, he died at an early age—August, 1656. One incident may be quoted as a curiosity. "He was not given to any exercises that required any violent motion; insomuch that, in the years 1650 and '51, being inclined to pursinence and fatness, rather than he would use any great motion, he thought fitter to prevent it by frequent swallowing down of pebblestones, which proved effectually."—p. 17.

It may be added that Hall, in the preface, refers to a translation of Hierocles (1651), made already "by the pencill of that incomparable and excellently learned Gentleman, Thomas Stanley of Cumberton, in County of Hertford, Esquire." This, of course, is the T. Stanley (1625-78) who wrote a (biographical rather than critical) *History of Philosophy* (1655), coming down to Carneades; and who produced an edition of *Æschylus*, of which "the notes," says Hallam,* "were, to a great extent, pillaged from foreign critics." Norris, accordingly, had had two predecessors in the same field, of whose work he knew nothing."†

* Literature of Europe, IV.

† A copy of Hall's 'Hierocles' is in the 'Bodleian,' and is the one I have consulted—it is a thin 16mo vol.

III. 1683. *Αποδοκιμασίας αποδοκιμασία*. TRACTATUS ADVERSUS REPROBATIONIS ABSOLUTÆ DECRETUM NOVO METHODO ET SUCCEN TISSIMO COMPENDIO ADORNATUS ET IN DUOS LIBROS DIGESTUS.

Motto:—QUI NEMINEM VULT PERIRE SED OMNES AD RESCIPISCENTIAM TENDERE.—II. Pet. 3, 9.

ἀγαθος ἦν το πᾶν τὸδε ὁ συνιστὰς ἀγαθῷ δε οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγενεται φθονος—*Plato*

Londini: Prostant venales apud Jacobum Norris, ad insigne Regiæ Majestatis Armorum, extra vulgò dictum Temple Bar, Anno Dom. MDCLXXXIII.

“What follows in this treatise, after the third chapter of the second Book is a declaration spoken in the public schools, commending the Roman Senate for banishing all mathematicians out of their dominions.” So Wood, in his ‘*Athenæ*.’ There is, however, no such appendix, or any, to the Bodleian copy, but there is a Latin note in ink—“et hanc sequentum orationem et alteram habuit coram academia non multo priusquam Gradum Magistri in Artibus Ambierit,”—almost Wood’s words, suggesting that he copied them without looking further

The author says in the preface that he has written the treatise—“ut Amuleti instar ab omni Dogmatis istius pestiferi contagio mihi in posterum præsidio esset.” He publishes it now because many have not access to the necessary books.

IV. 1683. A MURNIVAL OF KNAVES, * or, Whiggism plainly displayed and (if ‘not grown shameless’) burlesqued out of countenance. (Motto from Juv. Satire I.) London: Printed for James Norris, at the King’s Arms, Without the Temple, 1683—consists of 36 pp. quarto, large print.

* Murnival—or Mournival (from Gaelic muirn, hospitable)—a term at cards, meaning to have four of any of the Court Cards in one’s hand, or to hold four aces, *e.g.* :

“It can be no treason to drink and sing

A Mournival of healths to our new crowned King.”

Brome’s Cavalier Song on the Restoration of Charles II.

Dedicated to the Worshipful Mr. P.D.B.—otherwise called “Most worthy Patriots;”—evidently meant to be a satirical description of the Whigs, &c. These are informed that the “Pamphlet” contains nothing against the “loyal party, but only the Dissenters.” He feels that “the pen of a Cleveland” is required to do the theme justice; but his “endeavours” to “reduce” the Dissenters “to obedience,” if not so skilful as those of Cleveland, would have been are yet “honest.” And “if you disrelish anything herein, I am so much a stoick, that I value not your censure nor opinion: yet, however, with permission, give me leave to acquaint you that if you disapprove of it, I know who will not.” This is all at present from

Your humble servant,

PHILANAX.

In a P.S. he says: “If the author’s name cramps your understanding, . . . consult the Worshipful, Dr. Oates,* . . . and if he has not forgot his Greek and Latin as much as he has forfeited his religion and honesty, I believe he may be your Interpreter.”

The piece is a long, coarse, ‘Burlesque,’ formed on the model and breathing the spirit of †John Cleveland’s “The Hue and Cry after Sir John Presbyter.” A specimen of each will shew this, and also how inferior, except in coarseness, the copy is to the pattern.

Thus, Cleveland :—

Down, Dragon-Synod, with thy motley ware,
While we do swagger for the common prayer—
That dove-like embassy, that wings our sense
To Heaven’s gate in shape of Innocence;
Pray for the mitred authors, and defy
• These Demi-casters of Divinity.
For when Sir John with Jack-of-all-trades joyns,
His finger’s thicker than the Prelate’s loins.

* Of course an allusion to the ‘infamous informer.’

† (1612-1659).

And thus, Norris :—

He (*i.e.* the Dissenter), when the Spirit moves, can pray
Extempore three hours per day ;
And if, in all that time, of Sense
One word drops from him, I from hence
Forth to hear him will be always bound,
Tho' I'd first be set quick in th' ground.

Much of the 'Piece' is even coarser than this, so coarse, indeed, as to be unfit for quotation, and one would gladly have discovered that its authorship has been wrongly ascribed to Norris. But there is no mistake. For the old volume of 'Poemata' in the 'Bodleian,' which gives the piece, along with other contemporaneous Pamphlets, is clear on the point.

1683, indeed, was a year when the Tories went mad against the Whigs. It was the year of the Ryehouse Plot. It was the year when Lord William Russell (July) and Algernon Sydney (December) were tried and executed. It was the year when the University of Oxford made itself specially conspicuous by passing (July 21) * a decree in condemnation of the doctrine that resistance to a King is lawful.

Considering that Norris was living at the heart of the excitement, and was a strong Royalist to begin with, it is easy to realise how he might temporarily 'lose himself.' Perhaps the fact of never putting his name to, or ever alluding to, the Piece in any way may be taken for a sign of shame, if not repentance.

V. 1685. † Here may be mentioned the work of the elder John Norris, published by his son in this year. A copy of it is in the 'Bodleian,' and the title is : A Discourse concerning a Pretended Religious Assembling in Private Conventicles, wherein the unlawfulness and unreasonableness of it is fully evinced by several arguments.

By John Norris, M.A., and late Rector of Aldbourne, in the county of Wilts, 1685.

* The same day that Lord Russell was executed.

† London : Printed for James Norris (perhaps a kinsman. He published for Norris till 1687, then Mauship did so till 1716, and then Edmund Parker).

In the preface, the son says he has published the Discourse that he might 'comply with custom' in such matters; and might shew "Reverential respect to the dear memory of the author." The reader is not to expect "strokes of oratory, neat turns of expression, and harmonious cadences"; the 'design' of the writer having been strictly practical—viz, "to instruct ordinary and unlearned persons, and particularly those of his own congregation." On the whole, he is sure that the "cause has not suffered under" his father's hands, and that the treatment of it is fresh, if not original. The preface is dated All Souls, June 1, 1684.

Briefly stated, the arguments employed are eight. Preaching and meeting in conventicles is sinful, (1) because unsanctioned, nay disallowed, by the 'Laws' of the Kingdom in which we live; (2) because contrary to that order which God Himself, by His word, hath established in His church; (3) because having no promise of God's blessing made or annexed to it; (4) because contrary to express Gospel commands; (5) because having no Scriptural precedent or warrant or example to ground upon; (6) because God hath branded it with a black mark, forewarning and commanding His people to avoid it; (7) because 'performed' without any manner of commission or authority; (8) because, instead of building up people in Faith and Holiness, it demolisheth Christian duty; and in the natural tendency of it, produceth sinful and pernicious effects.

In No. VIII. of the 'Churchman's Remembrancer' * (being a collection of scarce and valuable Tracts in defence of the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England), the whole of this Discourse is reprinted, except the first argument, which, "since the Toleration, had become unseasonable." The date is 1810.

In the preface, the 'Piece' is spoken of as "hitherto little known and exceedingly scarce," but still timely,

* So the Preface.

and well worth revival. The author, we are told, was born (1615) at Collingbourne Kingston, "where," it appears, "he was possessed of a considerable estate," which "descended to his son and grandson; after whose decease, without heirs, it passed into another family." This is interesting; but, if true, how came the son to complain, more than once, of poverty? Referring to the fact that he slipped into the place of Mr. Alexander, Vicar of Collingbourne, when the latter was ejected by the Parliament, the theory is advanced that "Mr. Norris, being well known and respected by the people" of the village, "might, through their recommendation, be appointed to succeed him, and that Mr. Norris himself, to prevent the introduction of some objectionable person, might be induced to accept the situation." This is plausible, but does not explain how he could honourably hold the 'situation' and the opinions of his later 'Discourse' at the same time; nor does it explain why he, though really so good a churchman, was, in his turn, ejected at the Restoration.

At the end of the Preface is given the Latin epitaph, which tells us that "D. Johannes Norris, Fide Juxta et Vita Theologus Hujus ecclesiæ olim Vicarius, 16 Die Martii Anno Salutis Humanæ 1681, ætat suæ 66, mortalis esse desiit"; and that "Evangilium indefissus Ille—In sacris concionibus et suggesto—per 21 et amplius annos, alacri animo et studio haud mediocre illustravit," &c. The Church referred to was that of Aldbourne, Wilts; and there, on one of the walls, the epitaph—composed by his son—could once be seen, but has now, with all trace of its subject, disappeared.*

VI. 1684. POEMS and DISCOURSES occasionally written by John Norris, Fellow of All Souls' College, in Oxford. London: Printed by J. Harefinch, for James Norris, at the King's Arms, without Temple Bar.

* So says the present Vicar.

This first edition of the 'Miscellanies' is dedicated "to the excellently accomplished lady, Madam Anne Strickland, daughter of the Honourable Sir Thomas Strickland, of Boynton in Yorkshire, Baronet (about whom the only thing clear to me is that her father was the Sir Thomas Strickland, Knight, whom Charles I. made a 'Baronet' on the field of Edge Hill, 23rd October, 1642).

Norris professes to 'owe' some 'great service' to her, and for that reason, not for ambition—however he may be 'suspected' of it—is moved to lay this 'oblation' before her. It includes "one composition (very likely the 'Idea of Happiness') which has had the fortune to please so well that 'tis encouraged to make a second appearance;" and if the other pieces secure an equal 'acceptance,' he will 'value' her "single approbation more than the applause of a Theatre."

The contents of this earliest edition are * :—

1. The Passion of Our Blessed Saviour, represented in a Pindarique Ode, of which he says in the Annotations, "This Ode (if I mistake not) carries all throughout the true genius and spirit of Pindarique Poetry;" and, in the last corrected edition, with more modesty, "This Ode is after the Pindarick way, which is the highest and most magnificent kind of writing in verse." Cowley (1618-1667) is not mentioned, but it was he who had set the fashion of such 'Odes,' and thereby "dazzled and charmed the age," including Norris.
2. A Hymn upon the Transfiguration.
3. The Parting.

* At the end (of the Bodleian copy) the author 'advertises' that he is not the writer of a book intituled 'Hac et Hic,' and that, if those who say or think so are "tolerable judges of sense, or have any taste in distinguishing styles," they might see as much for themselves. If, however, they will not see, then even a 'Postscript' is wasted upon them.

4. To a Lady supposed to ask what Life was.
5. The third chapter of Job paraphrased,
6. Seraphic Love.
7. Atlas Britannicus decens instauratus (a laboured Latin poem, of eighty-one hexameters, in glorification of England, wisely withdrawn before the next edition came out).
8. Ducis Eboracensis ad Oxonium processio (another Latin poem, of fifty-four hexameters, in which the Duke of York is welcomed, on the occasion of a visit to the University, as a Divinity bringing and securing all possible good. Happily, this prolusion, also, was not republished).
9. The Retirement.
10. The Infidel.
11. On a Musician said to be mad with music.
12. The Consolation.
13. The Choice.
14. The Meditation.
15. The Irreconcilable.

So far, poetry : then come two essays.

1. On the Care and Improvement of Time.
2. On Solitude.
3. A Discourse concerning Heroic Piety, wherein its notion is stated and its Practice recommended.

(As to the 'Notion,' by Heroic Piety is meant "those excellent degrees and eminences of Religion which, though to arrive at be extremely laudable, yet we may fall short of them without sin."

As to the Practice, it is urged (1) that Religion, involving the happiness of man, he cannot have too much of it. (2) That God is so good, that anyone having "the least spark of generosity or ingenuity" must needs feel himself 'engaged to do something for his sake' "beyond the measures of necessity, and the regards of his main and final Interest." (3) That

God, being the only sufficing object of our love, our happiness cannot be "sufficiently secured" unless "we concenter our whole affections upon Him." (4) That "the degrees of our reward are proportionable to the degrees of our piety." (5) That since in this life we "cannot serve God long, we should serve Him much;" . . . for, "let us make what haste" we can "to be wise, time will outrun" us).

4. An Idea of Happiness (enquiring wherein the greatest happiness attainable by man in this Life does consist. In a letter to a Friend).

(Second edition. The first was printed separately "for James Norris, at the King's Arms, without Temple Bar." Another separate edition (extant in the Bodleian) was printed at the Theatre, Oxford, 1687. The 'piece' itself bears the date April 18, 1683; and was, as the Author says, "the meditation of a few broken hours in a garden."

"Every man's happiness depends" (subjectively) "wholly upon his own opinion"; whether, and how far, it be real, depends upon the object sought or embraced. God is the one perfect Good, and man's perfect good lies in the 'Fruition of God.'* 'Fruition of God' results from the application of our 'intellectual part' to God in its twofold capacity of the understanding, which is vision (so the 'Thomists'), and of the Will, which is Love (so the 'Scotists')—perhaps, also, from "a certain illapse † whereby the Divine essence falls in with and, as it were, penetrates the essence of the blessed." This, though credible, is not certain—what is certain is that, with or without 'so intimate a conjunction' of essences, vision and love

* "Could a man's life be so contrived that he should have a new pleasure still ready at hand as soon as he was grown weary of the old, and every day enjoy a virgin delight, he might, then, perhaps like Mr. Hobbes his notion, and, for a while, think himself happy in this continued succession of new acquisitions. But alas! nature does not treat us with this variety." The only distinct reference to Hobbes that I have met with.

† "An opinion said to be broached by Henry Gandavensis"—(Henry of Ghent, Doctor Solemnis, cir. 1217-1293)—but supported by Plato and Plotinus.

are absolutely necessary to 'Fruition'; these pre-suppose 'practical virtue,' and are themselves a 'Diviner virtue:' representing the "last stage of human perfection, the utmost round of the ladder whereby we ascend to Heaven—one step higher is Glory." The greatest Happiness, therefore, 'attainable in this state,' as in the other, "consists in the clear and intimate vision and most ardent love of God").

5. Three sets of verses, all hailing from London, all inspired by the "Idea of Happiness," and all eulogistic.

One is entitled, "To the admir'd (though to me unknown) Author on his Ingenious Treatise, "The Idea,"" &c.; is dated February 4, 1684; and is signed W.R. In the last stanza the author is assured that

In thy Idea we engraven see—

In characters Divine—Felicity.

Thou a new Map of Paradise hast drawn,

And more exact than e'er before was known, etc.

Another has the heading "Upon a Treatise called the Idea of Happiness"; is dated February 12, 1684; and is signed G.P. This writer divides men into "vulgar souls" and "nobler spirits," and says:—

"To such alone (meaning the latter) our Author
does prepare

An intellectual treat of Heavenly fare ;

Rich manna, true elixir, drawn with art,

More exquisite than Hermes could impart," etc.

The third is Pindaric; is dated March 25, 1684; and is signed S.P. Its title is simply 'on Mr. Norris's Idea of Happiness;' but it is the longest and most extravagant of the three. The opening lines are:—

When our inspirèd Writer, mounting on

The wings of tow'ring contemplation,

Could not to our low sphere his flight confine,

But, with a genius Divine,

Flew high and cut the pure æthereal line, etc.

Norris was more modest when he, in later editions, left these 'praises' out than when he put them in.

6. A Letter of Resolution concerning some passages in the foregoing Treatise.
7. Another letter to the same person concerning the notion of Plato's ideas and of Platonic love.

(This is very interesting, showing as it does that Norris was a ripe and a recognised Platonist at the age of 27. He writes to 'gratify his friend's request,' but he 'humours his own genius' in doing so. For there is "not a finer or more sublime piece of speculation in all Plato's philosophy than that of his ideas and that of his love." But both have been misunderstood.

A. The generality of writers, especially those of the Peripatetic order, take it for granted that by Ideas, Plato meant "Universal Natures, or abstract essences, subsisting eternally by themselves, separate both from the mind of God and all singular beings; according to which, as so many patterns, all singulars are formed. As for instance, that a man, not this or that in particular, but a universal man, or a man in general, should exist by itself, eternally, according to which all particular men were made." Such a notion is absurd. The 'true and genuine' notion, as he knows "by a more than ordinary acquaintance" with Plato's works, is this:—(a) that Plato, "considering the world as an effect of an Intellectual agent, and that there must be some form in the mind of the Artificer presupposed to his work, thought it necessary to suppose *αἰώνια πέρα δειγμάτων*—Eternal forms existing in the mind of God. And these he calls Ideas." (b) That they exist apart from His mind is a monstrous notion 'hatched in Aristotle's brain,' and is quite unknown to the 'Great Masters of Platonic Philosophy—Plotinus, Porphyrius, Proclus,—as well as to Plato* himself. (c) But their being in the Divine mind does

* Refers to 'Timæus,' 'Hippius,' 'Parmenides,' Repub: Bk. VI., &c.

not clash with "the approved Doctrine of the Schools — *Nihil est in Deo quod non sit Deus*"—because Plato did not regard his 'Ideas' as "any real essence distinct from the Divine essence, but only the Divine essence" viewed as "variously imitable or participable by created beings." (d) By distinguishing, moreover, the Divine essence into *νοῦς νοερός* and *νοῦς νοητός* (mind conceptive and mind exhibitiv), Plato avoids the false opinion which "makes all truth dependent upon the speculative understanding of God"; for the *νοῦς*, as conceptive, "does not make its object, but supposes it," and gives unchanging patterns to the *νοῦς* as exhibitiv.

B. 'Platonic Love,' again, "is a thing in every body's mouth," but scarce any "speak or think accurately of it." Some say it means,—*παιδερασία*, the Love of Males: though Plato, in several places, "expressly condemns it, and rejects it with great abhorrence"*; some (coming nearer the truth) say it means 'the Love of Souls'; some take it to mean 'a desire of imprinting any excellency, whether moral or intellectual, in the minds of beautiful young men by instruction'†; and the commonly received notion is that it means 'Love at a distance, Love that never designs a close fruition of the Object, whatever it be, whether sensual or intellectual; but chuses to dwell in the suburbs, pleasing himself with remote prospects, and makes a mistress of his own desire.' But, in truth, 'Platonic Love' "is the Love of Beauty abstracted from all sensual applications and desire of corporal contact, as it leads us on to the first original Beauty, God; or more plainly thus: The ascent of the Soul to the love of the

* Particularly in the first of his 'de legibus,' where he calls it "*τὰ παρα φύσιν πόλλημα*."

† Thus, Socrates in relation to Phaedrus and Alcibiades.

Divine Beauty by the love of abstracted beauty in bodies.")*

A new edition of the *Miscellanies* (treated by Norris as the first) appeared in 1687. Of this enlarged work, the second edition is dated 1692, the third 1699, the fourth 1706, the sixth 1710, the seventh 1722, and the ninth 1730.

VII. 1687. (June 1).† In his "ADDRESS TO THE READER," Norris reflects on the poetry of his day as "now for the most part dwindled down to light frothy stuff, consisting either of mad, extravagant conceits, or slight witticisms and little amorous conceits, fit only for a tavern entertainment." His design therefore, is to "restore the declining genius of poetry to its primitive and genuine greatness." For this purpose, he has "made choice for the most part of divine and moral subjects;" and if in two poems—those on 'Beauty' and 'Love'—he has "meddled with any other sort," he has sought to rescue them from those sordid abuses they have hitherto suffered.‡

The Dedication is to the Honourable Leopold William Finch, Warden of All Souls' College.

(a) Collegium Omnium Animarum Fidelium Defunctorum in Oxonia—founded by Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1437—with provision for a Warden and Twenty Fellows, or Scholars, whose number might be increased "up to 40 and no more." So, Anthony á Wood, in his "Colleges of Oxford" (p. 270). According to another account—"The College, as designed by Chichele, contained 40 Fellows; he nominated twenty himself, and these, with their Warden, Richard Andrew, chose twenty more."§

* See the 'Convivium.'

† London: S. Manship.

‡ The Dedication of the earlier work to Lady Anne Strickland is, of course, omitted.

§ Colleges of Oxford. Edited by Andrew Clark, M.A. 1891. P. 213.

The right of electing the Warden was vested in the Fellows.

(b) Finch was born about 1662, at Constantinople, where his father, the Earl of Winchelsea, was Ambassador. He was elected to a Fellowship of All Souls' in 1682. In 1686,* James II., "dispensing with the statutes and customs of the College," made him Warden. . . . After the Revolution, his title being deemed insufficient, he vacated the Wardenship, and was nominated Warden, October 31, 1688, by the Visitor, Archbishop Tenison, in consequence of a devolution made for that purpose."—Wood's "Colleges of Oxford" (p. 273).

There is no need to give the titles of the poems, increased from thirteen (excluding those on Britain and the Duke of York) to seventy ; but a fact about one of them may be mentioned. It is the one entitled "A Pastoral on the Death of his Sacred Majesty, King Charles II." This is really a translation of a Latin poem, now contained in the first volume of a work called † 'Musarum Anglicanarum analecta — sive Poemata quædam melioris notæ, seu hactenus inedita seu sparsim edita, in duo volumina congesta.' Editio prima, 1691. Editio secunda, 1699.

The title is :—"Carmen Pastorale—in obitum Augustiss : Regis Caroli II."

The 'interlocutores' are 'Thyrsis, Meliboeus et Daphnius'—the same as in the English rendering. The whole poem, in fact, is the same. Probably the original was composed immediately after the event (February 6, 1685) which it celebrates. Its re-publication among 'Poemata quædam melioris notæ,' points to Norris as an esteemed Latinist. And that he should have taken the trouble to put it into English, and should have let it stand in all the editions of his poems (even the re-

* January 21.

† In the 'Bodleian.'

vised one of 1706), shows that he was not ashamed of the production, as he ought to have been.

The prose contents of the enlarged edition—to which no further additions were made—are those of the 1684 volume, and the following * :—

1. Of the advantage of thinking.
2. Of solitude.
3. Of courage.
4. Of seriousness.
5. Of the slightness of all secular, and the importance of minding our Eternal, interest.
6. A metaphysical essay toward a demonstration of a God, from the steady and immutable nature of Truth. (“This essay,” says the ‘Postscript,’ has lain by me a considerable time, and I have lately reviewed it with all the coldness and indifferency of a stranger, and with more severity, perhaps, than I am like to meet with from the most prejudiced reader. I have turned it, and viewed it on all sides; and, after the most deliberate and impartial scrutiny that I could make, I must needs own that I am not conscious of the least flaw in the whole procedure.”)

He is aware how difficult it is (§ 1) to offer anything new on a “matter which has been squeezed to the last drop.” Even Descartes,† he thinks, had been anticipated in the first part of his “fine and subtle” argument—that which deals with the Idea of God as including ‘all kinds and degrees of perfection,’ and therefore ‘Existence’—by Aquinas; and in the second—that which infers the ‘existence’ of God from the ‘idea’ of it in the mind of man—by “St. Austin and the schools of the Platonists.”

He cannot be sure, then (without examining all the books in the world), that his own ‘Procedure’ is

* Those ‘pieces’ only are summarized which serve to throw light on Norris’s mental development.

† This opinion he afterwards retracted. See *Ideal System*, Part II., p. 292.

‘absolutely new and unblown upon.’ But he can at least ‘venture to say,’ that “’tis as new as the matter will now afford, and as any man in reason ought to expect.” Putting this new argument for the existence of a God into a few sentences, it is as follows:—

1. He states the ‘various acceptations of Truth’; and selects, for his purpose, truth, “as it signifies certain immutable relations and habitudes of things, one towards another, by way of affirmation and negation.”

2. He affirms that “such relations and habitudes of things toward one another” exist (for any thing will not follow from any thing); and that some are “steady and immutable.” (He instances in Logic, that the cause is always before the effect in order of nature; in Physics, that all local motion is by succession; in Metaphysics, that nothing can be and not be at the same time; in Mathematics, that all right angles are equal, &c.)

3. He argues that if the relations of things are eternal and immutable, the simple essences of things must be so likewise.

4. But these “*rationes rerum*” are “not eternal (as is too plain to need proof) in their natural subsistences, or in *rerum natura*; and so must be eternal in their ideal subsistencies, or in the “Ideal World”—the ‘*Mundus Archetypus*.’

5. This, however, is as much as to say that they exist eternally in “some understanding; or, rather, are the same with that understanding itself,” in an ‘exhibitive’ or ‘representative’ aspect.*

6. Hence, “there is an eternal mind or understanding, omniscient, immutable, and endowed with all possible perfections, the same which we call God.”

* Here he refers to his “Letter on Ideas.”

In the Postscript, he supposes some one to say: "Yes, if the simple essences actually exist, you may be right to conclude from them to the existence of certain relations between them; and to their absolute existence in an Eternal mind. But do they really exist?" Hereupon Norris 'grants the objection' so far as simply to suppose their existence, and then asks—"But now how can anything be said of that which *is* not?"

'This seems to me a fair example of the fallacy Kant had in mind when he showed that "Being or Existence is no possible predicate of anything. It is not part of the content of any conception. 'Take any subject you please—say, Julius Cæsar. Gather into the conception of him all his thinkable predicates, those of time and space not excepted, and you will soon understand that, though you have given him all these attributes, you have still left it undetermined whether he exists or does not exist.' . . . Hence the Cartesian argument for the being of God must be pronounced invalid. We can no more say that a perfect being exists, because the idea of Perfection includes existence, than we can say that a perfect horse exists for the same reason. The utmost we can say is that, if we think of a perfect being, we must think of him as existing, but not that he actually exists."*

7. 'The Christian Law asserted and Vindicated; or, a general apology for the Christian Religion, both as to the Obligativeness and Reasonableness of the Institution.'

(Treated under two heads (1) that Christianity is a state of service—(a vigorous protest against current antinomianism); (2) that it is a Reasonable service, in which he expounds clearly his attitude toward natural and revealed religion, showing how, in relation to the

* Quoted from Dr. Edward Caird's "Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant," pp. 147-8 (1877 edition). See Kant's Treatise "On the only possible ground of Proof for the Being of God."

former, Reason is 'the *Candle of the Lord' which 'finds out' its 'fundamental and substantial maxims;' and how, in relation to the latter, Reason either at once welcomes, though previously unable to discover, its truths; or, where these are above it, weighs the evidence by which they are established—such as the fulfilment of ancient prophesy, the birth, life, miracles, passion, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, the wonderful History of the Church, &c. We have here the 'pith' of all he ever taught on these subjects.)

8. A Discourse concerning Perseverance in holiness (not following Augustine's 'De dono perseverantiæ': for Norris lays the main stress on man's power, not on Divine grace).

9. Contemplation and Love; or, the Methodical Assent of the soul to God, by steps of meditation.

"In the depth of Solitude and Silence, having withdrawn myself, not only from all wordly commerce, but from all thoughts concerning anything without my own sphere, I retire wholly into myself, and speculate the composition of my Intellectual Nature." So the opening words. Contemplation I. shows 'that 'tis necessary man should have some end'; for the "spring of my soul (my appetitive faculty) is always at its full bent, is always pressing and endeavouring" toward some end. Contemplation II. shows that man cannot be his own end; for, though "I always equally desire, I am not always equally desirable"; both because "my morals and intellectuals" differ at different times in their degree of excellence, and because, even if perfect, they would still be 'finite.' Contemplation III. shows that the end of man cannot be any other created good; for though "some repast may be found in the creature," yet, "as for complete Satisfaction—'The sea saith it is not in me, and the Depth saith it is not in me.'" Contemplation IV. shows 'that God who is the author of man, is likewise his true end and

* The favourite phrase of the 'Cambridge School' in this connection.

center ;' for "He is absolutely good and perfect in Himself, so as to be able to fill our desires ; and He is essentially the most communicative of Beings—loving to give of His fulness as the Sun of its Light." Contemplations V. and VI. state two corollaries—first, that God is to be loved with 'all the Heart, Soul, and Mind ;' second, that He alone is to be the rule 'of all our actions,' and is "not to be used by us, but enjoyed." In thought and expression, these 'contemplations' are often beautiful, especially the words with which, at the close of each, he breathes forth its leading thought in prayer.

10. A Discourse upon Rom. XII., 3 (preached at St. Peter's Church in the East (Oxford), on Mid-Lent Sunday, March 29, 1685. Motto, Prov. xxvi., 12. Oxford: Printed by Leonard Lichfield for Thomas Fickus, a Bookseller, 1685.

It was published separately at first, with a Dedication "to the Rev. Dr. Henry More, of Christ's College, in Cambridge (dated two days after delivery). A copy of the Sermon, presented by the Author himself, * is in the 'Bodleian.' The Dedication is laudatory, of course, but has in it nothing noteworthy. The Discourse (somewhat affected, stiff, and pedantic) aims to show—(1) that we are not free to 'entertain' about ourselves what opinions we please, but ought to regulate them by some standard ; (2) that the standard ought to be the gifts and graces with which we are "really endowed ;" and (3), that to transgress this 'standard' lands us in 'absurdities and ill consequences.' Under the second head comes the statement that the "will necessarily follows the practical dictate of the understanding," which More challenged in the correspondence then taking place between him and Norris.

11. Consideration upon the Nature of Sin, accommodated to the ends both of speculation and practice.

* 'Ex dono Authoris,' in Norris's handwriting.

'Scholastic' in method, but very 'acute,' and affording a good illustration of Norris's position as a 'Moralist.'

(1) He distinguishes between 'transgressio voluntatis' and 'transgressio voluntaria'—or, the 'material' and 'formal' part of sin: that is to say, the *Act* of going wrong, and the *willing* of the act.

(2) He discusses 'material sin.' Sin, *per se*, is an irregular act; an action is made irregular by the existence of Law; *Law* may be positive, that is, 'prescribed by God, considered only as prescribed'; or, may be a law of Reason*—by which is meant, either the 'νομος ἐμψυχος'†—*i.e.*, the 'stock of rational tendencies' or 'practical sentiments' embedded in our 'nature'; or else, the power we have of reflecting upon, and realizing, the "reasonableness of these Moral anticipations and impressions." Taken in the latter sense, the law of Reason soon postulates 'certain antecedent and independent *Aptnesses* in things,' *i.e.*, qualities which make it 'fit' for them to be commanded or forbidden; these can be nothing else than the 'respective tendency' of things to promote or hinder the attainment of some end proposed by the wise Governor of the world. This end, to be worthy of God, can be none other than the Universal Good. Hence, "the fixed and immutable standard of morality is this—that whatever naturally tends to the common interest, is good and apt to be commanded, and whatever naturally tends to the disinterest of the public, is evil and apt to be forbidden." But is there, then—as on this showing seems to be the case—no difference between 'moral and physical evil'? No; "any otherwise than physical evil extends to all things in Nature which obstruct happiness; whereas moral evil is appropriated to *actions* that do so."

* Or, "that candle of the Lord that lights every man that comes into the world."

† He adds—in this sense the Law of Reason will be but another branch of the positive law. "For Light of Reason, and Light of Nature, are but different modes of Divine Revelation."

(3) But that 'material sin' may become 'formal,' *i.e.*, imputable as guilt, the 'irregular act' must have "a special dependence upon the will." It must depend, first, upon a will that is free, or capable of avoiding the act; and second, upon a will sufficiently instructed by the understanding. As to the question, whether sin is positive or privative, he maintains the former; for "good and bad actions are not privatively, but contrarily opposed"; and, therefore, both are positive—contraries being always so. Even 'sins of omission,' if we consider their nature, are really positive; "for their irregularity does not lie in the not doing, or the not willing to do, what ought to be done, but in the willing *not* to do it."

Norris, it may be remarked, seems to have written this discourse under the influence of Cumberland,* whose Treatise, 'de Legibus Naturae,' came out in 1672, and who is noteworthy as having been the first to lay down that the "common good of all" is the supreme end and standard, in subordination to which all other rules and virtues are to be determined. Henry More glanced at this principle in the words,† "if it be good that one man should be good, that one man should be supplied with the means of living well and happily, it is mathematically certain that it is doubly good that two should be supplied, and so on;" but he did not give it the scope and supremacy claimed for it by Norris. Cudworth placed the "basis of morality" in the ideal and immutable relations discerned by Reason. Norris often did the same. If, however, in the sphere of the actual, the outcome of these relations is the good of the whole, Norris might hold the point of view of Cudworth and Cumberland without contradiction.

12. A Letter concerning Love and Music.

* 1632-1718. Norris makes at least one reference to him in his 'Discourse on Perseverance in Holiness,' to illustrate the remark that "every virtue has a natural sanction of Reward and Punishment attending it."

† In his "Enchiridion Ethicum."

14. A Letter of self-consolation, occasioned by the death of a Friend. (So the edition of 1706. In earlier editions the title is "the copy of a letter written to my friend, F. B., concerning the death of my Dear Niece, M. C." *).

How deeply he felt her loss is seen very clearly in several of his poems, those, viz., "to the memory of my Dear Niece, M.C.," "The Resignation," "To my Guardian Angel," "The Defiance," "To Sleep," "Superstition," the last opening with the verse:—

"I care not though it be
By the *preciser* sort thought *Popery*,
We Poets can a Licence show
For everything we do ;
Hear, then, my little Saint, I'll *pray* to thee."

Some of these poems, inspired by sorrow, are among the best and sweetest Norris has written.

(In 1706, Norris revised the 'Miscellanies,' finding "many things in it that were not as it should be." His alterations, however, are mostly verbal, in the way of toning down strong expressions, or omitting personal allusions).

VIII. 1685. AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION of the four last books of "The Institutions and Life of Cyrus the Great," by that famous philosopher and gentleman, Xenophon, of Athens. The four first books were translated by Francis Digby, of Queen's College. London, 8vo.

IX. 1688. "THE THEORY AND REGULATION OF LOVE"—a Moral Essay, in Two Parts—to which is added Letters Philosophical and Moral between the author and Dr. Henry More.

Quod ergo nos cælo restituit
Non Dei cognitio est, sed amor.
Marsilius Ficinus.

* Written in ink, in the 'Bodleian' copy of the 1687 edition, are the words 'Mary Cooper.'

The second edition appeared in 1694, printed for S. Manship, at the Black Bull, near the Royal Exchange, in Cornhill.

The dedication is to the Lady Masham, at Oates, in Essex, and is dated March 26th, 1688, at All Souls College.

CONTENTS :—PART I.

Sect. I. The general design of this undertaking (viz., to derive a scheme of morality from Love), and its great usefulness to the whole drift of Morality.

Sect. II. Of the dignity and nature of Love in general, and of the first and great division of it (viz., into love concupiscent and love Benevolent).

Sect. III. The Analogy between Love and Motion, particularly the motion of the heart, with a further illustration of the first and great Division of Love.

Sect. IV. Of the first great branch of Love, viz., Love of concupiscence or desire, with the several kinds of it.

Sect. V. Of the second great branch of Love—viz., Love of Benevolence, and its division into self-love and charity; and where, also, 'tis enquired whether all Love is self-love.

PART II.

Sect. I. That love requires some measure of Regulation, and why love, as dirigible, is made the subject of Morality rather than understanding.

Sect. II. The Measures of love of concupiscence, all reduced to these two general heads—what we *must* desire, and what we *may* desire. The measure of these, both in general and in particular, whether sensual Pleasure be in itself evil, with an account of the true notion of original concupiscence and of mortification.

Sect. III. The Measures of Love of Benevolence, particularly of self-love,

Sect. IV. The Measures of common charity.

Sect. V. The Measures of friendship.

Since his last appearance in print, Norris had been studying Malebranche. There is no distinct trace of the French Philosopher in the 'Miscellanies,' but this treatise on Love—as the mere recital of its contents will have sufficed to show—is full of his teachings and influence.

Lady Masham's book—a 'Discourse concerning the Love of God,' published at London in 1696—reveals her dislike of his views on this subject, though she applies her criticisms rather to the later writings in which he expounded them.

X. 1689. "REASON AND RELIGION ; or, the grounds and measures of devotion considered from the nature of God and the nature of man, in several contemplations, with exercises of Devotion applied to every contemplation."

In this year Norris was presented to the living of Newton St. Loe. But the dedication proves that "Reason and Religion" was written at Oxford. It is addressed "to his Grace, the Duke of Ormond, Chancellor of the University of Oxford."

"Reason and Religion," the Author says, "may very fitly be inscribed as a Motto upon the gates of our University ; and every one of our colleges is a school of Piety as well as of Philosophy. The accomplishment of our Intellectuals and Morals is the peculiar designation of this place, and our proper and almost only business in it. And in pursuance of this end, your Grace has been lately pleased to give us the honour and yourself the trouble of being our Chancellor."

"Soon after the acquittal of the Bishops (30 June, 1688), the venerable Ormond, the most illustrious of the Cavaliers of the great Civil War, sank under his infirmities. The intelligence of his death was conveyed with speed to Oxford. Instantly the University,

of which he had long been Chancellor, met to name a successor. . . . A majority of the graduates, numbering a hundred and eighty, voted for the young Duke of Ormond, grandson of their late head, and son of the gallant Ossory. The speed with which they came to this resolution was caused by their apprehension that, if there were a delay even of a day, the King would attempt to force on them some chief who would betray their rights. The apprehension was reasonable; for, only two hours after they had separated, came a mandate from Whitehall requiring them to choose Jeffreys. Happily the election of young Ormond was already complete and irrevocable." *

(This young Duke was born at Dublin in 1665; he commanded William III.'s Life Guards at the battle of the Boyne, 1690; in 1703-6 he was Viceroy of Ireland; in 1712 he became commander-in-chief of the British Army, in place of Marlborough; in 1715 he was 'impeached' by the Whigs, and in consequence turned partisan of the "Pretender;" in 1745 he died in exile).

GENERAL CONTENTS OF THE WHOLE.

PART. I.

Introduction,

Contemplation I.—Of the general Idea of God.

Contemplation II.—That God is a being absolutely perfect, proved from the preceding general Idea of God.

Contemplation III.—That therefore all the perfections of particular Beings exist in God, and that after a more excellent manner than they do in particular Beings themselves.

Contemplation IV.—Of the attributes of God in general, particularly of the unity of God; which is proved from his Idea.

Contemplation V.—Of the Omniscience and Omnipresence of God.

* Macaulay's History of England. Vol. II., cap. IX.

Contemplation VI.—Of the Omnipotence of God.

Contemplation VII.—Of the Divine justice and veracity.

Contemplation VIII.—Of the Divine goodness and philanthropy.

PART. II.

Contemplation I.—Of man, considered as a creature.

Contemplation II.—Of man, considered as an intelligent creature,

Contemplation III.—Of man, considered as an amorous creature.

Contemplation IV.—Man, consider'd as an irregular lover.

This is the book which Locke specially remarked upon in his criticisms of Norris. It does, in fact, contain all the main points of his teaching—philosophical and theological. Cp., *e.g.*, §§ 6-39, under 'Contemplation V., Part I.,' in which he says about 'ideas' all that he afterwards developed in the first part of his 'Ideal System.' There is, too, under § 3, Contemplation I., Part II., a passage remarkable for the light it throws on the history of his thought. Speaking of the way we know, he says:—"Were we not otherwise prepossess'd in favour of the vulgar philosophy, what would be more familiar and obvious than to conclude that we see all things in God? This is a notion which I very early lighted upon by the natural parturiency of my own mind, before I had consulted with any authors that might imbue me with it. But afterwards I met with some that confirmed me in it. For it is a notion very frequently touched upon by Platonists—by Plotinus, Proclus, by Marsilius Ficinus, by St. Austin, by the late French philosopher Du Hamel (1624-1706), in his book 'de Mente Humana'—and is sometimes glanced at by Aquinas himself, but by none so copiously, so purposely, and so dextrously managed as by the incomparable Monsieur Malebranche, who, I

think, has established the truth of it beyond all cavil or exception, as well as reasonable doubting." He then states the arguments of the 'De Inquirenda Veritate' (Pt. 3, cap. 2), and adds, "*my own considerations*" have instructed me further, that (1) since knowledge is comprehension of truth, if the truth which I comprehend be in God and in Him only, then I must be said to see and know whatever I see and know in God.

(2) Since God has made man after His own image, 'tis highly rational to believe that we imitate Him in our understandings; but the mode of the Divine understanding is by consulting the Ideal World, or Himself, as variously imitable and exhibitiv of things.'

(3) 'Tis highly rational to believe that we know and perceive now after the same manner, though not in the same degree, as we shall hereafter.

(4) In thinking, I always think of being in general. Being in general is inseparably united to my mind, and intimately present to it—as being always and everywhere. But this is simply another name for God.

When Norris so defines God—as he does repeatedly in this book—it is hard not to think that he had read Spinoza * (d. 1677). But he nowhere mentions him, and Malebranche, also, was wont to speak of God as 'All Being.'

XI. 1690. "REFLECTIONS UPON THE CONDUCT OF HUMAN LIFE, with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. In a letter to the excellent Lady Masham. By John Norris, M.A., rector of Newton St. Loe, in Somersetshire, near Bath, and late fellow of All Souls' College, in Oxford. To which is annexed a visitation sermon by the same author."†

The dedicatory letter dwells upon her ladyship's failing sight as the occasion of his writing such a

* See, e.g., *Ethica I.*, Def. 6.

† London: Manship (Licensed Nov. 1, 1689).

treatise. This public reference to her 'infirmity,' or something in the manner of the reference, is said to have annoyed Lady Masham. Sufficient evidence that this was really so lies in the fact that, when the work was "reprinted in 1691, with large additions," the first letter was cancelled, and another took its place, in which not a word is said of the lady's 'eyes.' In the body of the book, too, any sentence touching on the point is carefully recast. Thus, the closing words of the first edition are as follows—"and now (Madam), having bid farewell to all unconcerning studies, all the dry and unsavoury parts of learning, 'tis high time to take my leave of your Ladyship too; *which I do with the hope that one great ground of your trouble for the misfortune of your eyes is by the foregoing considerations removed.*" In the amended edition these last words are erased, and instead of them we read—"which I do, with the hope that you are by this time in some measure convinced, as well as entertain'd, by what has been suggested for your consideration in the foregoing Discourses," &c. September 2, 1689.

GENERAL CONTENTS :—

First Reflection.—Wherein the general conduct of human life is taxed for placing, learning, and knowledge, in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding.

Second Reflection.—Wherein the general conduct of human life is taxed for using undue and irregular methods in prosecuting what is really perfective of the understanding.

The Third Reflection.—Wherein the general conduct of human life is taxed with a too importunate and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general.

The Conclusion.

The treatise is steeped in Malebranche—than whom "I cannot recommend you a better tutor." Compare, for example, the way he quotes (in Ref. III., § 12 ff)

in extenso the French father's rules as to the "methods of thinking"; * and how his animadversions against vain learning (in Ref. III., § 43) are little more than a reproduction of the same writer. †

This book won the approval of John Wesley, who republished a great part of it in 1741. The title of the fourth edition is:—

Reflections upon the conduct of human life with reference to learning and knowledge, extracted from Mr. Norris.

The fourth edition (1st^o edition, 1741 ‡)—London: printed by R. Hawes, and sold at the Foundry in Moorfields, and at the Rev. Mr. Wesley's Preaching Houses in town and country—1776. With omissions,—mainly significant of Wesley's avoidance of the author's 'peculiar philosophy.'—he gives:—

1. The Preface.
2. Reflection I. From middle of § 2 to end of § 14.
3. Reflection II. The sections which describe the threefold method of consulting the Ideal World—Thinking, Purity, Prayer.
4. Reflection III. The sections dealing with Dry and Vain Learning.

The Sermon printed at the end of the Reflections was preached in the 'Abbey' Church of Bath before the Right Reverend Father in God, Thomas, Bishop of Bath and Wells, at his visitation held there July 30, 1689.

The date shews that Norris must have left Oxford early in the year.

Bishop Thomas was "the good Bishop Ken," born 1635, educated (like Norris) at Winchester School, and then at Hart Hall, and New College, Oxford; made Bishop of Bath and Wells in 1684, and in 1690

* See De Inqui. Veritate, Book VI., Part 2.

† See De Inqui. Veritate, Book IV., cap. 6, 7, 8.

‡ Added in pencil in the 'Bodleian' copy—forming part of a Vol. called 'Wesley Tracts.'

‘deprived’ for refusing to take the oath of allegiance to William and Mary. He was also one of the ‘Seven Bishops’ who, in 1688, were committed to the Tower for petitioning James II.

The text of the Sermon is John xxi., 15, and is remarkable, in places, for its outspokenness. He says, *e.g.*, with regard to non-residence—“for, however St. Peter’s shadow might do cures upon the body, it must be his *Person* that must do good upon the *souls* of his charge; to speak out plainly what I intend, Non-residency is one of the greatest scandals of the *Reformed*, yea, of the Christian Religion, contrary to all Reason and Justice, as well as ‘Primitive Practice.’”

XII. 1690. “CHRISTIAN BLESSEDNESS,” or Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes*—It is dedicated “to my much honoured friend and Patron, Joseph Langton, Esq.,”—Newton St. Loe, April 21, 1690.

Newton St. Loe (=de sancto Laudo) is said to be a beautiful village. “The church, dedicated to the Holy Trinity,” is described “as a handsome edifice, consisting of nave, chancel, and chapel on the south side, covered with lead; at the west end is a tower containing a clock and five bells.”† This is a description of Norris’s church. It has since been altered and enlarged. A descendant of the Langtons—Earl Temple—is still Patron and Lord of the Manor.

Bound up with the Discourses are (1) “Cursory reflections upon a book call’d an Essay concerning human understanding”—in a letter to a friend; also—

(2) A brief consideration of the remarks made upon the foregoing Reflections, by the gentlemen of the *Athenian Society*, in the supplement to the third volume, &c.

* 3 d edition, 1694; 6th edition, 1713; 10th edition, 1724; 15th edition, 1728. The first six published by Manship. The others by Edmund Parker—at the Bible and Crown, over against the new church in Lombard Street.

† Collinson’s History of Somerset, Vol. III. 343. 1741

(“The Athenian Gazette, or Casuistical Mercury—resolving all the nice and curious questions proposed by the ingenious—printed for John Dunton, at the Raven, in the Poultry.” Such is the title of a four paged paper which began to appear* on Tuesday, March 17th, 1691. The twelfth volume (and I think the last) began on February 5th, 1694. In a Preface to the second volume, we are told that at first “one or two persons” only were “engaged in the design,” but that, for the future, it will be in the hands of several ; so that, “what would have been ‘impar onus’ to any one or two, may now be dispatched with much more ease and accuracy than before.” These managers of the paper are often, in later numbers, called the ‘Athenian Society,’ or the ‘Gentlemen of the Athenian Society.’ Under date Tuesday, Sept. 8, 1691, I find the following :—“Our readers may expect in our third Supplement (an account of) the design and scope—(among other books named) of (3) Mr Norris’s Discourses on the Beatitudes. (7) Mr. Norris’s Discourses on the Reflections on human learning.” So that the ‘remarks’ to which Norris replies, appear to have been published in Sept. 1691.† They were scarcely worth his notice : ‡ for, as he says in the last sentence of his reply, they have come from “a sort of men whose talent was never known to lie towards philosophy”).

XIII. 1690. § “PRACTICAL DISCOURSES” upon several divine subjects, vol. II—containing :—

1. A discourse concerning worldly and divine wisdom, upon Luke, xvi. 8.
2. Righteous and unrighteous judgment, upon John vii. 24.
3. Religious singularity, upon Rom. xii. 2.
4. The excellency of Praise and thanksgiving,

* At irregular intervals, but about twice a week.

† The folio which I consulted does not contain the supplement.

‡ He quotes many of them.

§ 6th edition, 1716. London, Manship.

upon Psalm l., 23 (preached in All Souls' College Chapel, in Oxford, upon the Founder's commemoration day).

5. The importance of a religious life, considered from the happy conclusion of it, upon Psalm xxxvii., 38.

6. Heavenly mindedness, upon Phil. iii., 20

7. Submission to Divine Providence, upon John xviii., 11.

8. Concerning the folly of covetousness, upon Luke xii., 20.

9. Concerning the consideration of God and the Divine Presence, upon Psalm xvi., 9.

10. Doing God's will on earth as it is done in Heaven, upon Matt. vi., 10.

It is dedicated "to the Right Reverend Father in God, Richard, Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells." This was Richard Kidder—"a man of considerable attainments and blameless character, but *suspected of a leaning towards Presbyterianism*" *—who succeeded Ken, in 1690.

No date is given, but Norris's words—"the happy relation wherein I now stand to you as my *Diocesan*, obliges me to lay these Papers at your Lordship's feet;" and the fact that, in 1691, he went to live at Bemerton, in the diocese of Salisbury, fixes the time within a few months.

XIV. 1691. THE CHARGE OF SCHISM, † continued—being a justification of the Author of Christian Blessedness for his charging the Separatists with schism, notwithstanding the Toleration. In a letter to a city friend. Anonymous.

* So Macaulay—History of England, Chap. XVII. Cp. the following :—1649 56, at Immanuel College, Cambridge (the Puritan College); 1662, ejected from Vicarage of Stanground, Hunts; 1664, Rector of Raine, Essex; 1689, Dean of Peterboro'; 1691 (June), Bishop of Bath and Wells; 1703 (November), died—"he and his wife were killed by a fall of a stack of chimneys on the palace roof, during a storm. It is reported that his heirs were sued for delapidations!"—Chalmer's Biographical Dictionary.

† (London: Manship. 2nd edition, corrected by the author, 1703).

The Toleration Act was passed in 1689. Norris, in his Discourse on 'Blessed are the Peacemakers,' had insisted upon "the Heinousness of the Sin of Schism, which is as expressly forbidden in Scripture as Murder or Adultery ;' and had 'demanded':—"Do they (the Dissenters and Separatists) live peaceably with the Church as far as it is possible, and as much as in them lies? They cannot with modesty say that they do. For if they did, not to say that they might come much nearer to us than they do, they must of necessity conform with us. Since as they were never able to shew anything unlawful in our Communion; so they *now* generally allow it to be lawful, and, accordingly, will afford us their company now and then, upon occasion, as often as they think fit to do us that Honour." (This last sentence seems to be a reference to the provision for "occasional conformity"). Coming immediately after the toleration, these words * raised a 'great clamour,' both in the 'city and in the country.' "I can hardly put my head into any company, but where I hear him (he writes as if he were merely a close acquaintance of the author's) either passionately railed at by popular uneducated tongues, or gravely condemned by those of more sober and improved understandings, who, though no enemies to his person, have yet but little charity for his cause." So much for the country, and, as to the city, his friend tells him that 'some' there, are just as angry. He, therefore, writes to maintain that his charge of Schism—notwithstanding "the toleration," which "is generally supposed to lay all in common, to put the Church and the conventicles upon a 'square,' and to acquit those that 'separate' not only from the penalty, but from the fault of nonconformity"—is justified; and is neither "false," nor "uncharitable," nor "unseasonable:" these points being the 'sum' of all that is said against the author—"bating impertinent cavils and foul-mouthed Reflections."

* Opening sentence of the 'Letter.'

The three last named works—with the exception of, perhaps, “The charge of Schism continued”—were written at Newton St. Loe. All the others which follow were composed at Bemerton. The first of these was :—

XV. 1692. “Two treatises concerning the Divine Light.*

(1) The first being an answer to a letter † of a learned Quaker, which he is pleased to call a “*just reprehension* to John Norris, for his unjust Reflections on the Quakers, in his book entitled, ‘Reflections upon the conduct of Human Life.’” ‡

(2) The second being a Discourse concerning the grossness of the Quakers’ notion of the Light within, with their confusion and inconsistency in explaining it, discoursed in a letter to a friend.

Norris added a postscript to the 1691 edition of his “Conduct of Human Life,” with a view to “undeceiving the Quakers,” who, he had been informed, “took great hold of the former edition of this book, giving out that it made for their way.” He supposes that, “if the Quakers understood their own notion, and knew how to explain it, and into what principles to resolve it, it would not very much differ from his own.” But as they usually represent it, the difference

* (London, Manship).

† Published previous year in London.

‡ “Together, with his false representation of their principle of the Light, in his P.S., wherein he opposes it to his notion of the Divine λόγος, or Ideal World, as he terms it. His confusions and self-contradictions therein manifested, and the doctrine and principle of the Quakers thereby cleared from his abuse. Occasionally written by way of letter, with advice to him, and may serve for a better information of the Quakers’ principle, to whom the knowledge of his, and this, shall come.” By “Richard Vickris (of Chew Magna, Somersetshire,” added, in pencil, in the Bodleian copy). Printed and sold by T.S., at the Crooked Billet, in Holywell Lane, in Shoreditch, 1691.” So full title. “In the ‘letter’ he says, ‘I visited Joseph Langton (Norris’s Patron at Newton St. Loe), a person of my respect and acquaintance, and near neighbour of thine, with whom I had some discourse about thy aforesaid book, recommending to him Robert Barclay’s ‘Apology for the Christian Divinity,’ for thy perusal.”

Evidently the Quaker thought he was near winning a convert; and evidently, too, Langton’s report of the interview was the occasion of Norris writing his P.S. to the second edition.

he conceives to be very great; "and he that thinks I 'symbolize' with the Quakers in my notion of the Divine Light, understands neither me nor them, as may appear by these following instances of difference":—

1. The Quakers' light is some Divine communication or manifestation; Norris "makes it to be the *very* essence and substance of the Deity," which, "virtually," contains all things in it, and is ultimately united to our minds."

2. The Quakers' light "is a sort of extraordinary inspiration." Norris supposes it to be "A man's natural and Ordinary way of understanding."

3. "The Quakers (if he mistakes not) confine the light within to some certain objects—namely, Moral and Spiritual truths, in order only to the direction of practice." . . . Norris "extends it as far as all truth—yea, as far as all that is intelligible."

4. "The Quakers make the light within a special privilege of a certain order of men—viz, their own party"—"not, indeed, as to possibility, but as to act"; whereas Norris makes it "the common and universal benefit of all men."

5. The Quakers make the light within to mean "some determinate, formed, dictate, or proposition." Norris understands by it "the essential Truth of God," always present to the mind, though requiring to be "carefully consulted" before it yields "formal" instruction.

6. The Quakers "only *cant* in some loose general expressions about the light," appealing for authority to St. John's Gospel, "though they understand neither one nor t' other"; whereas Norris offers "a natural, distinct, and philosophical way of explaining both—namely, by the omniformity of the Ideal World, or the Divine λόγος, who has in himself the essence and Ideas of all things, and in whom the same are perceived by us and all creatures."

The 'letter' called forth by this P.S. was written, says Norris, in such a rude, * violent, and passionate manner as is below the breeding even of a waterman ; " such, indeed, as " may tempt some unlucky fancies to imagine that he has exchanged his *cold* quaking fit for a *hot* one, and that the *light* within is turned into a flame."

In the letter much is made of Norris's admission † that, properly understood, the Quaker's notion and his own were not very far apart from each other ; and then, "exception" is taken to the six articles of his postscript. These 'exceptions' Norris "sets down at large" in the author's own words, "applying to them their respective answers distinctly." This takes up the whole of the first Treatise.

The second, in the form of a letter is much shorter, and partly explains itself by its title. It is really a prolonged answer to Vickris's "exception against the *sixth* article." But he soon takes leave ‡ of Mr. Vickris, and turns to Mr. Barclay—"the late publication" of whose "works in folio," has raised a "general exultation and triumph among the Quakers." His own opinion of Mr. Barclay is "that he is a very good man, and were it not for that com-

* Vickris, *e.g.*, speaks of Norris's 'rubbish.'

† P. 77 of 'Reflections.' "This (Λόγος, or Ideal World) is that great and universal oracle lodged in every man's breast ; . . . is that light within, so darkly talked of by some who have, by their . . . unprincipled way of representing it, discredited one of the noblest theories in the world. But the thing in itself, rightly understood, is true ; and if any shall call it Quakerism or enthusiasm, . . . 'tis such Quakerism as makes a good part of St. John's Gospel, and of St. Austin's works."

‡ Vickris, however, returned to the charge in "Truth and innocency defended," being a sober reply to some excesses in a Treatise written by John Norris concerning the Divine light, &c. London, printed and sold by T. Sowle, 1692-3. In 'Epistle to Reader,' he says, "that J. N., Master of Arts, late Rector of Newton St. Loe, near Bath, and newly advanced to Bemerton, near Sarum, late Fellow of "All Souls" College, in Oxford—a man of refined notions . . . should be reprehended by a Quaker—a man of that sullen tribe whose visible mark is "Rusticity," is, with him, such an intolerable piece of rudeness as cannot be borne without rendering him an affronting and provoking adversary." The impartial reader cannot but admit that the 'Quaker' had a good deal of right, and no small amount of reason on his side. Both 'letters' are among a number of Theological pamphlets (1666-93) in the 'Bodleian.'

mon prejudice that lies against him as being a Quaker, would be as sure not to fail of that character in the world, as any of the finest Wits this age has produced." He and Mr. Keith are the two great pillars of Quakerism. And in arguing his two points—that the Quakers make the light within (*a*) to be a 'creature,' and (*b*) to be a 'material creature,' he draws all his reasons either from Barclay's 'Apology,' or Keith's "Way to the City of God."

XVI. 1693.* PRACTICAL DISCOURSES upon several Divine subjects, Vol. III—London.

The dedication is "to the Right Honourable Thomas, Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, Baron Herbert of Cardiff, Lord Privy Seal, &c., and one of their Majesties' most Honourable Privy council." This was the nobleman to whom, in 1689, John Locke dedicated the "Essay on the human understanding." "The only thing, Mr. Pope used to say, he could never forgive his philosophic master, was the dedication to the Essay."† If Locke's language is too laudatory, Norris's seems equally so. "Few will be found," he says, "in any order, or class, of men so well qualified to judge (of the following papers) as your lordship, whose general insight into the whole compass of learning, and whose particular excellency, even to nicety and exactness, in the more refined Theories of philosophy, are so well known to the world that they deservedly render you at once the admiration and glory of a nice and inquisitive age," &c. Locke felt that he "was under the greatest obligation to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours I have received from your Lordship." Norris "presumes to make" his Lordship "the Patron of these discourses," because he first made himself so "to the author of them"; and that, "in a manner so signal, and so beyond the ordinary measures of generosity, that I was thence encouraged to hope that the same good-

* London, Manship. Imprimatur—March 18, 1693. 8th edition, 1722.

† Macaulay's History, Vol. II, cap. XV.

ness that obliged me to the most grateful acknowledgment would also induce your Lordship to accept this first opportunity I have of a publick expression of it."

Of course the reference here is to the Earl's having presented him to the living of Bemerton. As he says, "these discourses were all composed in the retirement which by your lordship's peculiar favour, I now enjoy." Bemerton was, and still is, in the gift of the Earl of Pembroke. This particular Earl was a great figure all through William III.'s reign, and even those of Queen Anne, George I., and George II. In 1690 he was put at the head of the 'Admiralty'; in 1692 he was made Lord Privy Seal; in 1699 he became Lord President of the Council, and the confidence of William in him was proved by appointing him "seven times Lord Justice during his absence on the Continent." Burnet's account of him—when describing the "negotiations for a peace held at Ryswick"—goes far to warrant the laudation of Norris and Locke. "The chief of our Plenipotentiaries was the Earl of Pembroke, a man of eminent virtue and of great and profound learning, particularly in mathematics. This made him a little too speculative and abstracted in his notions. He had great application, but he lived a little too much out of the world, though in a public station. A little more practice among men would have given him the last finishing. There was somewhat in his person and manner that created him an universal respect, for we had no man among us whom all sides loved and honoured so much as they did him."*

Another account says that "Wilton (the seat of the Pembrokes) will ever be a monument of his extensive knowledge, and the princely presents it contains, of the high estimation in which he was held by foreign potentates, as well as the many monarchs he saw and served at home. He lived rather as a primitive

* Burnet—history, B'k VI. 1687 A.D. p. 641.

Christian, in his behaviour meek, in his dress plain, rather retired, conversing but little.”*

THE GENERAL CONTENTS.

A discourse concerning the measures of divine love with the natural and moral grounds upon which it stands; upon Matt. xxii., 37.

(This discourse extends over 83 pages, and was written “for publick use and service,” not for pulpit delivery. It drew upon him considerable attention,—friendly and otherwise—from its putting so explicitly his favourite notions, that God is the sole author of our sensations, and that God ought to be the sole object of our love. Thus, he says, “the whole matter of the creation, though in continual motion, is yet, as to us, that is to our spirits, an idle, dead, unactive thing, and that of itself signifies no more to the production of our several sensations, than a company of odd figures or senseless characters do to the cure of an ague.” † Again “we are to love nothing but what is lovely : nothing is lovely but what is our good ; nothing is our good but what does us good ; nothing does us good but what causes pleasure in us ; nothing causes pleasure in us but God ; therefore we are to love nothing but God.”.

A discourse concerning the Natural and Moral vanity of man ; upon Psalm xxxix., 6.

A discourse shewing that the Law is not made void through faith ; upon Rom. iii. 31.

(Being a visitation sermon preached in the Cathedral Church of Sarum, before the Right Reverend Father in God, Gilbert, Lord Bishop of Sarum, at his visitation held there September 2, 1692).

A discourse concerning the origin and the relief of all trouble and uneasiness of mind ; upon Psalm xciv. 19.

* Noble's ‘Continuation of Grainger.’

† Page 55.

A discourse of the Natural and Moral Union of the Soul with God, and of the perfection that accrues to it from thence ; upon Psalm lxxiii, 28.

A discourse of the honour due to good men, and of the great crime of treating them with scorn and contempt ; upon 2 Tim. iii. 3.

A discourse of the several ways whereby God addresses himself to man ; upon Prob. viii. 1.4,5.

Postscript to the first discourse (proving his 'Thesis' that we ought to love God, "if not infinitely yet entirely," on the ground that, "*idem velle quod vult Deus*" is the "sum and abridgment of all Morality.")

XVII. 1694.* SPIRITUAL COUNSEL—or the father's advice to his children—"which was first composed," as he observes in the advertisement before it, "for the use of his own children,"—but, it may be added, not for their present use, seeing that he was only married in 1689. At first, says Wood, it was published anonymously—"his name is not set to it, only report makes him the author."

XVIII. 1695.† LETTERS CONCERNING THE LOVE OF GOD, between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. John Norris—wherein his late Discourse, shewing that it ought to be intire and exclusive of all other loves, is further cleared and justified. Published by John Norris, M.A., Rector of Bemerton, near Sarum.‡

The author of the said 'Proposal' was Mary Astell, born (at Newcastle-on-Tyne) 1668, died May 24, 1731.

She was brought up under the care of her uncle, a clergyman, learning from him Italian and French, logic, philosophy, and mathematics. At the age of twenty she went to London, taking up her abode in

* London, S. Mauship. In tract form (price stitched, 3d., or 20s. a hundred—so, on the Bodleian copy, 1701).

† London, S. Mauship

‡ Imprimatur, Oct. 7, 1694. "A second edition corrected by the authors, with some few things added, was printed in 1705." A third edition is dated 1730, (printed for Edmund Parker).

Chelsea. There she passed the rest of her life, studying deeply "many classic authors (particularly Xenophon, Plato, Hierocles, Tully, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Antoninus), and also writing much on various subjects.*

She appears to have been something of an oddity. Thus we are told that "when she saw needless visitors coming, she would look out at the window, and jestingly tell them Mrs. Astell was not at home." We are told, too, that "when she was confined to her bed by a gradual decay, and the time of dissolution drew near, she ordered her shroud and coffin to be made and brought to her bedside, and there to remain in view, as a constant memento of her approaching fate, and to keep her mind on proper contemplations."†

Her "Serious Proposal to the Ladies," was an "ingenious" treatise published, under that title, in 1694. In her own words, the Proposal was "to erect a Monastery or, if you will . . . , we will call it a Religious Retirement, and such as shall have a double aspect, being not only a retreat from the world for those who desire that advantage, but likewise an institution, and previous discipline, to fit us to do the greatest good in it." There were to be no irrevocable vows, or anything to keep ladies longer than they desired: It was to be conducted strictly on the principles of the Church of England, with daily services, "performed in the most affecting and elevating way"; and with the Holy Eucharist on every Lord's day and Holy day. There was to be a "course of solid, instruc-

* Such as "A defence of the female sex" (in 1701); "Reflections on Marriage" (1700); "Moderation truly stated" (1704), in answer to Dr. Davenant on "Moderation a virtue"; "An impartial inquiry into the causes of Rebellion and Civil Wars in this Kingdom" (1703-4); "A fair way with Dissenters and their patrons" (1704); "The Christian religion as practised by a Daughter of the Church of England" (1705); "Six familiar Essays upon Marriage, Crosses in Love, and Friendship" (1706).

† Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary. In this she took the advice of Norris in 'Spiritual Counsel'—but too literally. "Had she as much good breeding as good sense, she would be perfect, but she is now and then . . . a little offensive and shocking in her expressions."—Dr. Atterbury in letter to Dr. Smallridge, (1706).

tive preaching and catechizing"; and the inmates were to "consider it a special part of their duty to observe all the fasts of the Church." But it was intended quite as much for mental as for moral and religious training—or rather, the two were to go hand in hand: for "ignorance and a narrow education lay the foundation of vice." The proposal seemed at one time likely to take effect, for "a certain opulent lady" * intended to give £10,000 toward it. But Bishop Burnet went to the lady, and telling her it would look like paving the way 'for Popish orders,' got her to abandon her purpose. So the scheme fell through, and, at the same time, drew upon her much undeserved obloquy. †

The correspondence with Norris began, at her instance, in 1693, and closed, Sept. 21, 1694. There are eleven letters (six by the lady and five by Norris) in the body of the book; and two, by way of review, in an appendix. She is one of Norris's few genuine admirers. She says, "Ordinary writers I can penetrate at a first view, but every period of yours dilates my mind, calls it forth to pursue its recondite

I. London. St. Matthew's Day, 1693. Beauties in a train of useful and delightful thoughts." Her immediate reason for writing is to suggest a difficulty arising out of his sermon ‡ on the 'Love of God.' He has said that God ought to be the sole object of our love, because He is "the only efficient cause of our pleasure"—what then of pain? Either (a) it is not from God; or (b) God, "as the cause of pain," is a fit object of our "Aversion"; or (c) it cannot be true that nothing does us good but what causes pleasure, *i.e.*, pain may do us good.

II. Bemerton. October 13. Norris answers that God is indeed the author of pain, as being the author, or cause, of all our sensations; but "God wills our pleasures

* Lady Elizabeth Hastings (1682-1739). The 'Aspasia' of the 'Tatler,' of whom Steel said, "to love her is a liberal education." (Nos. 42, 49.)

† See, *e.g.*, 'Tatler,' Nos. 32, 59, 63, where she is vilely aspersed under the name of 'Madonella'—an attack said to have been inspired by Swift.

‡ Discourses, Vol. III.

as we are creatures, and our pain only as we are sinners; and we must measure our 'devoirs' by what is due to God from us as creatures." Further, pain may in some sense do us good, as "it may occasion us some good that exceeds its own proper evil"; nay, "as to the present life," the pain that God inflicts upon us here may well "be only medicinal, and in order to our greater good, and, consequently, from a principle of kindness."

III.
All Saints' Eve. The lady confesses herself satisfied; indeed, her letter was "really in favour of the notion that afflictions are not evil but good." But she raises one or two other points. Pleasure she would define as "all those grateful sensations agreeable to man's nature." Hence she is disposed to deny that the Pleasing Sensations of the wicked can be pleasures, or can be caused by God. Again, as to pain—either (a) it belongs to the "inferior part of the soul—that which is exercised about objects of sense, and, in this case, is no real evil; or, (b) it belongs to the superior part of the soul, the mind proper; and, since the mind is the *man*, and since mental pain incapacitates for enjoying any degree of real happiness, this alone is real evil; as such, "it is neither more nor less than *sin*—which I take to be the true and only evil of a man." God, therefore, is not the author of *mental* pain, but of *bodily* He is.

IV.
Bemerton.
Nov. 13, '93 Norris replies (1), There is no such thing as a sinful pleasure, properly speaking. All pleasure is simply good, "as being a real modification of the soul." "'Tis the circumstantiating of it that is the evil, and of this God is not the cause.

(2) The soul I take to be an entire, simple, uniform essence, intellectual throughout, without any parts at all, much less such heterogeneous parts" as his correspondent seems to indicate.

(3) Mental pain is not the same as sin. Pain is a 'passion,' sin an act; pain is a *real* modification of the

soul, sin, "in its formality, is not anything positive, but a mere privation." Besides, how do *you* "distinguish sin from the *punishment* of it?"

v. Dec. 12. The Lady has received much light. She begs to say, however, that she had drawn her distinction of the soul into inferior and superior from her teacher himself* (but Norris, in his next, says his words in the sermon referred to were spoken 'popularly'). She admits that mental pain and sin are not the same; and has come to the conclusion that it would be fitting to describe pain as an 'uneasiness,' and only *sin* as evil. This she argues on the ground, *inter alia*, that "evil as evil is in no way eligible;" but this can be said of sin only, which is always evil, whereas pain is a relative good" (in which Norris agrees substantially, though maintaining that pain, *per se*, is an 'evil,' and not 'eligible' in any degree or kind—save as conducing to more than compensating pleasure).

Here all disagreement between the two comes to an end, and the remaining letters on each side are just a re-statement and expansion of the points Norris had laid down in his sermon. The writing is often very eloquent, and Mrs. Astell's not the least so.†

Her letter in the Appendix does, however, raise and press an important objection, viz.: that "this theory renders a great part of God's workmanship vain and useless, and so does not well comport with His Majesty." She is referring to the 'Theory' that sensible objects have nothing whatever to do in the actual producing of sensations. She asks, "why there should not be a sensible congruity between those powers of the soul that are employed in sensation, and those objects which occasion it, analogous to that 'vital congruity which your friend, Dr. More, will have to be between

* See Discourses, Vol. I., p. 158.

† If there were nothing more remaining of this worthy Lady's, these letters alone "would perpetuate her memory to latest posterity!"—Ballard's 'Memoirs of British Ladies.'

some certain modifications of matter and the Plastick part of the soul.' " *

Norris's reply is to the effect that he has already proved, and she has already admitted, the *sole* efficiency of God in sensation ; that she must not yield what is clearly true to what is conjectural ; and that as to 'sensible congruity,' she may easily perceive how it cannot subsist between things so utterly unlike as matter and spirit.

July 17, 1694. Norris, in sending the letters forth, anticipates that the public will be tempted, "from the surprizing excellency of the writings, to question whether my correspondent be really a woman"—"a gentlewoman, and, to add to thy wonder, a *young* gentlewoman." †

He had begged her leave to publish them, "having received great spiritual comfort and advantage by them—not only heat, but light." At first she demurred, fearing to surrender "my darling, my beloved obscurity, which I court and doat upon above all earthly blessings." But, inasmuch as her letters may "decoy those to a perusal of them who, wanting piety to read a book for its usefulness, may probably have the curiosity to inquire what can be the product of a woman's pen," she consents on two conditions:—First, that her name shall be kept secret ; and secondly, that the letters be dedicated "to a lady whom I shall name to you, or else give me leave to do it." Her eulogy of this lady is absurdly extravagant ; such, indeed, as one finds it hard to reconcile with the leading thought of the Book—that the creature is nothing. She is one "who, in the bloom of her years, despising the temptations of youth and beauty, and whatever may withdraw her from Mary's noble choice, has made such advances in religion that, if she hold on at this rate, she'll quickly outstrip our Theory." . . . "So good is she that envy

More's 'Immortality of the soul,' Book II., cap. 14, § 8.

† She was 26.

itself has never a *But* to interfere with her praises." . . . And "not to rely wholly on report, I myself have observed in her so much sweetness and modesty, so free from the least tincture of vanity, so insensible to that worth which all the world admires, such a constant and regular attendance on the publick worship of God, prayers, and sacraments ; such a serious, reverent, and unaffected devotion, so fervent and so prudent, so equally composed of heat and light, . . . as made me, every time I prayed by her, fancy myself in the neighbourhood of seraphic flames"!! The dedication, accordingly, dictated by Miss Astell, is—

"To the truly Honourable Lady, the Lady Catherine Jones, in due acknowledgement of her merits, and in testimony of that just, and therefore great, veneration which is paid * to her Ladyship's virtue."

In the account of Mistress Astell's last days, it is said she was so absorbed in the contemplation of her approaching change, as to be unwilling to receive a visit even from her dear friend 'Lady Catherine Jones,' &c., but anything definite about the lady I cannot find.

XIX. 1697. † AN ACCOUNT OF REASON AND FAITH—in relation to the mysteries of Christianity—by John Norris, M.A., Rector of Bemerton, near Sarum. "Holding faith and a good conscience," I. Tim. i., 19.

Dedicated to the Right Honourable Henry, Lord of Coleraine (this was Henry Hare, the antiquary, second Lord Coleraine, 1636-1708. How Norris came into contact with him does not appear ; probably he was a visitor at Earl Pembroke's, Wilton.)

* As just quoted from the preface.

† London : S. Manship—octavo, 12th edition, 1724. Part of the book—viz., from cap. x. to end of postscript, inclusive—was printed as a Tract in 1800—in the 2nd Vol. of "The scholars armed against the errors of the time ; or, a Collection of Tracts on the principles and evidences of Christianity, the constitution of the Church, and the authority of the civil Government, the whole intended for the information and assistance of young students in our schools and universities, and published by a society for the Reformation of Principles." (The vols. are in the "Bodleian.")

"Reverence and respect for your great worth and goodness, and my grateful acknowledgments for the particular share and interest I have had in your favours," are the feelings expressed. He says, too, that the 'undertaking' has been 'encouraged' by his Lordship.

"The occasion of this 'undertaking' was a certain late Book, called 'Christianity not mysterious,' one of the most bold, daring, and irreverent pieces of defiance to the mysteries of the Christian Religion that even this licentious age has produced, and which has been supposed to have done great battery and execution upon them, and to be, indeed, a very shrewd and notable performance, even by people of competent sense and learning, not excluding the author himself, who, to shew his good opinion both of his cause and of his management of it, has since published a second edition of his book, with enlargements and with his name."*

The controversies arising out of the book have been conducted, says Norris, "in a rude bear-garden way;" but *he* has endeavoured to use "such Christian temper and moderation, as becomes the search of Truth, and may argue a mind concerned only for the finding it."

CONTENTS.

Chapter I. Of Reason.

Chapter II. Of Faith.

Chapter III. The distinction of things contrary to reason and *above* Reason considered.

Chapter IV. That human reason is not the measure of Truth.

Chapter V. That, therefore, a thing's being in-

* John Toland, 1669-1722. "Christianity not mysterious; or, a treatise shewing that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to reason, nor above it, and that no Christian doctrine can be properly called a mystery"—London, 1696. This may be called the first attack of English Deism on the current Christianity, as Bolingbroke's posthumous works (1752) may be called the last. Few books have made a greater stir in their day.

comprehensible by Reason, is, of itself, no concluding argument of its not being true.

Chapter VI. That if (it were so) Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth.

Chapter VII. That, therefore, the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just objection against the Belief of it. With an account of the Cartesian maxim that we are to assent only to what is evident.

Chapter VIII. Wherein is shewn what is the true use of Reason in believing.

Chapter IX. An application of the foregoing considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity.

Chapter X. The conclusion of the whole, with an Address to The Socinians.

Postscript (pp. 346).

The pith of the book seems to lie in these words ; "The sum is, the incomprehensibility of a thing is no argument against the belief of it, and, therefore, in the believing of a thing, the proper work of my Reason is not to consider whether it be incomprehensible. But when a thing is proposed to me as from God, all that my Reason has to do in this case is seriously, soberly, diligently, impartially, and, I add, humbly to examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of His authority, and has Him for its real author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this matter, and when she has done this, she is to rise from the seat of judgment, and resign it to Faith, which either gives or refuses her assent, *not* as the thing proposed is comprehensible or not-comprehensible ; but as it is either revealed or *not* revealed " (pp. 294-5).

XX. 1698.* PRACTICAL DISCOURSES upon several Divine subjects, viz:—

1. Of religious discourses in common conversation (in three parts) upon Psalm xxxvii, 30.†

* London : S. Manship.

† A 'tract' edition of this discourse is in the Bodleian (1706).

2. Of the fear of death. Heb. ii., 15.*
3. Concerning the extent of Christ's sacrifice. Matt. iii., 17.
4. Concerning practical Atheism. Tit i., 16.
5. Of walking by faith (in two parts). II. Cor. v. 7.
6. Concerning charity to the poor. I. John. iii., 17.
7. Concerning the right use of the world. I. Cor. iii., 17.
8. Concerning the successive vanity of human life. Eccl. xi., 8.
9. An admonition concerning two late books, called, "a Discourse of the love of God." Vol. IV., written by John Norris, M.A., Rector of Bemerton, near Sarum.

The Dedication is: "To my very worthy and much honour'd friends, Mrs. Eliz. Cabel, and Mrs. Mary Prowse.

Having hitherto paid his addresses abroad, he "finds an inclination to make a visit nearer home, and so begs leave to adorn a book . . . with the inscription of those recommending names which near relation and a very excelling worth have combined to endear to me." His main object is, not to improve them in knowledge or in life and practice; for he is well aware that they "live every day better sermons" than he can preach, but he wishes to "satisfie his own obligations, and to discharge a debt of honour and gratitude."

Anything further about these worthy kinswomen I have not been able to learn. The likelihood is that they were related to him through his wife.

As to the admonition at the end of the volume, it is addressed to two "men of considerable character and eminence in their several ways"—the first of whom has treated him with "disdain and contempt," imparting to his book "a spiteful air" throughout; while the

* A 'tract' edition of this discourse is in the 'Bodleian.'

other, is a "reverend author," "a neighbour and a friend, who does, indeed, treat him "with a little more civility and respect," but even in *his* book "there are here and there some roughnesses, little flirts and not any good natured Reflections and insinuations."

He says they are alike in one respect—in that they both "run upon a wrong ground"; "fight not with me, but with a shadow of their own"; "harp all along upon the same false string, and bestow great pains to prove a wrong proposition." For the "whole argument" is a "mere equivocal" "upon these two terms *Love* and *good*—*they* taking the terms "in the most large and popular sense," *he* taking them "in a stricter and more philosophical sense. *They* use the term Good "as it comprehends all that which, any manner of way, contributes to our good," and the term Love "as it comprehends within its latitude even the 'willing the use' of a thing"; *he*, on the other hand, means by the former, "that which really and truly does us good, or is the efficient cause of pleasure to us"; and, by the latter, "the soul's uniting itself to any object as its true good, beatifick object, or the cause of its good or happiness." In their sense of the terms he has no dispute with them, for he agrees with them. He is quite as ready as they, "in the ordinary way of speaking, to call the furniture of my house, or the books of my study, my goods; and to say "I love a pen that writes well, or a knife that cuts well, or a horse that goes well, or an adversary that reasons closely and to the purpose."

The names of his two adversaries are not given, but the one is called Dr. Wh——, and the other Mr. L. With reference to the latter he says, "Why our ingenious author *has* used me thus I partly guess, though why he *should* I know no reason, *especially considering the different treatment he had from me upon a like public occasion*, which I cannot mention without telling him by the way that *as*, if I made *no* reply to

his treatise I had not been in his debt, *so* if I make him a *Civil* one he is doubly in mine."

This, coupled with the fact that the only treatise which, so far, he seems to have dealt with in the way of published criticism was the 'Human Understanding,' strongly hints at Locke. Locke, however, never to my knowledge wrote against Norris's doctrine of the Love of God. Can it be that he is thinking of Lady Masham's 'discourse'—sent out in 1696—and that Locke may have a hand in its production? *

XXI. 1699. To this year belong the letters which passed between Norris and Corinna, given in Vol. II. of 'letters to Lady Wharton' (published 1727), and also in Vol. II. of 'Pylades and Corinna,' a collection of 'familiar' letters between several more or less distinguished persons (published 1732).

'Corinna,' therefore, was Lady Wharton—not however the Lady Anne, first wife of Lord Wharton, whom Edmund Waller (1605-1687) once coupled with her cousin, John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester (1647-1680), in his remark,—“They were allied in genius as in blood”; but *Lucy*, his second wife, mother of the famous (or infamous) Philip, Duke of Wharton (1699-1731). Both the ladies wrote (a poor sort of) poetry. †

There are nine Letters.

1. Thanks Corinna for a copy of verses in his praise; and, dissuading her from the muses, advises

* Ballard's "Memoirs (1765) of British Ladies" says that Mary Astell wrote her "Christian Religion as professed by a daughter of the Church of England" as an answer to Lady Masham's book, who wrote *probably* under the inspection of Mr. Locke.

There is nothing in Lady Masham's Discourse (of which there is a copy in the British Museum, but not in the 'Bodleian') to indicate a dual authorship; but, as the authorship was at first anonymous, Norris may have ascribed it to Locke. The Title of the book is "A Discourse concerning the Love of God. London. Printed for Awnsham and John Churchill at the Black Swan, Paternoster Road—1696"—and its design is to show the "unreasonableness of any Hypothesis lately recommended to the world for the ground of Christianity and Morality; as likewise the further injuriousness of that Hypothesis to true religion and Morality."

† See Nichol's 'Select Collection of Poems' Vol. V. p. 10.

her to cultivate 'serious and useful studies.' Bemerton, April 25, 1699.

2. Promises her advice about her studies when he knows what she has done. June 12, 1699.

3. Recommends her to study geometry—l'art de penser—Cartesianism in the works of the Master himself and his chief exponents—then, Malebranche, 'who lays the foundation of all science.' To these are added More's 'Ethics,' his immortality of the soul, his Philosophical Poems, and his Mystery of Godliness; Herbert's Country Parson—"a plain but very good book"; Locke "on the human understanding"—to be read, however, "with caution and circumspection," &c. July 12, 1699.

4—From "Corinna" to Norris—tells how she has read the 'Ideal World'* with great admiration and some advantage," and what she has heard about it.

5. Norris—pleading the 'hurry' of his life—briefly replies to the points she has mentioned, and concludes with "mine and my wife's most affectionate respects." June 6, 1700.

These five are in both volumes mentioned; the remaining four are only in "Pylades and Corinna."

6. Gallant in tone, and critical of some composition of Corinna's which she has sent him, Sep. 3, (date of year not given).

7. Apologises for long silence, and promises to send her a copy of second volume of his 'Ideal World,' just out (1704). No date.

8. Sympathizes with Corinna in her illness.—April 22 (no year).

9. To the same effect, winding up with answer to her enquiry as to advisability of 'communicating'† with a 'dying friend' who is a 'Dissenter.'

* Part I just out

† i.e., Partake of the Lord's Supper.

Norris thinks it were better not to do so.—
Oct. 3 (no year).

XXII. 1701.* AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE THEORY OF
THE IDEAL OR INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, designed
for Two Parts—the first considering it absolutely
in itself, and the second in relation to human
understanding.

PART I.—By John Norris, Rector of Bemerton,
near Sarum.

Tu cuncta superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique ab imagine formans.

Boethius 3 de consol, Met. 9.

The dedication is “to the Right Worshipful Sir
Thomas Cookes, of Bentley, in the County of Worster,
Baronet.”

This Worcestershire Baronet † “had made known
his desire, through the Bishop of Worcester, of found-
ing a college at Oxford: £10,000 was the sum he pro-
posed for an endowment.” There was competition for
the prize. . . . And ‡ “various disputes arising as to
where it should be placed, before it was paid in for this
charitable purpose, the interest and principal amounted
to about £15,000.” Finally (in 1714) it was used to
establish Worcester College, on the foundation of
Gloucester Hall.

Norris dwells on this “generous Bounty to the
public, and truly great, because living, charity,” as a
good reason for prefixing the Baronet’s name to his
work. For it proves him to be “a friend to the interest
of Learning and Religion.” He goes on to commend
“the man who gives before he is summoned to sur-
render, and had a heart to part with the world while
he may possess and enjoy it,” rather than “those slow
Benefactors who give only what they cannot keep,”
. . . or those “who heap up their riches together . . .

* London: S. Manship.

† Clark’s Colleges of Oxford, p. 439.

‡ Nash’s Worcestershire, Vol. I., 443, &c.

for moth and rust, or for the worse corruption of a loose and libertine heir."

Hence he asks leave "to erect this Philosophical monument to the memory of your noble and perpetual bounty, and to inscribe your name to a work which may as much commemorate your goodness as it is likely perhaps to exercise it."

It is possible that the worthy Baronet never read either the work or its dedication, for he died in the same year—1701.*

"By his own directions, he was buried † with a gold chain and locket round his neck, and two diamond rings upon his fingers."

XXIII. 1704. ‡ AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE THEORY OF THE IDEAL OR INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, being the Relative part of it.

Wherein the Intelligible World is considered with relation to the Human Understanding, whereof some account is here attempted and proposed.

PART II.—By John Norris, Rector of Bemerton, near Sarum.

"*Immensum rerum confecimus aequor et jam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla.*"

Dedicated to "The Right Worshipful Sir Thomas Cookes Winford, of Astley, in the County of Worcester, Baronet."

This Baronet was nephew to Sir Thomas Cookes, being the son of his sister Mary (only daughter and heir of Sir William Cookes, of Norgrove, in the same county) and John Winford (of an old Worcestershire family). He died in 1743.

Nothing remarkable is recorded of him; and it would doubtless be mere respect for him, as his uncle's

* 1648-1701.

† "In a chancel built on purpose, adjoining Tardebigg Church, near Bently."—*Nash's Worcestershire*.

‡ London: S. Manship.

heir, that prompted the dedication. Its language accordingly is quite impersonal.

"You are desired, Sir, to sit down at a Philosopher's table, which does not use to be very nicely, or very magnificently, spread, but whose chief furniture is Temperance and Frugality. However, if you can feast upon *Ideas*—which, indeed, is angels' food—perhaps you may not rise altogether empty, unless the celestial diet (which is what I fear) be rendered less acceptable by the undue management of the hand that prepares it," The "Present" is a "mean" one; but its "very poverty" "shews how ambitious he (the author) would be to serve you if he had anything better to offer."

I have met with but two distinct references to Norris's chief work at the time of its appearance.

I. One is that of 'Corinna,' in the letter already mentioned. Here she says, that (1) some, considering the generality of Reason, cannot agree with the view that "Brutes are mere machines." (2) A learned Divine of her acquaintance was pleased to object that your Theory supposed 'Precogitancy in God,' whereas 'God is pure act,' and "to think with the Almighty" is "to act." (3) Others ask whether there may not be such a specific difference in thought that a system of matter, fitly disposed and organized, may be capable of what you call impure thought or imagination.

This last point Norris does not "at present understand," but as to 'Precogitancy in God,' he asserts it earnestly as "a necessary requisite to his operations *ad extra*." The thought by which God acts is thought of 'volition;' but there is another thought in God which 'regulates and conducts; thought, namely, which—implying an 'Ideal view of things'—may fitly be called "Precogitancy."

II. A second reference is that of the 'Rev. Mr. Samuel Bolde, who took up the point which Norris four years before found a difficulty in understanding;

and aimed to show that he "hath not proved that extended substance is utterly incapable of thought."* This Norris had tried to do in the first chap. of the 'Theory,' Vol. II.—Corinna's letter, perhaps, having first set his mind to work upon it.

Samuel Bolde was the Dorsetshire Clergyman, who "had come forward, in 1697, to defend Locke's 'Reasonableness of Christianity,' and who, afterwards, did Locke a similar service in replying to the assailants of the Essay. He was one of Locke's correspondents, and, once at least, paid him a visit at Oates. Bolde's outspokenness and independence of judgment excited Locke's admiration." †

He seems to have held that Created Thinking substance need not be 'immaterial;' that the soul therefore may be material, but that matter in the form of thought, and so the soul, is necessarily immortal. Hence his assault on Norris, who, so far as I know, did not reply.

Samuel Bolde (1649-1737), born, probably, at Chester; brought up by a distinguished Puritan divine of that city, Wm. Cook; was Vicar of Shapwick, Dorsetshire (1674-88); and then Rector of Steeple, in the Isle of Purbeck, till his death. In 1682 he preached a sermon 'against persecution,' for which, and for otherwise favouring Dissenters, he was prosecuted, fined and imprisoned. In 1697-8 he wrote three tracts, defending Locke's views on 'Reasonableness' in Religion; and another in 1698, defending his 'Essay.' These are only a few of his controversial writings. He also wrote some devotional books, which are said to "show the sincerity, humility, and sweetness of his character."

* "Remarks on what Mr. Norris hath said in the first chap. of the Theory of the Ideal World, p. 2, to demonstrate the Immateriality of the Soul." Sep, 7th, 1704. (In the Bodleian). Cp. Locke's Essay, Book iv., cap. 3, § 6.

† Fowler's 'Life of Locke,' p. 118.

XXIV. 1708. A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul, wherein the great question of the Soul's Immortality is endeavoured to be rightly stated and fully cleared, occasioned by Mr. Dodwell's late Epistolary Discourse,—London, 1708.

Qui bene distinguit bene docet.

(The fourth edition, printed for Edmund Parker, at the Bible and Crown, in Lombard Street, appeared in 1722).

Henry Dodwell (1641-1711)—the non-juror of whom William III. said "He has set his heart on being a martyr, and I have set mine on disappointing him"—was Camdenian Professor in the University of Oxford. He was a most learned man, but, according to Macaulay, he had read so many books in various languages that . . . "the small intellectual spark which he possessed was put out by the fuel." He wrote treatises to prove that "the law of nations was a divine revelation made to the family which was preserved in the ark;" that a member of the church of England and a Dissenter who married each other were guilty of adultery; that instrumental music was allowable in public worship, because "the notes of the organ had a power to counteract the influence of devils on the spinal marrow." His 'doctrine of the soul' deny'd immortality to any who had not been baptized, and declared that baptism, to be efficacious must be 'by a minister who had been ordained by a bishop.' The Dissenters, however—having been offered the virtues of "Episcopalian baptism and refused the same—would be made immortal after death only that they might be tormented for ever and ever." *

The exact title of his work—on which he says he had bestowed great care—is "An Epistolary Discourse proving from the Scriptures and first fathers that the Soul is a principle naturally mortal, *but* immortalized

* Macaulay's History of England. Chapters 12 and 14.

actually by the pleasure of God, to punish or reward by its union with the Divine Baptismal spirit ; wherein is proved that none have the power of giving this immortalizing spirit since the Apostles, but only the Bishops." London, 1706.

Norris did not take up the matter till controversy upon it had been waging for some time, and when he did*—"yet I concern myself no further in the controversy between him and his adversaries than only as to the Natural Immortality of the soul ; and that, too, no further than (for the better accomodation of it) to endeavour to exhibit a right state of the question, that being what I apprehend most likely to be wanting both upon the subject itself, and in the late debates that have been concerning it, by what I have seen of them."

Norris's main point is that Dodwell† "affirms absolutely, that which is true only in one determinate sense" . . By this he means that Dodwell would have "Reason and Authority with him," if he affirmed that "the soul is indeed naturally mortal as to Being." In other words, the soul does not contain *within* itself, apart from the will of God, a principle of unending life. But still, God in creating the soul may have imparted to it such a principle, and may have intended it to be inalienable. And this, so Norris seems to maintain, was the fact.

He divided his treatise into two parts :—

1. Wherein the Distinction of the Natural and the Positive Immortality of the soul is considered.

2. Wherein is considered how, and in what sense, this distinction is applicable to the soul.

‡ "Mr. Dodwell returned an answer to this piece in the appendix to his book, entitled 'The Natural immortality of the Human soul clearly demonstrated

* To the Reader.

† "Like St. Ambrose de Fide ; Lib. 3. cap. 2."

‡ Chalmer's Dictionary.

from the Holy Scriptures, and concurrent Testimonies of the Primitive writers': 1708."

Hereupon Norris replied in a "Letter to Mr. Dodwell" "being a further pursuance of the philosophical Discourse"—and afterwards bound up with it, forming more than half the volume.

It seems to do little more than develop positions already laid down in the Discourse.*

XXV. 1707.† A PRACTICAL TREATISE concerning Humility—designed for the furtherance and improvement of that great Christian virtue—both in the minds and lives of men.

There is no dedication—considering the subject is the omission significant?

The address to the Reader says that "the great, and at this time but too seasonable importance of this subject, and the exceeding little that has been professedly written upon it, make it very necessary to be considered." He "could wish that one of greater intellectual abilities, and more health and leisure, had undertaken the work." But "if not a good book, it is on a good subject" and "may Almighty God (to whom I humbly offer this labour of mine for the good of his Church) accompany it with his grace and blessing to the Spiritual advantage and edification of all Christian people, and to the glory of his great name."

CONTENTS :—

Chap. I. An Account of the nature of humility, showing what we are properly to understand by it.

Chap. II. Of the immediate foundation of humility, the knowledge of ourselves.

Chap. III. The reasonableness of humility, wherein the particular reasons why we should be humble are considered.

Chap. IV. Of the excellency of Humility.

Chap. V. The necessity of Humility considered.

* 'Discourse' has 125 pp. 8vo. 'Letter' has 152 pp. 8vo.

† London, S. Manship. 6th edition, 1730, London, Edmund Parker.

Chap. VI. Of the particular duty and effects of humility, with some remarks upon the signs of it.

Chap. VII. The sinfulness, odiousness, and folly of pride, with some reflections upon the pride of the present age.

Chap. VIII. Wherein some of the principal remedies against pride, or means for the better attainment of humility, are considered.

Chap. IX. A Devotional meditation upon the several degrees of the divine humiliation in the Person of Jesus Christ.

Chap. X. A concluding exhortation to the study and practice of true Christian humility.

XXVI. 1710.* "A TREATISE CONCERNING CHRISTIAN PRUDENCE; or, the Principles of Practical Wisdom, fitted to the use of Human Life, and designed for the better regulation of it."

(7th edition, 1722. London: Edmund Parker.)

The dedicatory letter is to the Reverend Dr. Younger, Dean of Salisbury. It begins—

Sir, that I chuse to address these, my considerations upon this great and noble subject to *you*, is not that I think you need instruction upon it, or myself capable of giving it if you did; but to express the Respect which I think due to a good and every way worthy man, and to whom I owe a particular reverence for his station in that Church to which I am so near a neighbour."

It closes with "Heartly Prayers to Almighty God that He would long bless you with life and health, to be serviceable to His Church in these difficult times by your great wisdom and prudence, whereof there is to be seen in you a living treatise, and such as may serve to supply the defects of that which is here, with all dutiful submission, offered you by,

Reverend Sir,

Your very humble Servant,

* London;—S. Mauship.

"John Younger (Dean from Sept. 18, 1705 to 1728). He was a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxon., and held the living of Bishopston, near Salisbury, in 1688. He was chaplain to Princess Anne on her marriage to Prince George of Denmark; Prebendary of Woodford, 1680; Prebendary of Canterbury, 1685-91; and became a Canon Residentiary of St. Paul's in 1693, holding the latter dignity together with the Deanery. He died February 27th, 1728, at his home in Amen Corner, Newcourt."* His immediate predecessor, it may be mentioned, was Edward Young, the father of the author of 'Night Thoughts.'

Norris, in his preface, makes "no apology" for his treatise, thinking the subject to be of as "great importance as any in all Christian morality." He has undertaken it in pursuance of his conviction that nothing is more needed than a complete exposition and enforcement of the Christian virtues. "The first link of this Golden Chain I have attempted to finish in my treatise of Humility, and I could wish that some other more able hand would go on with the rest, it being for one of my little health, and less abilities, too great an undertaking." Next to humility he puts prudence, because this "sits at the helm, governs all the rest, conducts the whole movement of Life, is a kind of universal virtue." He concludes with the remark—"We have had so many idle and frothy trifles (to say no worse) of late from the press, 'tis time for something more serious and solid to appear." Norris was 'serious and solid' to the end; and could never feel much respect for 'his age,' because it had no mind to be either the one or the other.

CONTENTS :—

Chapter I. Of the importance of Prudence.

§ 1. Of the necessity of Prudence to a Virtuous and Christian Life.

* This is a correct extract from the Fasti of Salisbury Cathedral, very kindly furnished me by the present Dean (Dr. G. D. Boyle). The following entry, by Anthony à Wood in his Diary, suggests that Norris may have known Younger at Oxford :—"1681, July 10, Sunday, Dr. John Younger, an inceptor of Magdalen, preached."

§ 2. Of the power and sufficiency of prudence to a virtuous life.

Chap. II. "Being an enquiry into the nature of prudence, shewing what prudence and particularly Christian Prudence, is ; and how it differs from some other things, which carry a resemblance to it, such as wit, policy, &c., with a remark that prudence cannot consist with fatality.

Chap. III. "Wherein the acts or offices of prudence, and particularly Christian Prudence, are considered. And first of its general offices, and that with respect to both end and means.

Chap. IV. "Of the particular act or offices of Christian Prudence, with respect to both end and means ; which means are shewn to be God's commandments, and consequently that 'tis our wisdom to keep them.

Chap. V. "Wherein is considered how far Christian Prudence is concerned in the order and manner of keeping God's commandments, and particularly of the imprudence of a half religion and of the wisdom of Repentance.

Chap. VI. Of the subordinate means that serve to assist us in the keeping the commandments of God, as they fall under the consideration, use and application, of Christian Prudence.

Chap. VII. Some practical observations upon the conduct of a prudent Christian in the government of himself.

§ 1. How a prudent Christian orders himself in the government of his senses.

§ 2. How . . . of his understanding.

§ 3. How . . . of his will and affections or passions.

§ 4. How . . . of his conscience.

§ 5. How . . . in the choice of his Religion.

§ 6. How . . . with respect to this world.

Chap. VIII. Containing a Persuasive to the study of true Christian wisdom, with some prudential advice to the practice of it.

At the end is a 'Prayer for wisdom,' some of whose words may be quoted as pointing to the spirit of his whole life, and bringing it to a noble close:—

"Grant me that wisdom which is unto Salvation, and whatever follies and indiscretions I am guilty of as to this world, make me so wise and prudent as not to mismanage my grand affair, my one thing necessary."

There is a pamphlet entitled: "Advice for rich and poor"—a dialogue about South Carolina, written to induce emigration, which is entered under Norris's name in the 'Bodleian' catalogue, and has his name (written) on one of the opening leaves; but the poor style and the preface—which promises to answer all enquiries addressed to the author, by (prepaid) letters, "at the Post Office, Charlestown"—is conclusive against his authorship.



